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Abstract
Hydrogen fuel cells have the potential to dramatically reduce emissions from the energy sector,
particularly when integrated into an automotive application. However, there are three main
hurdles to the commercialisation of this promising technology; one of which is reliability. Cur-
rent standards require an automotive fuel cell to last around 5000 h of operation (equivalent
to around 150,000 miles), which has proven difficult to achieve to date. This hurdle can be
overcome through in-depth reliability analysis including techniques such as Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Petri-net simulation. This research
has found that the reliability field regarding hydrogen fuel cells is still in its infancy, and needs
development, if the current standards are to be achieved. In this research, a detailed reliability
study of a Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) is undertaken. The results of
which are a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a PEMFC. The FMEA and FTA are the
most up to date assessments of failure in fuel cells developed using a comprehensive literature
review and expert opinion.
Advanced modelling of fuel cell degradation logic was developed using Petri-net modelling
techniques. 20 failure modules were identified that represented the interactions of all failure
modes and operational parameters in a PEMFC. Petri-net simulation was used to overcome key
pitfalls observed in FTA to provide a verified degradation model of a PEMFC in an automotive
application, undergoing a specific drive cycle, however any drive cycle can be input to this
model. Overall results show that the modelled fuel cell’s lifetime would reach 34 hours before
falling below the industry standard degradation rate of more than 5%. The degradation model
has the capability to simulate fuel cell degradation under any drive cycle and with any operating
parameters.
A fuel cell test rig was also developed that was used to verify the simulated degradation.
The rig is capable of testing single cells or stacks from 0-470W power. The results from the
verification experimentation agreed strongly with the degradation model, giving confidence in
the accuracy of the developed Petri-net degradation model.
This research contributes greatly to the field of reliability of PEMFCs through the most
up-to-date and comprehensive FMEA and FTA presented. Additionally, a degradation model
based upon Petri-nets is the first degradation model to encompass a 1D performance model to
predict fuel cell life time under specific drive cycles.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Climate change issues and sustainability concerns have increased in interest and awareness in
recent years, since anthropogenic activities have been found to impact considerably upon the
environment [1]. The way in which manmade activities contribute to climate change is mainly
due to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. These include, among others, carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) that contribute to the greenhouse effect. Additionally,
energy prices are set to continue to rise by alarming rates [2] which will disrupt the UKs energy
system due to a rise in oil prices. As a consequence of that, there will be an increase in the
volatility in the politics of security of energy. Currently Europe has an 80% dependence on oil
that is from outside the EU [3], which could increase tensions with oil producing countries in
the future.
A report by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) showed an increase in
the price of oil over the next 15 years [4]. The estimated increase in oil prices is directly linked
to the fact that it is now estimated that the worlds oil reserves are running out at a rapid rate;
oil reserves are projected to only last 40-50 years with current technology and
usage. Transport is already responsible for almost 70% of the European
Unions (EUs) oil use and this share continues to increase [5].
Figure 1.1: US oil production figures [6].
This can be alluded to when observing the total US output of oil; Figure 1.1 shows the total
United States (US) production of oil in Giga-barrels, and shows a clear peak in the production,
and thus a decline in output over the past few decades. This can be considered to be an
indication of the lack of abundance of this fossil fuel.
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The United Kingdom (UK) emitted 549.3 Million tonnes of Carbon Dioxide equivelant
(MtCO2e) in 2011 [7] and 122.2 MtCO2e was due to the transport industry, with 74% of
this figure due to cars, taxis and busses [8]. Due to the aforementioned negative environmental
impacts of emissions from fossil fuel energy sources, this figure needs to be dramatically reduced
not only to meet government targets, but for the health of the biosphere.
The UK government set out targets to reduce GHG emissions in the Climate Change Act of
2008. The act presents the targets of an 80% reduction of greenhouse gas levels by 2050, with
a closer target of a 34% reduction by 2020. These two targets are based upon the level of GHG
emissions in 1990 [9]. The targets are legally bound and therefore need to be met, thus many
initiatives and research have emerged to aid the UK in reaching these targets.
There are some technologies that can be used as alternatives to the fossil fuel dependent
transport industry and alleviate our negative impact upon the environment. Battery Electric
Vehicles (BEVs) have increased in popularity in recent times due to their potential to be zero
emission vehicles at the point of use, and if charged with a renewable energy source could
reduce transport emissions drastically. However, their popularity is somewhat limited due to
their small ranges when compared to Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, and long
recharging time requirements[10]. These negative attributes have affected their uptake with the
general public customer base, and stinted their growth and commercialization.
Figure 1.2: Range Comparison of BEV & Fuel Cell Vehicles [11].
Charge times for BEVs are notoriously timely and it is common for current commercial
BEVs to take up to 8 hours to fully charge from a zero state of charge. This issue is not present
for the current ICE owner, who can fully restock the vehicles energy reserves in a couple of
minutes. The charge and range issues combined are one of the major hurdles to the uptake of
BEVs. If one has a BEV that has a range of 150 miles from a full charge, but a journey is 300
miles, it would require an 8 hour charge at the halfway point. Therefore it is apparent that
a low-zero emissions vehicle is required that has the same range as the ICE, but without the
emissions and oil dependency.
Figure 1.2 shows a comparison of total range for vehicles propelled by different types of
batteries, and a Fuel Cell (FC). The FC range is only limited by the amount of hydrogen (H2)
the vehicle can store.
FCs negate the above issues as they are an electro-chemical, zero-emission energy conversion
and power generation device. Their only exhaust emission is water that is so pure, it was used
3
by the Apollo astronauts as drinking water on their lunar missions [12]. They can be re-fuelled
in a similar time to conventional ICE vehicles, and can operate to a similar range. These positive
attributes have put FCs in the limelight as an attractive alternative to the fossil fuel dependant
ICE.
Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) could mitigate the negative attributes of the BEV, as
they have comparable ranges to ICE vehicles, and are re-fuelled in a similar time too. Figure 1.2
shows how BEVs suffer from range issues when compared to a FCEV system. If a BEV system
was required to meet the range of a standard FCEV system, it would have many banks of Li-ion
batteries which are massive, and as such, would vastly increase the weight of the vehicle. So
much so that it would not be feasible to create a vehicle of that size and mass. With every
additional kg of weight added by the extra battery capacity would require larger brakes, body
structure and electric power to handle the mass of the vehicle.
1.1 Types of FC
There are five main types of FC that have been developed over the years, these are; Polymer
Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Alkaline Fuel Cell (AFC),Phosphoric Acid Fuel
Cell (PAFC), Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell (MCFC) and the Solid Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC).
The main way in which they are segregated is by their constituent materials for the electrolyte
based upon the operating temperature. PEMFC, AFC and PAFC have relatively low operating
temperatures (<200◦C), and can thus utilise aqueous or thin polymer electrolytes, whereas
MCFC and SOFC operate at temperatures from 600◦C and 1000◦C respectively, and thus
cannot use aqueous electrolytes due to vapour pressure [13]. Table 1.1 taken from [13] shows
the different types of FC, listing their component materials and operating temperature.
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Table 1.1: FC Classification [13].
. PEMFC AFC PAFC MCFC SOFC
Electrolyte Hydrated
Polymeric
Ion Ex-
change
Membranes
Mobilized or
Immobilized
Potassium
Hydroxide
in asbestos
matrix
Immobilized
Liquid Phos-
phoric Acid
in SiC
Immobilized
Liquid
Molten Car-
bonate in
LiAlO2
Perovskites
Electrodes Carbon Transition
metals
Carbon Nickel and
Nickel Oxide
Perovskite
and per-
ovskite /
metal cermet
Catalyst Platinum Platinum Platinum Electrode
material
Electrode
material
Interconnect Carbon or
metal
Metal Graphite Stainless
steel or
Nickel
Nickel, ce-
ramic, or
steel
Operating
Temperature
40-80◦C 65-220◦C 205◦C 650◦C 600-1000◦C
Charge Car-
rier
H+ OH– H+ CO3− O−
External
Reformer
for Hy-
drocarbon
Fuels
Yes Yes Yes No, for some
fuels
No, for some
fuels and cell
designs
External
shift Conver-
sion of CO
to Hydrogen
Yes, plus pu-
rification to
remove trace
CO
Yes, plus
purification
to remove
CO and CO2
Yes No No
Prime Cell
Components
Carbon-
based
Carbon-
based
Graphite-
based
Stainless-
based
Ceramic
Product Wa-
ter Manage-
ment
Evaporative Evaporative Evaporative Gaseous
Product
Gaseous
Prodcut
Product
Heat Man-
agement
Process Gas
+ Liquid
Cooling
Medium
Process
Gas +
Electrolyte
Circulation
Process Gas
+ Liquid
Cooling
Internal
Reforming +
Process Gas
Internal Re-
forming and
Process Gas
The charge carriers from left to right are: hydrogen protons, hydroxides, hydrogen protons,
carbonates, and oxygen.
MCFC and SOFC are more generally used for static power supply and Combined Heat and
Power (CHP) stations for buildings. This is mainly due to their high operating temperatures
ability to be harnessed for the heating of the building, increasing overall efficiency. They have the
ability to use natural gas as the fuel with on-board reformers to create a hydrogen feed. They do
this using their high operating temperatures to steam reform natural gas into hydrogen. PAFC
are mainly used in medium scale CHP applications as they have a relatively high operating
temperature that can produce enough warm water for medium scale applications. AFC have
become less popular in recent years, and PEMFC have taken over in popularity for small scale
and transport applications. Mainly due to the PEMFC having a higher power density, operating
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at lower temperatures, and having a solid electrolyte rather than a liquid.
Out of the many classifications of FC, the PEMFC is commonly singled out as the most
appropriate to be implemented into an automotive application. This is due to its relatively low
operating temperature of around 50-80◦C, its ability to use air as the cathode reactant and its
rapid start-up time. Due to this, the PEMFC will be the main focus of this thesis.
1.2 Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell
The first practical demonstration of a hydrogen FC was by lawyer and amateur scientist Sir
William Grove in 1839. He understood that through electrolysis, an electrical current can be
passed through water (H2O) to break it down into its constituent H2 and oxygen (O2) molecules.
From this he believed that the reverse of the electrolysis should be possible, and set up an
experiment with platinum (Pt) electrodes in two separate bottles containing H2 and O2. When
he submersed the bottles into dilute sulphuric acid, he observed that the gases were consumed
and an electrical current was produced when the gasses recombined to form H2O.
A FC is an electro-chemical energy generation device that directly uses H2 and O2 to create
electrical and heat energy. The only by-product of the reaction is water.
The overall reaction that takes place in a PEMFC is shown in Equation 1.1.
H2(gas) +
1
2 O2(gas) −−→ H2O(liquid) + heat + electricity (1.1)
At the anode side (the negative electrode), H2 is passed over the catalyst layer of Platinum
(Pt) nanoparticles which breaks the H2 molecule down into protons 2 H
+ and electrons 2 e–,
establishing an oxidation reaction. The electrons travel through the anode and to an external
circuit to create the electrical current that can be used for work, such as to spin a motor, as
given by Equation 1.2.
At the cathode side (the positive electrode), O2 is passed over the Pt catalyst layer which
breaks the O2 down into two oxygen atoms with negative charge, establishing a reduction
reaction. The negative charge pulls the hydrogen protons through the electrolyte membrane to
meet the electrons and oxygen atoms at the cathode side to form water, and completing the
reaction shown in Equation 1.3.
The two half-cell reactions together complete the overall redox reaction of the FC (Equations
1.2 & 1.3).
H2 −−→ 2 H+ + 2 e− oxidation reaction (1.2)
1
2 O2 + 2 e
− + 2 H+ −−→ H2O reduction reaction (1.3)
Figure 1.3 graphically depicts the main components and passage of protons in a basic
PEMFC.
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Figure 1.3: PEMFC Drawing.
The membrane at the core of a Hydrogen Fuel Cell (HFC) is made of Polytetrafluoroethylene
(PTFE) commonly known as Teflon®, which can be found as a non-stick coating applied to
frying pans. The PTFE core is hydrophobic which means that it repels water, and this aids
with the removal of excess water during the reaction. The core material is modified to have
side chains ending with sulphonic acid (HSO3) which is hydrophilic, meaning that it attracts
water. The combination of a hydrophobic and hydrophilic material means that the material can
remain hydrated but expel excess water. The ability to do this is fundamental to the transport
of the H+ protons through the electrolyte membrane. The protons achieve this by bonding to
a H2O molecule in the hydrated membrane forming a hydronium ion H3O
+, this way they can
piggyback across the membrane to meet the electron at the other end (shown in Equation 1.4).
H+ + H2O −−→ H3O+ (1.4)
The resulting voltage created by the redox reaction, at Standard Temperature and Pressure
(STP) (25◦C / 1 bar) is 1.23 volts. The voltage produced during the reaction is often displayed
in the form of a polarisation curve, or I-V curve. To create a usable amount of energy, cells
are arranged in large stacks separated by Bipolar Plates (BIPs) that feed gas to each cell and
conduct the electricity in series along the stack to the end plates. This modular design allows
the possible power output to be as high as practicably desired.
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1.3 Polarisation Curve
Figure 1.4 presents the standard polarisation curve which is used throughout FC science. It
indicates the evolution of the PEMFC voltage in relation to the applied current, and the losses
associated with certain FC phenomenon. It is used throughout FC research as a tool to ascertain
FC performance and health over the range of operating current. Any reduction in the gradient
of the curve will signify a phenomena that is causing performance losses to either of the three
loss regions in the system.
Figure 1.4: Standard Polarisation Curve [14].
V eq(th) shown by the dotted line at the top of the graph is the FC’s theoretical maxi-
mum potential, this is commonly known as 1.23V. The theoretical maximum potential can be
calculated using Equation, 1.5.
V eq(th) =
−4 gf¯
2F
(1.5)
Where V eq(th) is the reversible voltage of the cell at standard temperature and pressure,
−4 gf¯ is the change in Gibbs free energy of formation per mole, and F is Faradays constant
of 96485 · 3 Cmol−1. Therefore when using H2 and O2 at standard temperature and pressure,
the equation yields 1.23 V.
Veq(OCV ) (from Figure 1.4) is the measured Open Circuit Voltage (OCV) and is lower
than the theoretical maximum potential due to reactants crossover through the membrane
(thus not being reacted in the cell) and mixed potential losses. These are inevitable losses,
and are expected when manufacturing and operating hydrogen FCs. Therefore, in practice, one
would expect to see an OCV of around 1V.
The x axis shows the current density for the cell, and often reaches up to around 2 A/cm2
in commercial FCs.
The initial dip in the I-V curve that can be observed in section I of Figure 1.4 shows
the activation losses in a FC system. These are attributable to the overall slowness of the
reactions taking part at the electrodes, more specifically the cathode O2 reduction reaction. The
O2 reduction reaction at the cathode is in orders of magnitude slower than the H2 oxidation
reaction at the anode, thus the disparity of rate of reaction culminates in an initial decay in
the polarisation curve at low current densities [15].
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The linear drop in cell voltage that can be seen in the centre portion of the graph is at-
tributable to ohmic losses in the cell. Ohmic losses are resistive losses in the system and can be
either from the external electrical circuit, or the PEM itself. Therefore the total ohmic losses
can be calculated from the resistance of the entire system to the flow of protons and electrons.
The exponential decay observable at higher current densities is due to the concentration
losses. This is where the gas supply from the inlet feed is not fast enough to diffuse through the
gas supply channels to the active reaction sites, and can also be termed mass transport losses.
1.4 Current Uses and Applications of PEMFC
PEMFCs initial breakthrough came by the hands of General Electric in the 60s, when they
developed PEMFCs for the US Navy and Army. Fascinated by the results of the FCs, NASA
obtained a number of PEMFCs for the Gemini space project, and successfully used pairs of
1kW PEMFCs to power the Gemini 6-12 expeditions [12].
Since their breakthrough, they have been adapted to be used in many applications from
small mobile energy generators, to large-scale CHP stations. In between the two extremes,
PEMFCs have been known to power cars, buses and even light aircraft.
The automotive industry is starting to see the potential with this technology, and as such,
PEMFCs are used exclusively in the latest commercially available FCEVs such as the Toyota
Murai and Hyundai ix35. Manufacturers such as Audi, Mercedes-Benz and Honda have also
alluded towards the introduction of production FCEVs in the near future. However, there are
issues with this promising technology in the form of: cost, infrastructure and reliability.
Cost - The majority of PEMFC vehicles are limited run research projects and as such, the
economy of scale cannot reduce the price. Additionally PEMFCs use Pt nanoparticles as the
reaction catalyst, which is an inherently expensive material.
Infrastructure - There are currently limited H2 fuelling stations to cater for this technology,
with the majority being within university campuses or company grounds.
Reliability - PEMFCs are required to meet specific lifetime goals, and currently they
struggle to reach these goals due to unforeseen degradation of the membrane, Catalyst Layer
(CL), Gas Diffusion Layer (GDL) and BIP components, all of which contribute towards a
reduction of FC performance.
1.5 FC degradation and reliability
There are a range of targets for different FC applications, with the main two being set for
stationary and automotive applications respectively.
The US Department of Energy (DoE), Japanese New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development Organisation (NEDO) and European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Plat-
form (HFP) Implementation Panel (IP) have all set reliability targets for PEMFCs in automo-
tive application of a lifetime of more than 5000 hours of operation (equivalent to around 150,000
miles operation) [16]. The current state of FC development struggles to meet these targets, and
as such, an in-depth reliability analysis of PEMFCs is invaluable to help manufacturers and
developers. Such an analysis requires obtaining a detailed understanding of the failure modes
of all the different parts of the cell, and the effects the failures have on the cell as a whole. The
target set for stationary applications is set at a minimum lifetime of 40,000 hours of operation.
Currently, the understanding of the reliability of PEMFCs is still in its infancy, and requires
further development to help with the commercialisation of this promising technology.
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1.6 FC Modelling
Due to the high costs involved in purchasing PEMFCs, it is wise to model the behaviour of the
cells to elucidate key performance characteristics. The majority of PEMFC modelling in the
literature is empirical in nature, that is to say that the models utilise experimental parameters
that were observed, rather than relying on theory [17].
The modelling of HFCs has progressed rapidly in the past decade, from relatively simple
one dimensional models, to highly complex three dimensional models. One of the initial and
better known one dimension models comes from Springer et. al [18]. The authors initiated the
HFC model movement with more and more complex models being developed to try to replicate
observable polarization curves based upon input parameters.
1.6.1 Model Classification
Mathematical modelling of PEMFCs can broadly be classified into two main types; Empirical
Performance models and Mechanistic models[19]. Empirical models are sometimes further bro-
ken down into two sub-types; Analytical models, and semi-empirical models[20].
Analytical models are very simple and are often only used for quick calculations regarding
analytical voltage versus current density curves. They classify the operation of a FC utilising
short equations to represent the reversible voltage and any losses in the system. They are lim-
ited due to their inherent simplicity, therefore more complex calculations require more intricate
models.
Semi-Empirical models combine equations derived from theory with empirical relation-
ships.
Mechanistic modelling uses terms derived from theory and not from experimental results
as with empirical modelling.
1.6.2 0D Models
0D models are the most basic method of computing the voltage output of a cell. It is usually
computed using Equation 1.6 and is seldom used in modern FC research as there is little to
learn from the results, however it is a good way to reduce computational loads when using
simulation methods such as Monte-Carlo simulations with many iterations.
The Nernst equation can be calculated from the following.
Enernst =
∆G
2F
+
∆S
2F
(T − Tref ) + RT
2F
[ln(PH2) + 1/2ln(PO2)] (1.6)
Where ∆G is the change in Gibbs free energy; F is Farady’s constant; ∆S is the change in
entropy; R is the universal gas constant; and PH2 and PO2 are partial pressures for H2 and O2
respectively. T is the temperature of the cell, whereas Tref is the reference temperature for the
cell. Solving this equation using STP values, the following is found.
Enernst = 1.229− 0.85x10−3(T − 298.15) + 4.31x10−5T [ln(PH2) + 1/2ln(PO2)] (1.7)
A simple plot of a polarisation curve can be obtained using the Nernst potential calculation
in Equations 1.6 and 1.7 and the five main loss pathways in a FC, as in Equation 1.8.
V cell = Enernst + ηact,a + ηact,c + ηfc + ηohmic + ηconcentration (1.8)
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Where Enernst is the Nernst equation, ηact,a and ηact,c are the activation losses at respective
electrodes, ηfc is the overvoltage due to fuel crossover, ηohmic is the loss due to electrode, connec-
tions and polymer proton resistance, and ηconcentration relates to the losses due to concentration
of fuel.
A simple polarisation curve can be easily replicated through a simplified 0D model as in
Equation 1.9, also known as the Tafel equation.
E = Enernst − i r −A ln(i) +mexp(ni) (1.9)
Where E is equal to the cell voltage, Enernst is the Nernst voltage, A represents the Tafel
slope, i shows the current density, r is the area specific resistance, and m & n are constants
regarding the mass-transfer overvoltage. Plotting this simple relationship gives us the familiar
polarisation curve used in FC science (See Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.5: Polarisation curve for typical, low temperature, air pressure, FC.
The x axis here is represented in mA/cm−2 rather than A/cm2 in Figure 1.4 as the current
density itself doesn’t reach more than 1 A/cm2, therefore it was rescaled to show the detail of
the polarisation curve.
The loss mechanisms are noted in the literature, Mann et al.[21] present the the activa-
tion, ohmic and concentration losses expressed as shown in Equation 1.10, Equation 1.11 and
Equation 1.12.
ηact,a = −4Gec
2F
+
RT
2F
ln(4FAk0
a
c ∗
H2
)− RT
2F
lni (1.10)
Where 4Gec is the standard-state free energy of activation for chemisorption (J/mol), is
Faradays constant, A is the active cell area (cm2), c ∗
H2
is the liquid-phase concentration of
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hydrogen (mol/cm3), k0
a
is the intrinsic rate constant for anode reaction (cm/s), R is the gas
constant (J/mol K), and i is the current (amps).
ηact,c =
RT
αcFn
(
ln
[
nFAko
c
exp
(
− 4Ge
RT
)
× (c ∗
O2
)(1−αc)(c ∗
H+
)(1−αc)(c ∗
H2O
)αc
]
− lni) (1.11)
ηohmic = ηelectronic
ohmic
+ ηproton
ohmic
+−i(Relectronic +Rproton) = −iRinternal (1.12)
Where Rproton corresponds to;
Rproton =
rM l
A
(1.13)
Where rM is the membranes specific resistivity to the flow of hydrated protons (ohm.cm),
and l is the thickness of the membrane in (cm), which has the function of the cell electrolyte.
Adequate hydration of the membrane in a PEMFC is of paramount importance. As discussed
in section 1.2, the H2 protons travel through the membrane due to a piggy back method with
H2O molecules, creating H3O
+ ions. If the water levels in the membrane decrease, the resistance
to proton migration increases.
The voltage losses due to mass transportation/concentration loss are taken from Larminie
and Dicks[22]; shown in Equation 1.14.
4 Vconcentration = −Bln(1− i
i1
) (1.14)
Where B is a constant that depends on the cell and the operating conditions, i1 is a limiting
current density (mA cm-2) where the fuel is used up equal to its supply rate, and i is the
operating current density. As the PEMFC system is designed to be operated in the mid-range
of the polarisation curve, it is seldom the case where concentration losses are observed in a
healthily operating PEMFC system.
1.6.3 Further dimensional models
Other than the basic 0D models, more in-depth and complex modelling can be undertaken to
ascertain FC performance.
1D models
1D models are a description of the phenomena taking place on a 1D plane, through the mem-
brane from anode to cathode. This latitudinally dimensional model approach is based upon flux
balance, and models the exact amount of species moving in and out of the FC.
2D models
2D models go a step further and look at the phenomena taking place on two planes through
the cell, both latitudinally and longitudinally. They also often include more detailed equations
relating to heat transfer and the mass of reactants, amongst others.
Modelling Verification
The modelling of FC performance can help with reliability and degradation analysis of FCs,
however experimentation can further solidify any results obtained through modelling. The mod-
elling of the FC’s performance is valuable to reliability as it can map changes in performance
of the FC through the modification of key variables that the model uses to plot performance.
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Verification of the FC model should be undertaken to show how the theoretical performance of
a specified cell compares to the real world example. Once a verified FC model has been created,
modifying this model with degradation due to failure modes can be done.
Verification is done by undertaking experimentation at certain operating conditions, taking
into account temperatures of ambient atmosphere and gas feeds etc. Completing a polarisation
curve to ascertain the performance of the cell. Then comparing the data from the experimenta-
tion to the same conditions used in the FC model. For instance, if a gas feed temperature was
at STP, then the model would use the same STP rates for its inputs. The comparison of the
modelled FC performance and the experimental data should agree, which would show a model
that emulates what is seen in the real world and therefore accurate.
1.7 Thesis Aims & Objectives
Currently there are three main hurdles to the commercialisation of PEMFCs and their com-
petition with the ICE, these are; infrastructure, cost and durability[23]. The aim of this work
is to research into the reliability issues concerning PEMFC for transport applications, culmi-
nating in an affective model to predict the lifetime and degradation of a FC in an automotive
environment.
The main aim of the thesis will be satisfied using the following objectives:
1. Understand current PEMFC degradation phenomena and modelling methods.
2. Gain a greater understanding of PEMFC reliability studies currently in the literature.
3. Based upon the literature review;
i Assemble a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)/Failure Mode, Effect and Crit-
icality Analysis (FMECA) regarding a single cell PEMFC system.
ii Create a Fault Tree (FT) for a single cell PEMFC system .
4. Analyse the FT to understand the interactions of the various failure modes in a PEMFC
system.
5. Use advanced techniques, such as Petri-Net analysis, to generate a quantitative model for
PEMFC degradation.
6. Validate the model with experimental results where appropriate.
The integration of these objectives is shown in Figure 1.6.
1.8 Layout of Remaining Thesis
The remaining chapters of the thesis are listed below.
Chapter 2 - Durability & Reliability - Literature Review
A review of the current literature regarding the durability and reliability of PEMFCs is pre-
sented. Different techniques that have been used by numerous authors are discussed.
Chapter 3 - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
This chapter details the work undertaken in construction an FMEA that represents all of the
failure modes that an automotive FC system could experience.
Chapter 4 - Enhancing the Existing Reliability Modelling
An in-depth analysis of the most recent, and most advanced reliability analysis found in the
literature is presented. Key errors found in the work from the literature are scrutinised and a
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Undertake Fault Tree 
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Complete Petri-Net 
Simulation
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Fuel Cell Technology
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Figure 1.6: Integration of Objectives.
re-evaluation is presented to improve the work.
Chapter 5 - Proposed Petri-Net Analysis
The model of choice is then presented given the determined model complexities. Showing the
way in which Petri-Net modelling techniques can be used to model FC degradation.
Chapter 6 - FC Model Integration and Validation
The use of a zero dimensional fuel model is explained, alongside some experimental validation
of the model. The use of degradation observation techniques such as polarisation curve and
Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy (EIS) techniques are also explained.
Chapter 7 - Results
The resulting data from the degradation modelling is presented in this chapter. Different as-
pects of the models’ outputs are discussed and analysed.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Future Work
The final chapter looks at what can be ascertained from the work, and where the work could
go in the future.
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Chapter 2
Durability & Reliability -
Literature Review
PEMFCs in an automotive application are required to perform under dynamic loads, freeze
thaw conditions and around 30,000 start-up/shutdown cycles for 5,000 hours to be competitive
with current ICEs [24]. State of the art PEMFC system lifetimes are not satisfactory to date due
to decay in performance and ultimately catastrophic failure of the FC [25]. Thus it is paramount
that the reliability issues are understood and mitigated against to aid in the commercialisation
of this promising technology. PEMFC degradation can be measured by the drop in output
power over time and is noted as µV h−1.
2.1 Understanding FC Failures
A premature failure for this case would entail degradation of more than 5% or a lifetime of
less than 5000 hours of operation as per the previously identified standards. To try to mitigate
premature failures in a PEMFC system, one must first fully understand the contributing factors
that might lead to the failure. Two techniques to aid in the achievement of this are FMEA and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). These techniques can be used to broaden the knowledge of possible
failures that can occur in a HFC system, with the view to predict and reduce the occurrence
of the issues.
2.1.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a systematic procedure to evaluate the potential failures that can occur in a system.
FMEA works in a bottom up fashion where all potential failure modes that could cause the
system to fail are listed to give a better idea of the systems potential failures. FMEA also
analyses the effect that the failure modes might have on the system (effect analysis). FMEA of
systems are common ground and required in many industries, and government agencies such
as the Air Force and Navy [26]. FMEA is often undertaken at the earliest stage possible, as to
pre-empt potential difficulties in the system once in operation. However, they are also used to
gain a greater understanding of a system that is yet to be built and still in its design stage.
FMEA techniques can be approached with two main methods of analysis of a system; Func-
tional, and Hardware. Functional FMEAs are coarse system breakdowns, where sub-systems
are chosen to be analysed that provide some function to the overall system in question. This
method is the more basic option, and gives the analyst an idea of how certain sub-systems
interact in the main system. Hardware FMEAs are slightly more complex, and delve deeper
into the component failure modes in a system, and how they interact with the system.
Table 2.1 shows an example of an FMEA table used to analyse a system. Each column is
filled out for each component or sub-system to yield a complete picture of the overall system’s
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Table 2.1: Example FMEA Worksheet from [27]
potential failure modes. Each column is filled in with its respective data as per;
• Identification –Usually containing the component name and possible reference code. i.e.
1.1 Actuator ACT11.
• Function –The intended function of the component. i.e. open/close flap.
• Failure Mode –How the component has failed. i.e. stuck failed closed/failed open.
• Failure Effect
1. Local Effect –The localised effect of the failure.
2. System –The global effect of the failure on the whole system.
• Failure Detection Method –Are there any methods to observe if a failure has occurred?
i.e. alarms.
• Compensating Provisions –Are there any failsafes in place to mitigate against the failure
mode? i.e. redirect fluid via alternate route.
• System Outcome –The overall conclusive effect the failure mode has on a system. Some-
times not included due to correlation with Failure Effect - System.
FMEAs can be further evolved into FMECA where each failure mode is given a ranking
based upon its probability of occurrence and severity to the system. The rank given to each
failure mode is the product of severity classification and the probability of the failure modes
occurrence/frequency. Thus two more columns are added to the FMEA Table 2.1; Probabili-
ty/frequency of occurrence, and severity.
The severity classifications are defined at four levels;
1. Minor –No effect on system performance, no damage or injury.
2. Marginal –Degradation of item functional output, minor damage, delay to mission or
minor injury.
3. Critical –Severe reduction of functional output affecting system performance, perhaps loss
of mission, major damage or severe injury.
4. Catastrophic –Complete loss of system, system function or fatalities.
The severity classification number (1-4) is plotted with the frequency/probability data (also
broken into sections from 1-4/5), if available. This yields a criticality matrix as per Figure 2.1.
The frequency data is a numerical value that can be determined based upon either the frequency
of occurrence or the probability of occurrence:
The shaded region in Figure 2.1 is therefore the unacceptable region and would require
further analysis or a design change to make that failure mode fall into an acceptable region of
the criticality matrix.
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Figure 2.1: Criticality Matrix
2.1.2 FMEA used in the literature
There are no full FMEA tables available in the literature; however Rama, et al. [28] compiled
a table for a single cell PEMFC listing the component, failure mode and the cause of the
failure (see Figure 2.2). The full table is presented in Appendix A. The authors used five main
degradation/failure modes, relating to; activation losses, mass transport losses, ohmic losses,
efficiency loss and catastrophic cell failure.
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Figure 2.2: Sample from full table in [28]
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Arguably, the first three degradation/failure modes mentioned are the only ones necessary
in that column, efficiency loss and catastrophic FC failure are effects that can pertain from the
aforementioned failure modes. To this end, there appears to be no mention of the effects of
each failure mode in the table. The authors list the main areas of degradation relating to the
polarisation curve (see Section 1.6) and the FC component where the failure mode occurs. After
this the authors list faults such as Platinum agglomeration causing loss of electrochemically
active surface area (EASA), and what may cause this fault. There is no mention of how this
failure mode would affect the overall operation of the PEMFC system. This is a limitation to
the table proposed by the authors, as one of the main objectives of compiling an FMEA is
to understand the failure modes within a defined system, and to understand how each failure
can affect the system. This knowledge can help the designers and engineers mitigate against
premature failure of the overall system, however without all the qualitative data regarding the
FMEA, it is difficult to do so. With the increasing speed of data release, and only the one
aforementioned table for failure mode analysis, it is required to compile a full FMEA of a
PEMFC using the most up-to-date data.
2.1.3 Fault Tree Analysis
FTA is an analytical technique where the ‘top event’ or undesired event is specified, and the
contributing factors are evaluated in the context of the system environment. This produces a
graphical model which depicts a failure structure by highlighting the potential basic events that
lead to it. This is a top-down approach as opposed to a bottom-up approach that can be used
to analyse the causal relationship between component failure events and system failures [27]. It
is a qualitative model that can be, and often is, evaluated quantitatively [29].
In order to compile a FT, several steps must be taken:
1. Clearly define the overall undesired event or ’Top Event‘
2. Based upon an in-depth literature review, expert knowledge and/or experimentation;
determine the possible failure modes that can occur in the system that would contribute
towards the top event
3. Once the tree has been drawn, analyse the logic if the tree to check its integrity
4. Qualitatively analyse the FT and determine the MCS
5. If failure probability is available, quantitatively analyse the tree with the most up-to-date
and relevant data for each failure mode
Intermediate events are indicated by boxes, and contain a description, whereas basic events
are denoted by circles, often containing codes. The relationship between the events are repre-
sented by gates. Gates can take many forms, and the gates can either allow passage or inhibit
the flow of logic through the tree, and the way in which the decision is made is dependent upon
the type of gate, with the most basic types listed in Figure 2.3. The gates also indicate the
relationship between different events in the fault tree depiction. The circles represent the basic
events of the tree, which is to say that the event cannot be further broken down into other
relationships. Basic events feed into gates as per the example in Figure 2.4.
FT models can be evaluated either qualitatively or quantitatively to ascertain required data.
The FT model is itself a qualitative model as it is constructed, but it can be further evaluated
to delve deeper into the failure possibilities in a system. The way in which FT are further
qualitatively evaluated is by ascertaining the Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) of the top event. These
MCSs are the lowest combination of basic events that can cause the undesired top event. These
MCS are a valuable tool for reliability engineers to focus on the most likely failure roots and
components that could cause the system to fail. Through this type of analysis of the FT model,
one can identify weak links in the system, where one basic event may cause the top event failure.
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Figure 2.4: Example of common Fault Tree gate use
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These areas can be mitigated against after identification through MCS analysis of the FT. The
qualitative aspect is due to the graphical representation of the subject system, and this can be
quantitatively evaluated by obtaining the probabilistic reliability data for each component and
importing said data into the model. One can find the failure combinations from the graphical
representation of a FT in the form of MCSs. FTs can be evolved to yield numerical data
through quantitative evaluation in addition to the aforementioned MCS qualitative assessment
technique. Boolean logic is used to quantify MCS information, where a ‘•’ denotes ‘AND’ and
a ‘+’ represents ‘OR’ logic.
Dominant cut sets can be determined from this method of analysis, which are the MCSs
that have the most influence upon the top event probability of occurrence, and where most
effort should be concentrated initially.
There are many ways in which to calculate the top event probability, with the inclusion-
exclusion method, rare event method, lower bound, and MCS upper bound methods listed
below.
The inclusion-exclusion method is shown in Equation 2.1.
P (TOP ) =
Nc∑
i=1
P (Ci)−
Nc∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
P (Ci ∩ Cj)
+
Nc∑
i=3
i−1∑
j=2
j−1∑
k=1
P (Ci ∩ Cj ∩ Ck)− . . .
· · ·+ (−1)Nc+1P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CNC ) (2.1)
In Equation 2.1, the combinations of MCSs in pairs, threes, fours and so on, are listed to
determine the overall probability.
The rare event approximation is shown in Equation 2.2.
P (TOP ) =
Nc∑
i=1
P (Ci) (2.2)
The lower bound method is shown in Equation 2.3.
P (TOP ) =
Nc∑
i=1
P (Ci)−
Nc∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
P (Ci ∩ Cj) (2.3)
The MCS upper bound method is shown in Equation 2.4.
P (TOP ) = 1−
Nc∏
i=1
1− P (Ci)) (2.4)
Depending upon the accuracy needed, and the computing resources available in relation to
the complexity of the FT to analyse, any of the above methods can be used to determine the
top event probability.
2.1.4 FT Method used in the Literature
Placca and Kouta [30] recently used FT analysis to investigate PEMFC degradation. They
constructed a FT of a single cell PEMFC with the overall concerning factor being the top event
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of ‘reduction in voltage output’ to an extent that was detrimental to the functioning of the
PEMFC system.
Placca et al. constructed a physical fault tree of a single cell PEMFC by splitting the top-
event of the ‘Degradation of the Cell’ down into three sub-events: Membrane Degradation,
Catalyst Layer Degradation and GDL Layer Degradation (See Figure 2.5). The entire FT can
be found in Appendix B.
Figure 2.5: Top level interaction in work presented by Placca & Kouta [30]
These are three of the four main physical components of a PEMFC with only the bipolar
plate being omitted. The omission of the bipolar plate component of a PEMFC is another issue
that needs to be addressed with this work. There are many studies in the literature that docu-
ment and analyse the degradation and failures of bipolar plate materials in PEMFC. Corrosion
and mechanical failure are common occurrences in many studies [31][32]. It is recommended
that for a more reliable FT, one would need to include ‘G5 Bipolar plate failure’. Failure modes
affecting the bipolar plates include, but are not limited to; corrosion of the metal bipolar plate
when in contact with the aqueous and acidic environment of the PEMFC, mechanical fatigue
caused by repeated thermal cycles and silicone sealant used as a gasket on the bipolar plate
can degrade and enter the membrane. According to the authors, the bipolar plate issue was
omitted due to the degradation rates shown in the literature were considered negligible.
All of the failure modes used in the French work were translated from French to English
and checked with the original authors and are presented in Tables 2.2 - 2.5.
The majority of the basic events are too equivocal and are not necessarily binary in nature.
E002 ‘long-term functioning’ is too ambiguous in description, not informing the reader whether
it means that the cell is completely failed or is degraded to a lower output state due to long-term
operation. There is no explanation of what this pertains to, such as a time frame, or what the
failure mode is. During long term operation, many components can fail by any number of failure
modes. As such this basic event is misleading and should be further explained or changed for
specific failure modes. The reference is from a review paper of multiple lifetime studies by J.
Wu et al.[23]. The authors list 12 studies of lifetime analysis of PEMFC experiments. Placca et
al. chose to take the first result by Ralph [33] where it would have been more scientific to take
an average of all the studies to more adequately represent the scope of all works in this area,
and get a more reliable value of ‘long term operation’ degradation.
The intermediate events are shown in separate tables as some of the numbered events have
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different text labels in different trees. They used reliability data compiled from many sources
within the literature, and extrapolated the data to acquire a formatted degradation measure.
Difficulties arise with this work as the data accumulated is from different tests that use differ-
ences in variables such as; pressure, temperature, cycling, and even different membranes. This
makes the data heterogeneous in nature and can therefore skew the accuracy of the output
data pertaining to reliability values. Some data that could not be found in the literature was
proposed by the authors based on ‘previous experience’. From the above two examples, the
data could be seen as fundamentally unreliable, and this is acknowledged to some extent by the
authors in their concluding remarks regarding weaknesses in the work. The lack of homogenised
data for a PEMFC is a pitfall that can only be overcome by an increase in experimental anal-
ysis of certain failure modes in a FC. An ideal scenario would incorporate sets of standardised
experiments to homogenate degradation data, aiding with the validity of failure analysis.
Yousfi-Steiner, et al.[14] looked into using FT analysis to help understand contributing
factors towards water management issues in a PEMFC.
Figure 2.6: Drying out of the Membrane FT [14]
The example shown in Figure 2.6 indicates the basic use of OR and AND gates to determine
whether a mixture of certain phenomena can cause the top event of Drying out of the membrane.
For example the leftmost branch looks at how a combination of stack temperature increase
(Tstack ↑), relative humidity decrease (φin ↓−→) and current density reduction (I ↓−→), will
result in the drying of the membrane.
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Table 2.2: Basic Events from Placca et al. [30]
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Table 2.3: Intermediate events for Membrane FT [30]
Table 2.4: Intermediate events for Catalyst FT [30]
Table 2.5: Intermediate events for Diffusion Layer FT [30]
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Figure 2.7: Flooding of the Membrane FT [14]
Figure 2.7 presents a more detailed overview of failure logic for a different top event. Mem-
brane flooding is detailed with less ambiguity in the failure events. However the logic could be
developed further, such as the intermediate event Flow Fields Obstruction.
There are more failure modes that could cause flow field obstruction, such as BIP corrosion,
pressure increase due to swelling/corrosion and ice formation due to subfreezing temperatures.
For a comprehensive analysis of the factors that could lead to flow field obstruction, these
should be factored into the FT. Alternatively, Figure 2.7 shows the relationships required for
the flooding of a membrane to occur, taking into account the relationship between liquid water
existence and the condensation rate overpowering the evacuation rate.
The same authors also used FT analysis in another publication regarding Pt catalyst degra-
dation mechanisms [34]. Figure 2.8 shows how the authors chose to not only include the basic
events (presented in circles) however they also chose to list some operating conditions that can
also lead to the top event. For example; Low stoichiometry and long periods at OCV from the
left branch of the tree.
The trees presented in Figures 2.6-2.8 are a good way of indicating logic of failure modes
and operating parameters that might influence the top event. However, as with the work from
Placca & Kouta, there are some anomalies. Figure 2.6 shows some instances that might lead
to the drying out of the cell, however the right most branch needs to be improved upon. In
Figure 2.9, Qgas refers to the volumetric flow rate of the gas, I is in reference to the current
density, φin is the relative humidity and Tstack is the temperature of the stack. The upward
arrows indicate an increase in the parameter; a horizontal arrow indicates no change and the
downward arrows show a decrease in the value of the given parameter. Therefore, according to
the authors, if all four variables remain constant, the membrane will dry out. This is not the
case, as a constant flow of gas to maintain a constant current density, in the environment of
constant Relative Humidity (RH) and stack temperature, are ideal scenarios for the operation
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Figure 2.8: Catalyst Degradation Example [34]
Figure 2.9: Detail of Branch from Drying out Tree [14]
of a PEMFC. This may be due to oversimplification of the basic events; it is difficult to state
that a basic event can be either constant/decreasing, or constant/increasing. These should have
been further split down into one basic event for increasing and one for constant rate (with the
same done for decreasing rate respectively).
2.1.5 Petri-net Modelling
Petri-nets were first conceived by Carl Adam Petri and have a solid mathematical modelling
language foundation. Petri-nets consist of two types of nodes; Places and Transitions. Places can
be understood as representing an event in the system, and the transitions can be understood to
represent the conditions. A simple Petri-net structure [35] can be based upon (P,T,F,B) where:
A finite set of places P = {p1, . . . , p|P |}
A finite set of transitions T = {t1, . . . , t|T | with P ∩ T = {}
A | P | x | T | matrix F with elements out of {0,1}, and
A | P | x | T | matrix B with elements out of {0,1}
27
The F & B matrices are the Forward and Backward transitional states of the places. These
are the sets of arcs that connect places and transitions in the graphical model.
Figure 2.10 shows a simple two place, one transition Petri-Net. ‘P1’ is the first place, and
represents the system’s working state. However, if a set of predetermined criteria are met, ‘T1’
transition can fire, and represents the transition of the system going from a working state, to
a failed state ‘P2’. The arrows connecting the places and transitions are the arcs, and indicate
direction of flow of the logic.
Figure 2.10: Example of a simple Petri-Net
Coloured Petri-nets are similar in fashion to the standard Petri-net, however the tokens that
fire from place-to-place can contain information about the system. Whereas the standard Petri-
net is used to determine the system state from the position of the tokens, coloured Petri-nets
can hold pertinent data about the system in the same token. This aspect of coloured Petri-nets
makes them an ideal candidate for use in PEMFC systems, as certain levels of degradation
can be stored in the token, rather than having multiple places to represent multiple levels of
degradation. The data contained within the tokens can be analysed or modified depending
upon the tranistions it passes through or the system state information. Using coloured Petri-
nets allows the combination of multiple sub-modules of Petri-nets to combine into an overall
Petr-net model.
Petri-net graphs can be analysed in a number of ways, from the duration of a token’s
placement in a place or frequency of occupation of a place.
2.1.6 Qualitative Analysis
As shown, Petri-Nets have a graphical representation which can be qualitatively analysed. They
show the different states of a system and what transitions exist between them. One can place
tokens in places to easier understand the current state of the system. Following the token
marks through the running of the Petri-Net model is a useful qualitative tool to see how certain
interactions in a system can lead to other effects. Evaluating the matrices for Figure 2.10 is a
method to do this. The starting matrix can be shown as Equation 2.5.
P =
(
1
0
)
(2.5)
This shows that there is a token in P1, and no token placed into P2.
A transition matrix can be used to determine the token movement when a transition fires
as in Equation 2.6.
P1
P2
T1(−1
1
)
(2.6)
This shows how a token is removed from P1 (-1) and is placed into P2 (1) upon firing of
T1. This would result in a new marking matrix denoted by Equation 2.7.
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Figure 2.11: Example Petri-net for PEMFC system [35]
P =
(
0
1
)
(2.7)
2.1.7 Quantitative Analysis
The quantification of Petri-Net structures is often undertaken using a probability distribution
functions such as the Weibull distribution, modelling values such as lifetime of components/sys-
tems. The token placement in a place/state would initiate a calculation of event probability
based upon data such as the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). The quantification can take the
form of a cumulative average lifetime of a system, or a percentage of times that places are
marked with a token.
Coloured Petri-nets can assign a value to a token that moves through the net. This could
be in the form of a counter or level of degradation in a system.
2.1.8 Petri-nets in the literature.
Petri-net modelling is presented by Wieland, et al [35]. The model presented is flexible as it can
accommodate expansion and adaptation, where it can represent a single cell, a stack, or even
fleet of cars.
Figure 2.11 shows the graphical representation of the Petri-net model presented. Z0 indicates
the initial starting place for the modelling and that the cell is operational. Z1 refers to the cell
being out of order, resulting in the stack being out of order. Place A is indicative of the states
of spontaneous nature, whereas place B is the state of repair. From here, transitions 1-4b can
fire, dependent upon the random numbers designated to the transitions.
Transition 1 ‘Degradation’ fires in any case and is representative of stack aging. It also takes
into account the worsening of each of the five characteristics the model takes into account; MEA
Voltage, internal leakage, external leakage, voltage loss from BIP and coolant gas leakage. The
model takes a mean and standard deviation for each and this is used against the age value to
generate a random number for computing the worsening of the characteristic.
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Transition 2 ‘Spontaneous event’ is housed in place ‘A’ and does not operate in the same
manner as transition 1. This does not fire at each step, however it fires through the following
logic process [35];
1. Firstly, it is determined if a spontaneous event j is happening at time t. Every
spontaneous event j occurs with a certain probability p(j,astack). Here astack
is the stack age, which is defined by the age of the oldest component. The
spontaneous event takes place if a uniformly distributed random variable U(0,1)
is less than or equal to the given probability p(j,astack).
2. After deciding whether the spontaneous event j is occurring, the number of
effected cells next to a randomly chosen start cell zs is determined. Some mech-
anisms affect weak cells in favour. In such cases the start cell zs is the cell with
the lowest voltage or the cell with the greatest leakage. The number of cells
that are affected by the event j is generated by the normal distribution. For
every event ameanj,num and standard deviation j, num is saved. The number
numj of affected cells is specified by Eq. (3):
numj = N(j, num, 2j, num).(3)
Transition 3 ‘Reversible Event’ is operated in the same way as transition 2, however there
is no lasting effect on the system, the failure is noted but the system returns to the place Z0.
Transitions 4a and 4b represent repair or breakdown respectively. Thresholds are set for
each characteristic, that when exceeded, either repair or breakdown of the system is initiated.
The output of the model is a percentage contribution to cell degradation based upon the
input failure modes. For example; ‘Natural Ageing” is quoted to be the most significant con-
tributor to cell degradation. There is no mention of an estimated lifetime of the cell/stack.
A potential weakness to this research is again that data used is aggregated from numerous
sources in different formats. This cherry-picking of data does not give an accurate representation
of an individual cell with its own environmental and operational parameters. It is highlighted
by the authors as a weakness in the fact that the models degradation state is steady and not
associated with environmental factors, such as time of year. It could be argued that freeze thaw
related degradation will not be as significant in summer as it is in winter. Petri-net modelling
is known for its ability to be adaptable to situations that contain dependencies and features
that can include numerous degraded states.
2.1.9 Markov Modelling
The underlying principle of Markov Modelling (MM), is that they make use of the Markov
Property in that the model uses stochastic variables for its calculations that only depend on
the current state of the system, and has no memory of previous events. MM is potentially well
suited to PEMFC reliability analysis as the state transitions in a MM occur continuously instead
of at discrete time intervals. This is beneficial as PEMFC components can suffer deterioration
as a consequence of age and spontaneous negative events.
The structure of MM involved the listing of all the possible states of the system to be
analysed. These take the form of circles in a diagram that indicate what state the system is in.
Arrows joining these possible states indicate the logic flow between states, or transitions. Once
all states of the system that is being analysed have been determined and joined by transition
arrows, the graph can be converted into equations that model the system. The state equations
will contain the probabilities of failure or repair for each transition. MM is often used when FTA
has been exhausted due to dependencies in the system that is being analysed. MM suffer slightly
in terms of adaptability, any MM that is adapted with a new state or transition structure is
deemed to be a new MM with an increased complexity. MMs work by having transitions entering
and leaving a state, with the total probability equal to the sum of all transitions leaving the
state, multiplied by the probability of the actual state. For large and complex models, single
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determining equations are replaced with matrices that show the state of the system, and larger
equations dealing with these matrices determine the modelling of the system state.
For a MM to be applicable, the system being analysed has to be stationary, it must use the
memoryless property and all possible states of the system must be identifiable. It must also be
noted that the models themselves can grow very large when considering a system with many
components with many states for each component.
Work in this area is very sparse and still under development, however a recent work was
published by an American research group, looking at MM of a standalone power supply unit
[36]. This work looked at a power plant system level analysis (See Figure 2.12), including;
cooling system, humidification system, fuelling & humidification system, air circulating system,
energy storage system, and the FC itself.
Figure 2.12: State Space Model Presented by Tanrioven & Alam[36]
A fundamental issue with the presented work, is the fact that degradation is only considered
after 5000 hours of operation, and that stack degradation is assumed to be a flat rate drop of
0.0001% per hour. Additionally, for a fully comprehensive MM of a PEMFC system, one would
need an endless amount of states to represent every level of degradation for every component.
Therefore a true appraisal of a PEMFC system would have an infeasibly large state transition
diagram.
Additionally, MMs offer no versatility in regards to expansion. With the infancy of the area
of PEMFC reliability analysis it is assumed that any model will need to be easily adaptable
when new data is acquired by the research field.
The overall MM presented is a good first step into looking at MM of PEMFC systems on
the whole. However it fails to consider differing degradation rates based upon component level
failures in the PEMFC itself.
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2.2 Modelling Conclusion
Within the FC area, reliability modelling is still in its infancy and current analysis undertaken
in the literature has been highlighted to show potential weaknesses with the current methods.
Petri-nets have proven to be a useful method to analyse failures, however they are more involved
than a simple FT model, and if verification of a simple, quantitatively analysed FT model can
be achieved, it would highlight what areas PEMFC designers and engineers need to focus on to
make PEMFCs last longer than ICE. The focus of this work is to improve the methods currently
used in PEMFC reliability analysis, and ascertain a functional reliability model to accurately
predict degradation phenomenon and lifetimes of PEMFC.
Additionally it was found that no research to date has modelled a PEMFC and verified the
outputs against real-world drive cycles. The data review thus far has seen that verification is
usually done under full load and partial loads for certain timescales. In the real world, it is
highly unlikely that a PEMFC car user will drive at full load for extensive periods of time.
They are more likely to vary greatly dependent upon routes, traffic and other factors.
The analysed methods in this chapter have all displayed weaknesses due to a lack of com-
plexity of the FC system, which is an area that will be developed in future chapters.
2.2.1 Next Steps
Due to the previously highlighted limitations and modelling review, the next steps would be to
start with a fully comprehensive FMEA of a PEMFC. The FT previously presented by Placca
& Kouta [30] will be analysed in depth, as to acquire its applicability and accuracy for PEMFC
reliability research. This will inevitably lead on to an optimised FT based upon the results of
the FMEA.
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Chapter 3
FMEA
As previously highlighted in Chapter 2, there are no previous examples of a full FMEA for a
PEMFC in the literature. Therefore a full FMEA was constructed through an in depth literature
search, to agglomerate the known failure modes that can occur in a PEMFC, alongside their
effects and any important remarks.
An overall PEMFC system in an automotive application has numerous interacting systems
and support mechanisms to get power from the gas, to the wheels. Therefore the system bound-
aries for this work are set at only the PEMFC itself as in Figure 3.1. The black-dashed, boxed
out area is the main focus of this work, excluding any failure phenomenon experienced in the
ancillary components of the automotive system.
3.1 PEMFC Construction
Due to the range of materials and components that can be used to create a PEMFC, the
following analysis is based upon the key assumptions of material and construction (Figure 3.2);
• Standard PEMFC construction.
– PTFE membrane.
– Carbon GDL.
– Pt/C catalyst laye.r
– Stainless-Steel BIP.
• Using H2 fuel feed with a purity of 99.97% as required by the ISO standard 14687-2:2012
[38].
3.1.1 PTFE Membrane
PTFE membranes are perfluorinated polymers, with the most commonly available being Nafion.
Perfluorinated polymer membranes are also available from Tokuyama (Neosepta-F®), W. L.
Gore and Associates, Inc. (Gore-Select®), Asahi Glass Company (Flemion®), Asahi Chemical
Industry (Asiplex®) and Dow. Nafion has a backbone chemical structure very similar to PTFE
(Teflon®) however, where it differs is that Nafion includes sulfonic acid (SO3−H+) functional
groups. The PTFE backbone forms the strength of the membrane, and the SO3−H+ terminal
groups provide charge sites for protonic transport. This study considers the Nafion brand PTFE
membrane.
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Figure 3.1: Functional Block Diagram of PEMFC automotive system
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Figure 3.2: Components of a PEMFC [37]
3.1.2 Carbon GDL
The GDL is made from a carbon-fibre based material that is either formed into a paper or
woven cloth type. Carbon-fibre is used due to its high electrical conductivity and high porosity
values. Due to the materials for each method of constructing the GDL being identical, the failure
mechanisms that can be experienced by either construction method are the same, therefore each
construction method can be considered, as only the construction style differs and the material
is the same. This study uses the carbon paper type GDL.
3.1.3 Pt/C Catalyst
Pt and C are mixed in an ionomer and usually ball milled to mix into an ink. This is then either
screen printed or directly printed onto the membrane or GDL surfaces.
3.1.4 Stainless-Steel BIP
The endplates, or BIP are usually made from steel, and are routed to form serpentine channels
for the gas to be delivered to the GDL component.
3.2 Operating Conditions
The operating conditions for the system are considered to be reflective of the power requirements
of the New European Drive Cycle (NEDC), used to assess the emissions of car engines and
fuel economy in passenger cars. The NEDC is representative of the typical usage of a car in
Europe, consisting of an Economic Comission for Europe (ECE)-15 urban drive cycle (Figure
3.3) repeated four times, followed by an extra-urban driving cycle (Figure 3.4). The product
of which is shown in Figure 3.5. It is assumed that due to the power demand from the vehicle
during this cycle, the failure modes identified can occur.
During operation in the above context, the FC can experience the following:
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Figure 3.3: ECE 15 Drive Cycle [39]
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Figure 3.4: Extra-Urban Drive Cycle [39]
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Figure 3.5: New European Drive Cycle [39]
• OCV
• Steady state voltage (constant load output of around 0.6-0.7 V)
• Load following state (FC demand from 0-1.2 V dependent upon drive cycle phase)
• Cold temperatures (<80◦C)
• Ideal temperatures (80◦C)
• Hot temperatures (>80◦C)
It is also noted that modern day PEMFCs systems purge the hydrogen gas feed at regular
intervals, therefore this should be taken into consideration with any failure mode evaluation.
Experimentation with a 100W PEMFC stack showed that the manufacturers’ recommended 0.5
second purge every 30 seconds was not optimal for the unit. Changing the purge interval to 0.5
seconds every 20 seconds increased the performance of the stack, by decreasing the build-up of
excess water in the stack.
3.3 Performance Loss Mechanisms
The performance loss mechanisms are split into the four main components of a PEMFC; Mem-
brane, Catalyst Layer, GDL, and BIP of which they effect. This is to help to understand which
failure modes occur in which of the main sub-layers of a PEMFC single cell.
3.3.1 Membrane
The membrane forms the heart of the PEMFC stack and is the electrolyte that blocks the flow
of electrons, however it allows the passage of H+ protons through from anode to cathode side. It
can suffer from 8 separate basic failure modes, that can lead on to localised and system effects.
• Incorrect BIP torque can increase the membrane’s resistance consistent with the vis-
coelastic compression of the membrane.
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• Polymer ’creep’ causes membrane thinning and can lead to mechanical damage of the
membrane.
• OH and OOH radicals & H2O2 can contaminate the PTFE material of the membrane
through end group unzipping.
• The presence of foreign cationic ions can adsorb onto the membrane, and they have
a stronger affinity with H+ ions in the membrane. This can lead to extensive drying of
the membrane and attenuated water flux/protonic conductivity.
• Ice formation can seriously impair the mechanical strength of the membrane by rear-
ranging ionomer at a molecular level through freeze cycling. Additionally, frozen water
reduces the conductivity of the membrane and the impermeability of the membrane.
• Fatigue from relative humidity and temperature cycling can cause a weakness
and eventual mechanical breach of the membrane.
• Excessive heat in a PEMFC can cause Sulphur Dioxide OH radical formation, and the
glass transition state of Per-FluoroSulfonic Acid (PSFA) polymers. Additionally, excessive
heat can dry out the membrane, causing a drop in protonic conductivity.
• Flooding swells the membrane which increases pressure build-up, and actively blocks
pores, reducing protonic conductivity, and risks freezing if operating temperatures are
low.
3.3.2 Catalyst Layer
The Catalyst Layer is sandwiched between the membrane and GDL, and it facilitates the
electrochemical reaction kinetics of the Hydrogen Oxidation Reaction (HOR) and the Oxygen
Reduction Reaction (ORR). This component can suffer from 6 main failure modes, leading to
a reduction in cell performance.
• Pt agglomeration and particle growth is the electrochemical phenomenon often re-
ferred to as ’Otswald Ripening’. This is where small nano-particles of Pt tend to want to
group together, and form larger particles. This reduces the surface area of the Pt catalyst,
slowing the reaction kinetics.
• Pt elemental loss is where Pt particles can separate from the catalyst layers binding,
and moving out of the cell without predisposition, reducing the speed of the reaction.
• Pt migration is where the Pt particles move from their original position to other areas
of the cell, such as the membrane.
• Pt can be contaminated by impurities in the gas feed, air feed or system born
contaminants, such as silicone from gaskets or metals from BIP. These poison
the catalyst layer.
• Flooding blocks the porous pathways, leading to reactant mal-distribution which can
further lead to either; delaminanation of the membrane, cut-off of electron pathway and
Pt agglomoration/dissolution.
• Ice Formation as with flooding.
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GDL
The GDL provides electrical conductivity from the reaction sites to the external circuit. It also
diffuses the gas feeds to the reaction sites on the catalyst layer. This component can experience
3 main failure modes, however the first listed can effect two main areas of the GDL.
• OH radicals can degrade the PTFE material used to make the GDL hydrophobic as
with the membrane failure mode.
• The OH radicals can also contaminate the Carbon material decreasing GDL conductivity
and hydrophobicity.
• Water can flood the GDL which blocks the passage of gasses to the reaction sites through
the GDL pore.
• Water can also freeze in the GDL, which also blocks gas flow through the pores of the
GDL.
3.3.3 BIP
The BIP encapsulates a single cell of the PEMFC. It separates fuel, oxidant gas and coolant. It
also homogeneously distributes reactant gasses to the GDL, whilst collecting current from the
FC reaction. This component suffers from 2 failure modes.
• An oxide film can develop that slowly builds up in thickness. This increases the resistance
of the BIP and reduces the current collected by the BIP.
• The BIP can corrode leading to the release of Fe, Ni (Nickel) and Cr (Chromium)
atoms into the PEMFC.
3.3.4 Differences from the literature
The previous work in [30] identified 22 failure modes attributable to reduction in performance
or catastrophic cell failure. Certain failure modes identified in [30] were omitted from this work.
Namely:
• ‘Membrane short circuit’ - This is not necessary as this failure would be noticed during
the pre-commissioning checks by the manufacturer, rather than a developing fault.
• ‘Gas leak from seals’ - This is not considered as part of this work as seal degradation
has been singled out as a negligible failure mode when PEMFC construction is quality
controlled.
“Only in a couple of long-term experiments was seal degradation observed,
and this might have been the consequence of an inappropriate materials
selection.” pp.18 [40]
Additionally, gasket seals that do suffer from degradation are the liquid applied sealant
types used in the past. Modern systems use a solid type gasket that doesn’t suffer the
same degradation.
• ‘BPP warping of polymer matrix’ - As the boundaries for this work state a steel BIP, a
polymer BIP failure is not necessary.
• ‘BPP cracking’ - This has been omitted as the steel plates do not suffer from cracking,
only the polymer and graphite BIPs suffer from this.
• ‘Injection-moulded BPP low electrical conductivity’ - Polymer material BIPs are not
considered in this work.
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• ‘Coated stainless-steel BPP loss of surface electrical conductivity’ - As above, only plain
stainless steel BIPs are considered in this work.
The work in [30] considered multiple construction materials for the BIP, however for the
sake of an accurate end result pertaining to a single construction type PEMFC that would
be manufactured with only one type of BIP, this work only considers one construction type
BIP (stainless-steel). Hence the four failure modes related to the BIP are all omitted due to
the material considerations. Six failure modes were removed when compared to other works,
however five new failure modes were identified and added to advance this area of work. This
work is therefore more specific and detailed in comparison to the existing works.
Aside from the above omissions from previous work, this work shares some similarities with
previous examples, however developments to logic and basic event definitions have been made.
3.4 FMEA Table
A comprehensive FMEA has been developed which consists of the identification of the physical
component of the PEMFC being analysed, followed by a brief description of its function. The
failure modes that can be experienced in this area are then listed, detailing the effects that
this failure mode has. The local effect is the contained effect of the failure mode, whereas the
system effect is how the failure mode will affect the overall operation of the entire system. Failure
detection methods are listed for more details on how to distinguish these failures, whether it
be in-situ or ex-situ. Mitigation strategies are listed where previous work has identified a way
to reduce or mitigate against these failure modes. Any poignant remarks are listed that may
help further the understanding of any of the previously highlighted points, followed by any key
relationships between the listed failure mode, and any other failure mode in the system that is
being analysed. Finally the source of the failure mode information is listed for integrity.
3.4.1 Membrane Section
From a full literature review of membrane degradation and failure experimentation, an FMEA
can be constructed containing all known basic events that affect the membrane component of
a PEMFC with the construction previously mentioned.
The first failure mode ‘1.0/1.1 Incorrect BIP torque’ is taken from work in [41] which shows
how increasing the pressure experienced by the membrane directly influences the resistivity of
the membrane (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 can be explained further by considering each individual column:
Column:
1. Identifies the component of the PEMFC where the given failure mode is experienced.
In this instance, ‘Incorrect BIP torque’ affects the membrane, and as such the Polymer
Electrolyte Membrane component is listed.
2. Gives a brief description of the component and its function within the PEMFC. The Poly-
mer Electrolyte Membrane component of a PEMFC is the central part of the cell which
forms the electrolyte, and serves to block the passage of reactant gasses and electrons
released during the reaction, however allows the passage of hydrogen protons from the
anode side, to cathode.
3. Contains the identification number and description of the failure mode to affect the
PEMFC. The number 1.0 identifies the failure mode is in relation to the Polymer Elec-
trolyte Membrane, listed in column one. The number /1.1 identifies the first failure mode
listed of that section, in it’s own sub-section. Therefore failure modes 1.0/1.1 and 1.0/1.2
are both primarily related to mechanical degradation.
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4. Contains information pertaining to the local effect of the failure mode, taken from the
literature. For this instance, the local effect of increased BIP torque involves increased
pressure on the membrane, which in turn increases the membrane resistance. Membranes
are increasingly being made thinner and thinner to reduce membrane resistance, and
therefore improve system voltage output. Therefore increasing the membrane resistance
is considered to be an undesirable effect.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
1.0 Polymer
Electrolyte
Membrane
The ’heart’ of
the PEMFC.
Forms the
electrolyte
at the centre
of the cell.
Blocks pas-
sage of gasses
and electrons,
but facilitates
passage of hy-
drogen protons
from anode to
cathode side.
1.0/1.1 Incor-
rect BIP torque
Local mechan-
ical stress due
to increased
pressure.
Increase of
membrane
resistance,
consistent with
the viscoelastic
compression of
the membrane.
Reduced pas-
sage of H+
protons. Re-
duction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Lin-
ear sweep
Voltammetry
Check bipolar
plate compres-
sion torque is
suitable for the
application
Oxide Film
Formation
(BIP), Flood-
ing, Ice Forma-
tion, Creep.
Satterfield,
et al. (2006)
Mechanical
properties of
Nafion and
titania/Nafion
composite
membranes
for polymer
electrolyte
membrane
FCs. & Wang,
H, et al. (2012)
PEM FC
failure mode
analysis. New
York, CRC
Press. (pp87)
& Borup, R, et
al. (2007) Sci-
entific aspects
of polymer
electrolyte fuel
Table 3.1: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - Incorrect BIP Torque
5. Lists how this local effect affects the system overall. For this example the incorrect BIP
torque reduces the passage of protons which reduces the output voltage of the system
through an increase in ohmic resistance. This can be observed in a polarisation curve
from a linear drop in the centre section of the curve.
6. Lists the potential methods to detect this failure mode’s affect on the system. For this
example, a polarisation curve would show a drop in the middle linear section of the curve,
as the failure mode is regarding ohmic losses in the system. Linear sweep voltammetry
could potentially identify this failure mode as it is most commonly used to identify gas
crossover. The rate of gas crossover would change with mechanical compression of the
membrane through incorrect BIP torque.
7. Lists any potential mitigation strategies to reduce the likelihood of occurrence, or the
severity of the effect. For this example, a simple quality control measure of checking the
BIP torque would identify this failure mode at an early stage. It is recommended that
due to creep, this torque should be checked after assembly, and after the commissioning
phase.
8. Contains any pertinent remarks that would either help the reader to understand the entire
row, or any factors to consider regarding the failure mode.
9. Lists any relationships that this failure mode may have with other aspects of the FMEA.
For this example, oxide film formation on the surface of the BIP can also increase the
mechanical compression of the membrane, as does flooding and ice formation. These will
worsen the effect of incorrect BIP torque by taking up more room inside the cell, increasing
pressure on the membrane.
10. Finally, the source of the data is noted for ease of referencing the experimentation that
tested the failure mode. The references for this example are from a review paper [16],
a review book [42], and specific membrane compression experimentation [41]. Figure 3.6
shows how an increase of pressure from 0-7.25 MPa increases the resistivity of the mem-
brane by 1ohm/cm2. The effect of this resistance increase can be observed through a
polarisation curve change. Figure 3.7 shows how the increase in mechanical stress on the
membrane, vastly degrades the performance of the cell after the activation region of the
PEMFC operation. At higher current densities, the performance drops of significantly
quicker than with standard compression as opposed to a 7.25 KPa.
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Figure 3.6: Polymer resistivity as a function of applied stress on membrane [41]
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Figure 3.7: Difference between standard polarisation curve, and polarisation curve with 1
ohm/cm2 increase
Another failure mode analysed in the membrane section is ‘1.0/2.1 OH and OOH radicals
& H2O2 contamination to PTFE’. This failure mode has been presented in different ways in
previous reliability work, and the numerous different observations can make this failure mode
difficult to fully understand. To clarify this area, a review of radical attack and hydrogen
peroxide degradation was undertaken.
Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide attack in the membrane has a complicated relationship with
other components and failure modes within a PEMFC system. The ways in which this failure
mode was analysed is through results from chemical degradation studies [16] [43] [44]. It has
been discovered that radicals can be formed from oxygen molecules permeating through from
the cathode side of the FC, to the anode side of the FC. This O2 can reduce at the anode
Pt catalyst, forming ·OOH radicals, and then lead on to H2O2 formation, and more radical
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formation (Equations 3.1 - 3.3).
H2 + Pt→ Pt−H (3.1)
Pt−H + O2 → ·OOH (3.2)
·OOH + Pt−H→ H2O2 (3.3)
If there are foreign ions present such as Fe+2 and Cu
+
2 released from BIP degradation,
the H2O2 formed can further develop into ·OH and ·OOH radicals, and at a higher rate.
Therefore the metal ions from the BIP catalyse, can severely increased the radical and peroxide
degradation to the membrane, as presented in [16] (Equations 3.4 & 3.5).
H2O2 + M
+
2 → M+3 + ·OH + OH− (3.4)
·OH + H2O2 → H2O + ·OOH (3.5)
Another mechanism for radical and peroxide attack is presented in [45] proposed a method
of production of radicals, which occurs due to the diffusion of gasses through the membrane,
and formation of H2O2.
H2 → 2 H · (3.6)
H · + O2 → HO2 · (3.7)
HO2 · +H· → H2O2 (3.8)
H2O2 + M
+
2 → M+3 + ·OH + OH− (3.9)
·OH + H2O2 → H2O + HO2 · (3.10)
Equations 3.6-3.10 show the stages of how radicals are a product of H2O2 production which
occurs under normal operating conditions and membrane health. It is suggested in [46] that
peroxide can form, by Equation 3.11, by a 2 electron reduction of O2 pathway;
O2 + 2 H
+ + 2 e− → H2O2 (3.11)
Due to the above, OH and OOH radical attack, and H2O2 attack were grouped into one
basic events; ‘OH and OOH radicals & H2O2 contamination to PTFE’, which represents the
formation under normal conditions, and H2O2 created from 2 electron reduction of O2 on Pt.
The way in which radicals and peroxide degrade the membrane is through end-group unzip-
ping, as stated in the local effect column of the FMEA entry (Table 3.2). The PTFE backbone
of the membrane is modified with end-groups or side chains of perfluorosulfonic acid ionomers
which help facilitate the FC reaction. These are attacked and ‘unzip’ from the PTFE core,
releasing fluorine into the exhaust water.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
1.0 Polymer
Electrolyte
Membrane
The ’heart’ of
the PEMFC.
Forms the
electrolyte
at the centre
of the cell.
Blocks pas-
sage of gasses
and electrons,
but facilitates
passage of hy-
drogen protons
from anode to
cathode side
1.0/2.1 OH and
OOH radicals
& H2O2 con-
tamination to
PTFE
End group
unzipping. The
Polytetraflu-
oroethylene
(PTFE) core
material is
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Electron Spin
Resonance
(ESR) spec-
troscopy,
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Curve, Lin-
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polytetraflu-
oroethylene
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of titanium
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ate titania
quasinetworks
in the polar
domains of
a polymer
electrolyte
membrane FC,
can mitigate
against the risk
of H2 and O2
gas crossover.
Low humidity
and OCV can
exacerbate the
attack and
degradation
Protonic resis-
tance of mem-
brane, H2O2
formation,
Mechanical
Damage
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
FC failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
Table 3.2: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide Attack
3.4.2 Catalyst Layer
The first failure mode ‘2.0/1 Pt agglomeration and particle growth’ is taken from review papers
[16] and [42] which shows the effect of Otswald Ripening and Pt Agglomeration on the loss of
Electrochemically Active Surface Area (ECSA) (Table 3.3).
The section of FMEA can be explored through considering each column:
Column:
1. ‘Pt agglomeration and particle growth’ affects the catalyst layer of the PEMFC, and as
such the Catalyst Layer component is listed with its numerical identifier ‘2.0’.
2. The catalyst layer component of a PEMFC is the layer immediately adjacent to the
membrane on either side. It sandwiches the membrane and facilitates the electrochemical
reaction kinetics of the HOR and ORR.
3. The number 2.0 identifies the failure mode relates to the Catalyst Layer, listed in column
one. The number /1 identifies the first failure mode listed of that section.
4. Contains information pertaining to the local effect of the failure mode, taken from the
literature. For this instance, the local effect of the nanoparticles of Pt clumping together
and reducing their surface energy, reduces the active surface area for reaction. This slows
down the reaction kinetics by actively reducing the amount of sites for the HOR & ORR.
Therefore reducing the ECSA is considered to be an undesirable effect.
5. For this example the reduction of ECSA reduces the output voltage of the system through
a decrease in reaction kinetics. This can be observed in a polarisation curve from a drop
in the beginning section of the curve pertaining to an increase in activation losses.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
2.0 Catalyst
Layer
Layer sand-
wiched be-
tween PEM
and GDL.
Facilitates
electrochemical
reaction kinet-
ics of the HOR
and ORR.
2.0/1 Pt ag-
glomeration
and particle
growth
Pt nanopar-
ticles have
inherent ten-
dancy to
combine to re-
duce their high
surface energy.
This algglom-
eration reduces
the electro-
chemically
active surface
area. Reducing
voltage output
Reduction in
voltage output
Ex situ
transmis-
sion electron
microscopy
(TEM), X-ray
diffraction
(XRD) us-
ing Averbach
Fourier trans-
form method
for deter-
mination of
weighted crys-
tallite sizes.
Polarisation
Curve. Cyclic
Voltammetry
Borup et al
(2006) showed
that Pt par-
tical growth
increases with
temperature.
Critically when
increasing
temp from 60 -
80oC. Ref (p12
in Wang book)
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87) \&
Borup, R, et
al. (2007) Sci-
entific aspects
of polymer
electrolyte fuel
cell durability
and degrada-
tion. Chemical
Review, vol.
107, pp3927.
Table 3.3: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - Pt Agglomeration & Particle Growth
6. Some methods to detect the failure are listed in this column. Ex-situ Transmission Electron
Microscopy (TEM) is a method where a beam of electrons are transmitted through a
specimen and the beams then interact with the sample. An image can be formed from
this interaction for analysis of the material constitution (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.8: Pt Agglomeration observed by TEM [47]
X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) experimentation uses an incident beam of x-rays created by ac-
celerating electrons between two electrodes. On impact, the x-rays fly off in all directions,
most of this is lost as heat, however a small percentage transformed into x-rays consist
a mixture of wavelengths. These wavelengths can be plotted to see what materials and
what size are present. Using the Averbach Fourier transform method, one can determine
the weighted crystallite sizes. An example of this is shown in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Pt Agglomeration observed by XRD [48]
As for in-situ methods; A polarisation curve would show a drop in the curve at the
beginning due to an increase in activation losses. Cyclic Voltammetry can be used to
analyse the ECSA of the cell.
7. There are no mitigation strategies for Pt agglomeration.
8. The remark for this failure mode is regarding temperature increase effects on Pt agglom-
eration. It was found in [16] and [42] that an increase in temperature of the cell, increases
the degradation rate due to Pt agglomeration and particle growth.
9. There are no relationships for Pt agglomeration and particle growth.
10. The source of the data is noted for ease of referencing the experimentation that tested the
failure mode. The references for this example are from a review paper [16], and a review
book [42].
3.4.3 GDL
The first failure mode ‘3.0/1 OH Radicals contamination to PTFE’ is taken from a review paper
[23] and is presented in Table 3.4.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
3.0 Gas Diffu-
sion Layer
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OH radicals
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creasing GDL
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and hydropho-
bicity
Reduction in
voltage output
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Curve
Using graphi-
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during GDL
preparation to
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oxidative and
electrooxida-
tive stability.
Flooding J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
durability:
Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
Table 3.4: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - Gas Diffusion Layer OH radical attack to PTFE
A further explanation of the above table is detailed below:
Column:
1. ‘OH Radicals contamination to PTFE’ affects the GDL of the PEMFC, and as such the
GDL component is listed with its numerical identifier ‘3.0’.
2. The GDL has two main functions; it disperses the feed gases from the BIP gas channels to
the reactive sites on the Catalyst Layer. It also serves to provide an electrically conductive
bridge from the reaction site to the BIP where the electrical ‘work’ energy can be utilised.
3. The number 3.0 identifies the failure mode is in relation to the GDL, listed in column
one. The number /1.0 identifies the first failure mode listed of that section.
4. The radical contamination can attack the PTFE material used in GDL construction,
and this directly affects the GDL’s electrical conductivity and it’s hydrophobicity. This
means that the removal of excess water is limited, and less electrical ‘work’ energy can be
harvested by the system.
5. For this example, the overall system effect is a reduction in the output voltage.
6. A polarisation curve can be used to identify this failure mode occurrence. The reduced
electrical conductivity is related to ohmic resistance of the polarisation curve, and as such,
the center section relative to ohmic resistance would show a linear drop.
7. One can increase the GDL’s resistance to this type of degradation by using graphitised
fibers during the GDL construction process. This would improve the oxidative and electro-
oxidative stability of the GDL.
8. There are no remarks for this failure mode.
9. Due to the loss of GDL hydrophobicity, this failure mode will have an affect on flooding
phenomena in the PEMFC.
10. The source information for this failure mode is from a review paper [23].
3.4.4 BIP
The first failure mode ‘4.0/1 Oxide film formation’ is taken from a review paper [23] and is
analysed in Table 3.5.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
4.0 Bipolar
Plate
The BIP is a
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component of
a PEMFC. It
separates fuel,
oxidant gas
and coolant;
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distributing
reactant gases
to the GDL.
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the current
from the FC
reaction, de-
livering it to
the external
circuit.
4.0/1 Oxide
film formation
An oxide film
layer can form
at the junction
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and BIP. This
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current flow.
Drop in output
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to resistance
increase
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Curve
Swelling J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
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Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
Table 3.5: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - BIP section, Oxide film formation
The table entries contents are further explained below:
Column:
1. ‘Oxide film formation’ affects the BIP of the PEMFC, and as such the BIP component is
listed with its numerical identifier ‘4.0’.
2. The BIP has two main functions; it delivers the feed gases from the hydrogen storage and
air compressor to the GDL whilst separating the coolant flow from the PEMFC inners,
and collects the current to pass on to the next cell in the stack.
3. The number 4.0 identifies the failure mode is in relation to the BIP, listed in column one.
The number /1.0 identifies the first failure mode listed of that section.
4. During operation, the BIP can start to build up an oxide film layer on the boundary of
the BIP and the GDL. This increases internal resistance and increases pressure in the cell.
5. For this example, the overall system effect is a reduction in the output voltage.
6. A polarisation curve can be used to identify this failure mode occurrence. The reduced
electrical conductivity is related to ohmic resistance of the polarisation curve, and as such,
the centre section relative to ohmic resistance would show a linear drop.
7. There are no mitigation strategies in relation to this failure mode.
8. There are no remarks for this failure mode.
9. Oxide film formation increases the thickness of the BIP, and as the torque levels are set
from commissioning, this will increase the mechanical pressure in the cell. As such, this
failure mode can be related to membrane swelling.
10. The source information for this failure mode is from a review paper [23].
3.5 Conclusions
In total, the complete FMEA has 21 failure modes identified; 8 membrane layer failure modes,
7 catalyst layer, 4 GDL and 2 BIP failure modes. The full FMEA covering all the component
failure modes listed in this section is given in Appendix A.
Due to the complicated nature of the relationships between failure modes, a most significant
failure mode is not easily singled out. To ascertain a greater understanding of the logic pertaining
to failure modes in PEMFCs, alternative methods of reliability analysis need to be considered.
The fact that the membrane has the most failure modes identified, would suggest that this
component is one of the most susceptible to degradation and failures in the system.
The most common system effect is the overall drop in voltage, with the most common
and easily undertaken failure detection method is considered to be the polarisation curve. An
overview of the main findings are presented by Whiteley, et al. in [49].
The full FMEA is a detailed analysis of the degradation phenomena that can be observed
in a PEMFC environment. The failure modes are taken from the literature based upon the key
assumptions previously mentioned.
This work has extended the previous work in [30] by developing their list of operating
failures into a full FMEA. Details are provided in this work that were previously unavailable,
giving a greater insight into failure modes in a PEMFC and how they interact. This FMEA
table is invaluable in the FT production process, as it take a very detailed view of all of the
possible failure modes and their possible interactions in a specified system. The data from the
above forms the basis of the following FT section. Due to the full FMEA, it was discovered
that there are numerous relationships between failure modes that need be further analysed. A
FT can graphically identify the logic of failure modes in a system to greater understand the
implications of this work.
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Chapter 4
Existing Reliability Modelling
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, FT analysis was recently used in [30] to try to model the
reliability of a single cell PEMFC. From various literary sources, they came to the conclusion
that there are 37 individual basic events to be considered when analysing the degradation of a
PEMFC. The FT presented is a ‘physical analysis of a single cell PEMFC’, splitting the top-
event of the ‘Degradation of the Cell’ down through an OR gate into three physical components
of a PEMFC; Membrane (G2), Gas Diffusion Layer (G4) and Catalyst Layer (G3) as in Figure
2.5. These are three of the four main physical components of a PEMFC with only the bipolar
plate being omitted.
G2, G3 and G4 each had 12, 12 and 6 intermediate events respectively, which further
branched down through OR gates to the basic events. As all of the gates in the presented
FT were of the OR variety, the minimum cut sets are simply all order ones, representing the
basic events of the tree.
This chapter presents an intensive review of the existing work and will enhance the present
work with the followings reported for consideration.
4.1 Analysis Review - Limitations Determined
4.1.1 Top Event
The top event for the tree developed in [30] can be interpreted as equivocal; ‘Degradation of
the cell’ does not directly inform the reader of what ‘degradation’ is classed as, and what drop
in voltage output is considered to be degraded. A failure of a sub-system or process is an ideal
scenario for using FT analysis, however the top event of ‘Degradation of a cell’ does not fit these
criteria. A more prudent way of defining the top event would be to suggest a rate of degradation
over a time period that is unacceptable. Partial failures can be used in a FT, however the terms
must be clearly defined as to not cause ambiguity.
The commonly agreed criteria for the PEMFC is to have a reduction in output voltage of
no more than 5% over the 5000 hours period [23]. Therefore for a failure at the top level of
the FT, unacceptable conditions would entail a performance drop of >5% before 5000 hours,
or failure to meet 5000 hours of operation. A top event reflecting this standard would alleviate
the uncertainty with the current top event. It is suggested that a new top event is used to
emulate the commonly accepted lifetime requirements of a PEMFC for automotive applications
to have a top event of; ‘<5000h cell lifetime or >5% drop of output voltage’. This proposed
top event represents a reduction of more than 5% of the performance of the fuel cell over
the operating time of 5000 hours. A drop in performance of 6% in the first 1000 hours would
therefore trigger this top event, however a total drop in performance of 4% over 6000 hours
would not trigger the top event. This target is used due to the fuel cell community accepting
this as their standards, however in reality it is a very stern target. Fuel cells operate in very
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harsh conditions, experiencing oxidising, acidic, temperature variation and potential/current
variations. They therefore inherently degrade during normal operating conditions. PEMFCs in
automotive applications are exclusively hybridised with conventional batteries, both to allow for
regenerative braking, and to level the load out form the electric motor. It is therefore completely
feasible that a PEMFC vehicle could still perform well even after 10-15% voltage degradation.
However, the finer details of international target setting is not the subject of this work, and
therefore this work is bound by the current regulations set out in [23].
4.1.2 Bipolar Plate Omission
The omission of the bipolar plate component of a PEMFC is an issue that needs to be addressed.
There are many studies in the literature that document and analyse the degradation and failures
of bipolar plate materials in PEMFC. Failure modes affecting the bipolar plates are; corrosion
of the metal bipolar plate when in contact with the aqueous and acidic environment of the
PEMFC, releasing metal ions, and oxide film formation.
Corrosion related failures have documented occurrences in a number of studies [50][32][51].
A 2012 study showed that cell performance can be dramatically reduced through bipolar plate
corrosion and the formation of passive oxides creating an oxide film [52]. The corrosion of the
plate material and the formation of the oxide film reduce the electrical conductivity of the plate.
They showed that the film gradually increases in thickness with age, and as such the resistance
increases with the thickness of the film. This phenomenon is only present on the cathode side
where O2 is the fuel and hence having the opportunity to form the oxide layer. At the anode
side, H2 is the fuel, and thus this issue is not apparent.
The bipolar plate can also affect other parts of the PEMFC, for example steel bipolar plates
can release Iron (Fe+) and Copper (Cu+) ions that can have a detrimental affect elsewhere.
For example in an intermediate event in the membrane branch named ‘Contamination by trace
metal ion G10’. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, G10 is split into the presence of foreign cations
and altered water flux.
The FT presented puts accelerated membrane thinning and pinholes as the cause of altered
water flux, whereas review papers [40][23] suggest that the presence of the foreign cations
displace the H+ ions in the membrane, and would lead to membrane thinning and possibly
pinhole formation. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, ‘Contamination by trace metal ion - G10’
is shown as an intermediate event that can be caused by either the undeveloped event of
‘Presence of foreign cationic ions - E039’ or ‘Altered water flux inside the membrane - G12’.
‘Altered water flux inside the membrane - G12’ is further split into two basic events; ‘Formation
of pinholes - E031’ and ‘Acceleration of membrane thinning - E030’. The logic here requires
further development, as the presence of trace metal ions could be considered to be a basic
event leading towards pinholes/accelerated thinning of the membrane. Additionally ‘Presence
of foreign cationic ions - E039’ which is an undeveloped event in the tree, is arguably identical
to ‘Contamination by trace metal ion - G10’, and is therefore redundant.
As mentioned earlier, foreign cations can stem from the bipolar plate material as well as
inlet piping or humidifier materials. This fact, alongside the other bipolar plate corrosion issues
mentioned previously, would indicate that the overall structure of the tree would need further
evaluation.
Trace metal ions such as Fe+2 from the bipolar plate can have adverse effects throughout the
cell. It is known that these metal ions can contaminate the membrane and poison the electrode
catalyst. The current logic regarding the trace metal ions in the membrane degradation section
needs re-evaluating. The presence of foreign metal ions leads to accelerated membrane thinning
and possibly pinhole generation, therefore the tree should reflect this. This would require the
replication of the above basic event ‘E050 Metal Ion Release’ in the newly proposed G2 and
G3 intermediate events.
It has been stated that oxide film formation can increase the contact resistance of the bipolar
plate by ‘many orders of magnitude’ [32]. This basic event would need to be included in the
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Figure 4.1: Metal Ion Intermediate Event from [30]
overall model due to its effect on the reduction of output voltage, which is the quantifier for
degradation, leading to the top event failure.
4.1.3 Ambiguity of Intermediate Events
As with the previous issues found with the top event and first intermediate events, the majority
of the basic events are also equivocal and are not necessarily binary in nature. E002 ‘long-term
functioning’ (see Appendix B) is ambiguous in description, not informing the reader whether it
means that the cell is completely failed or is degraded to a lower output state due to long-term
operation. There is no explanation of what this pertains to, such as a time frame, or what the
failure mode is. During long term operation, many components can degrade by any number of
failure modes.
The membrane branch contains three basic events that need to be further considered. ‘Pin-
holes’, ‘Pinhole Production’ and ‘Formation of Pinholes’ are all listed as basic events, and are
explained as follows; ‘Pinholes’ are stated as occurring ‘due to exothermal combustion between
H2 and O2’. ‘Pinhole Production’ is listed as not due to, but related to ‘mechanical degradation’.
Finally ‘Formation of Pinholes’ is considered to be ‘due to contamination by trace metal ion’.
This would suggest that the three ‘basic’ events could be further broken down to fundamental
basic events.
4.1.4 Lack of Standardised Data
The lack of homogenised data for a PEMFC is a pitfall that can only be overcome by an increase
in experimental analysis of certain failure modes in a FC. An ideal scenario would incorporate
sets of standardised experiments to homogenate degradation data, aiding with the validity of
failure analysis. These would use the same cell materials, size and construction to make sure
that degradation data is as reliable as possible.
4.2 Conclusions
A recently presented quantitative FT has proven to be a good first step in degradation analysis
and failure forecasting. Some areas that need to be addressed have been identified in [53][54], in
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Figure 4.2: Proposed Change to ’Global’ Tree
particular critical component omission, basic event logic & structure, ambiguity of events and
lack of standardised data sets. It is envisaged that if these issues can be addressed, the overall
degradation analysis of PEMFCs will become increasingly more accurate.
Building upon the information ascertained from the previous FMEA, and from the analysis
of the presented FT, a new FT is developed to advance this field of PEMFC degradation and
reliability concerns.
4.3 Advancing the FT
4.3.1 Top event & intermediate top level structure
Following investigation into the operation of the PEMFC and a FMEA analysis carried out
to understand the effect of the component failure modes, 21 basic events were found relating
to the top event ‘<5000h cell lifetime or >5% drop of output voltage’, and for which data is
available for a quantitative analysis.
The basic events for the overall FT are shown in Table 4.1.
Some of the basic events listed in this table were not previously considered in existing work
with FTA, the existing failure modes that have remained unchanged are listed in bold text.
Some of the basic events listed in Table 4.1 were omitted in previous works, however they have
been introduced as the literature shows that these failure modes have been observed in PEMFC
operation.
The overall intermediate events are also presented in Figure 4.2, containing Catalyst Layer
Degradation, Membrane Degradation, Gas Diffusion Layer Degradation and Bipolar Plate
Degradation. These represent the grouping and classification of the types of intermediate or
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Table 4.1: List of Basic Events
Basic Events - Membrane
Flooding
Ice Formation
Incorrect BIP torque
Creep
Fatigue from Relative Humidity and Temperature cycling
Oxide Film Formation
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination form Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
OH or OOH Radical Attack
Previously Formed Pinholes
Excess Heat
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic Events - Catalyst
Pt Loss and Distribution
Pt Migration
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination from Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution
Ice Formation
Flooding
Creep
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic Events - Gas Diffusion Layer
OH or OOH Radical Attack
Flooding
Ice Formation
Basic Events - Bipolar plate
Oxide Film Formation
Corrosion leading to release of multivalent cations
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basic events that feed into that branch. All of the intermediate events from this level contribute
towards the specific top event degradation levels.
4.3.2 Proposed FT
A new FT has been developed that goes further than the work in [30]. The Bipolar plate omission
has been addressed with the addition of a fourth level 2 intermediate event; ‘Bipolar Plate
Degradation’. The basic events feeding this intermediate event include; ‘Oxide film Formation’
and ‘Dissolution of metal ions’.
Cho, et al. [55] showed that the corrosion of the metal bipolar plates for stainless steel
releases metallic elements such as Fe, Nickel (Ni), Chromium (Cr) and Titanium (Ti). The
dissolution of these metals into the Membrane Electrode Assembly (MEA) can increase the
ohmic resistance and the charge transfer resistance by taking up space on the active sites of the
catalyst.
Wu, et al. [23] discuss the degradation mechanisms of bipolar plate materials in a PEMFC,
paying attention to the formation of an oxide film on the plate. A large concern with bipolar
plates, is the contact resistance between the BIP and the GDL, attributed to the resistance
caused by the formation of the oxide film.
Due to the aforementioned factors observed in [55] and [23], these two factors are included
in the presented FT under gate ‘BIP’ in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.3: Proposed ‘Membrane’ Top level
The membrane degradation branch of the global FT is further split down into the three
main pathways of degradation in the membrane; ‘Mechanical Degradation’, ‘Chemical Attack’
and ‘Thermal Degradation’ as per Figure 4.3.
The mechanical degradation branch of the membrane branch of the global FT is presented
in Figure 4.4 and shows the failure modes that contribute towards membrane degradation con-
tributing towards the top event voltage drop. Level 1 intermediate events of this sub-branch in-
clude; ‘Local mechanical stress due to increased pressure’, ‘Microcrack Fracture’ and ‘Pinholes’.
Any localised mechanical stress is caused by swelling inside the cell, and as such the swelling
relationships are repeated from the basic events under the ‘Non-Uniform Contact Pressure’
intermediate event under the ‘Microcrack Fracture’ intermediate event. Microcrack fractures
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Figure 4.4: Proposed mechanical section of the ‘Membrane’ FT
can be considered to be anything that results in a physical breach of the membrane, and is
segregated from pinholes due to geometry. Microcracks can be considered to be tears, whereas
pinholes are circular holes. These are not grouped under one mechanical breach intermediate
event due to the varying conditions and events leading to each phenomena. The Pinholes section
describes the basic events and combinations of said events leading to the formation of pinholes
on the membrane material. The two main pathways described are from either mechanical stress
(such as punctures from foreign bodies) and a chemical measure from the chemical degradation
segment of the membrane FT that is transferred in.
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Figure 4.5: Proposed chemical section of ‘Membrane’ FT
The chemical attack branch is further divided in to three intermediate events and one
basic event in level 1, shown in Figure 4.5. ‘Exothermal Combustion Between H2 and O2’ is
caused by any previously formed pinholes, and thus the feed gasses meeting and reacting. The
‘Presence of foreign cationic ions’ can be caused by either the ‘Dissolution of metal ions’ and any
‘Contamination from Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity’. The radical attack level 1 event needs
to have any dissolution of metal ions from the bipolar plate and hydrogen peroxide formation
to be fulfilled. However radical attack can fulfil the criteria for overall chemical degradation on
its own, and as such is listed as a basic event.
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Figure 4.6: Proposed Thermal section of ‘Membrane’ FT
Thermal degradation is then listed with two intermediate events of ‘Degradation due to
freezing temperatures’ and ‘Degradation due to high Temperatures’. The two main basic events
that feed these are; ‘Ice Formation’ and ‘Excess Heat’ as can be seen in Figure 4.6. Under a
normal temperature range for a PEMFC (around 60-80◦C), there is no degradation in relation
to only temperature. Only when the cell is operated below freezing, or above the designated
operating temperature is degradation observed. Each basic event feeds into an intermediate
event which further explains the degradation caused by either too much heat or too little heat,
however the only available data is attributable to the basic event itself, therefore the additional
intermediate events are there for strictly qualitative purposes.
The FT for the GDL presented in Figure 4.7 is split from overall ‘Gas Diffusion Layer
Degradation’ into the level 1 intermediate events; ‘Anode Side’, ‘Mechanical Compression’ and
‘Cathode Side’. This is primarily a physical representation of the failure modes that can be
experienced at either side of the cell. ‘Mechanical Compression’ is an undeveloped event due to
the lack of literature regarding the degradation of GDL material due to mechanical compression
and the related degradation data. This area has been identified as an area for potential further
development through experimentation and in-depth research.
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Figure 4.7: Proposed ‘GDL’ FT
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Figure 4.8: Proposed ‘Catalyst” FT
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‘Catalyst Layer Degradation’ was split into its three main constituent materials. When
constructing the catalyst ink, carbon support material is mixed with the Pt nanoparticles, an
ionomer (usually PTFE based), and finally a solvent as a mixer. After ball milling for a while the
solvent is lost during curing, leaving the mixed carbon/Pt/ionomer ink. Degradation regarding
these component materials is therefore proposed in Figure 4.8. Failure phenomena such as Pt
agglomeration locally affect the dispersion of Pt nanoparticles on the carbon support, and as
such are listed in the ‘Pt Catalyst Degradation’ section of the tree. Any failure modes that
affect the Carbon support material are listed in the corresponding branch of the FT.
4.3.3 FT Summary
The FT was split into branches representing the physical components of a PEMFC; membrane,
gas diffusion layer, catalyst layer and bipolar plate as shown in Figure 4.2. These were further
broken down depending upon the categorisation of the failure phenomena. The FT was drawn
based upon the information gleaned from the FMEA completed previously.
The FT was created based upon the same initial assumptions regarding the construction
and operation of the cell, highlighted in chapter 2.
The membrane is a single component which can experience failures from mechanical, thermal
or chemical degradation mechanisms. Therefore this section was split into the three degradation
mechanisms shown in Figure 4.3. The GDL has a single component construction, however there
are two GDL layers in a PEMFC and as such, this segment was split into anode side and
cathode side degradation mechanisms. As can be seen in Figure 4.7, mechanical compression
was also included which would affect both sides of the GDL. The BIP is a very simple segment
with only few failure mechanisms that they need not be further split down into sub-categories.
In terms of the full tree, there are 70 overall events, stemming from 37 overall intermediate
events. The majority of basic events are all stemmed from OR gates as each basic event can
lead to the overall top event individually, leaving only two AND gates in the membrane section.
Due to the absorption law the MCS for the overall FT are all of the basic events individually.
This section has re-evaluated the previous FT logic including the addition of previously
omitted failure modes. The new FT layout is a more logical progression of the failure modes
in a PEMFC, and as such is a step forward towards to reliability analysis of PEMFC. Not
only this, but this section has shown an up to date validity of the causes of degradation in a
PEMFC, by systematically analysing all the potential failure modes in a specific type of FC.
This enhances the understanding of reliability issues in PEMFCs.
4.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
Because of their graphical representation and ability to assign data to basic events, FTs can
be evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. The MCS are a list of cut sets that are the
minimal and necessary conditions for the top event to be realised. These can inform the reader
of what are the most severe basic events in a system, and where the most attention needs to
be applied.
4.4.1 Qualitative
Qualitative analysis is in the form of analysing the combination of gates through either algebraic
representations or listing cut sets. A cut set is a list of events where all of which will lead to
the occurrence of the top event.
4.4.2 Quantitative
Quantification of the FT was undertaken to gain an understanding of the expected failure
occurrence during operating life. Degradation rates were sought from the literature where avail-
able, with any gaps in the data filled by expert evaluation as in Table 4.2. For example, where
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available, previously published experimental studies were analysed and the degradation rate
presented due to an adverse operating condition was used in this work as the rate associated
with the same basic event occurring. For example J.M.L Canut. et, al. [56] found that when
flooding occurred, a degradation in voltage equal to 0.39 Vh−1 was observed. Therefore this
rate was used to correspond to the failure mode of ‘flooding’.
Figure 4.9: PEMFC Membrane flooding degradation test [56]
In their experimentation, the flow rate of cathode supply feed was decreased to induce
flooding effects in the cell, and produced the results presented in Figure 4.9. Two testes were
conducted, and for integrity of results, both test were considered and averaged for the overall
voltage drop due to cell flooding of 0.39 Vh−1.
Table 4.2 shows the basic event codes for each corresponding basic event description. This
code will be used in later tables for brevity and formatting limitations.
As in [30], for each basic event listed in Table 4.2, µ(t) is assumed to follow a Weibull
distribution, where µ(t) = 1/λ(t) and λ(t) is the degradation rate. The probability density
function F (t) is given by Equation 4.1. The Weibull distribution was used as it adds a level of
randomness to the flat degradation rates used. It can be assumed that a real world system would
not always behave in the exact way that the flat degradation rate would suggest, therefore the
Weibull distribution varies the outcome based upon the integration of a random number.
F (t) =
β
ηd
(
t− γ
ηd
)β−1
e
−
(
t−γ
ηd
)β
(4.1)
Where β is the shape parameter or Weibull slope, ηd is the scale parameter or characteristic
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Table 4.2: List of Degradation Parameters Used
ID Failure Mode Parameter Value (Vh−1) Ref
BE01 Flooding 0.39 [56]
BE02 Ice Formation 0.5 Proposed
BE03 Incorrect BIP torque 10−3 Proposed
BE04 Creep 10−5 Proposed
BE05 Fatigue from Relative Humidity Cycling 1.2 x 10−4 [57]
BE06 Oxide film formation 3.125 x 10−5 [58]
BE07 Dissolution of metal ions 3.125 x 10−5 [58]
BE08 Contamination from Humidifier.. 4.37 x 10−3 [25]
BE09 Exothermal Combustion due to.. 1.3 x 10−2 [59]
BE10 Previously Formed Pinholes 1.3 x 10−3 [59]
BE11 OH or OOH Radical Attack 1.3 x 10−3 [59]
BE12 Excess Heat 0.25 [56]
BE13 Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution 2.5 x 10−2 [60]
BE14 Pt Loss & Distribution 2.5 x 10−2 [60]
BE15 Pt Migration 2.5 x 10−2 [60]
lifetime, and γ is the location parameter. The shape parameter is equal to the slope of the
line in a probability plot. This equation was used by the software FaultTree+ to determine the
failure behaviour for the assembeled FT by applying the Weibull rates to each individual basic
event in the tree, and analysing the failure logic to determine the top event unavailability.
The scale parameter can be determined from:
ηd =
µ(t)
Γ(1 + 1β )
(4.2)
Where:
Γ(η) =
∫ ∞
0
xη−1e−xdx (4.3)
The location parameter, γ, is left at 0 for this study, as it is assumed that all degradation
starts at the beginning of life for the cell.
It was shown in [61] that if µ(t) follows a Weibull distribution with parameters β & ηd then
times to failure (T) will also follow a Weibull distribution with parameters β and η = Dfηd.
Where Df is the degradation level at which failure occurs. In the analysis performed for this
work, failure is assumed to occur when there is a 5% drop in voltage. Therefore Df = 0.05Vin
where Vin is the initial voltage of the cell. Vin is assumed to be 1 V for this work, as discussed
in chapter 1 where it was suggested that a real world FC would expect an OCV of around 1V
due to losses.
Using the parameters η and β for T in the FT enables the probability of the top event to
be determined.
Each parameter calculated for each basic event is listed in Table 4.3, and shows the degra-
dation rate, multiplicative inverse, scale parameter for µ(t), scale parameter for T , gamma
function, and the shape parameter.
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Table 4.3: Table of Weibull distribution data used
ID Deg. Rate Mu (t) Scale Parameter
for µ(t) [Eq. 4.2]
Scale Parameter
for T [0.005xµ(t)]
Gamma
Function
Shape
Charac-
teristic
λ(t) µ(t) ηd η Γ(α) β
BE01 0.39 2.56 2.56 0.13 1 1
BE02 0.5 2 2 0.1 1 1
BE03 10−3 100 88.26 4.41 1.13 0.8
BE04 10−5 10000 11283.79 564.19 0.89 2
BE05 1.2 x 10−4 8333.33 9403.16 470.16 0.89 2
BE06 3.125 x 10−5 32000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE07 3.125 x 10−5 32000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE08 4.37 x 10−3 228.83 258.21 12.91 0.89 2
BE09 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE10 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE11 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE12 0.25 4 4 0.2 1 1
BE13 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE14 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE15 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
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Figure 4.10: Unavailability of cell over Time
4.5 Results
The minimal cut sets for the FT developed are in fact the basic events themselves due to the
fact that the vast majority of the logic gates are of ‘OR’ gates. This means that the basic event
with the highest likelihood of failure will trigger the top event first under every iteration of the
model. A plot of the unavailability of the cell over time is shown in Figure 4.10.
As can be seen, the unavailability of the FC - when the cell is considered failed - is after
around 30 minutes. This is a very low lifetime for a FC, and is solely due to the highest
degradation rate interacting with the logic of the FT. BE02 - Ice Formation, has a degradation
rate of 0.5V h−1 as operating a FC in sub-zero temperatures has severe effects on the materials
of the FC and even the blockage of feed gasses to the reactant sites, however the probability of
this occurring depends on operating conditions.
If high degradation failure modes such as BE12, BE02 and BE01 are removed, we see the
unavailability increase to around 3 hours of operation (Figure 4.11), which is consistent with
a failure due to the next highest degradation rate. This shows that the failure mode with the
lowest η and corresponding β will be the failure mode to trigger the top event soonest.
BE01, BE02 and BE12 are failure modes that shouldn’t occur under normal operating
conditions, however they can be triggered by the occurrence of alternative failure modes. If
pinholes occur during normal operation, they can trigger the exothermal combustion of the
feed gasses, which leads to excess heat. The FTA approach does not consider these knock on
failure occurrences, and is an additional pitfall to using this technique for a highly accurate
degradation model.
Also, in order to understand the degradation experienced under all possible operating con-
ditions, a FT would need to be analysed for each condition, which can be considered to be
infeasible. To do so would require a FT for every type of operating mode, from differing pres-
sures to differing temperatures, and therefore would be very large and complex. Alternative
methods to understand degradation in FCs is needed to overcome this shortfall.
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Figure 4.11: Unavailability
4.5.1 Relationship Concerns
The basic events in the membrane branch of a PEMFC FT are intrinsically linked. Some
events can lead on to other events occurring, additionally some events can exacerbate other
issues. To discuss this further, under the membrane degradation branch of the tree, G2, gas
crossover has been listed as a basic event (‘Increasing gas crossover’ E020). H2O2 formation is
listed as a basic event under the peroxide/radical degradation and is placed under the chemical
degradation branch. In the ‘Electrocatalysts and catalyst layers degradation’ branch, a basic
event of Platinum dissolution’ highlights the issue of Pt nanoparticles separating from the CL
and migrating to other areas of the cell. F.A.D. Bruijn. et, al. [40] suggest that radicals are
formed at either; the cathode through H2O2 which is formed as part of the oxygen reduction
reaction, or through the decomposition of H2O2 at the anode through the crossover of O2
from the cathode to anode. Additionally, they state that recent work shows how radicals can
be formed through a more direct pathway as opposed to the H2O2 intermediary pathway, in
the presence of Pt. This is where favourable conditions for degradation can be provided by a
reaction between molecular H2 and O2 in the presence of Pt particles that have separated from
the CL through electrode degradation. This shows that gas crossover, H2O2 formation and Pt
dissolution are interlinked and therefore should not be listed as segregated basic events. Gas
crossover creates H2O2, which causes radical introduction, and Pt nanoparticles from dissolution
create radicals that attack the membrane. The radical attack causes thinning of membrane
which can create pinholes and increased gas crossover. Operating conditions have been proven
to exacerbate the above relationships, namely; high temperature, low humidification and high
gas pressure.
In order to understand the links between the different basic events in the current FT, the
entirety of the basic events contained in the intermediate events branches were plotted out with
any potential links and relationships highlighted, the relationships are shown in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Relationship Analysis of Basic Events
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In Figure 4.12, arrows link basic events that can have an affect upon the other. The Figure
highlights the complex nature of the basic events experienced in such a system.
Pt Catalyst Degradation
One of the main overarching pitfalls regarding relationships between basic events occurs within
Pt catalyst degradation. The catalyst layer is comprised of a fine distribution of Pt nanoparti-
cles, dispersed over carbon black support. The catalyst layer is subject to research attention as
it is feeds into one of the three main hurdles to commercialisation of FCs; cost. Pt is a funda-
mentally expensive metal and the most effective way to utilise this commodity is to reduce the
Pt loadings and increase their durability in a cell. The mechanisms for Pt catalyst degradation
are; (i) Agglomeration and Particle Growth; (ii) Loss; (iii) Migration and (iv) Poisoning due to
Contamination (shown in Figure 4.13).
Figure 4.13: Pt Catalyst Degradation FT Logic
Agglomeration and Particle Growth refers to the tendency for small nanoparticles of Pt
to want to group together and cluster to form larger particles. The thermodynamically driven
development is apparent due to larger particles of Pt being more energetically preferential than
smaller ones. This mechanism is often referred to as ‘Ostwald Ripening’.
Pt Loss is a process where nanoparticles of Pt can be detached from their carbon support
and flow through the FC to be removed by the product water.
Migration is a similar process to Loss, however the detached particles can be redistributed
to other areas of the FC, causing adverse effects with other components.
Poisoning due to Contamination can be categorised by the degradation of the catalyst due
to foreign contaminants from either fuel supply or system-derived contaminants.
The above mechanisms of degradation will reduce the overall surface area of catalyst and
reduce the ECSA of the cell. Not only does the loss of ECSA due to the previous degradation
mechanisms cause an overall reduction in output voltage, but Pt particles present in other areas
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of the FC can cause concerns. In these other area Pt contamination will cause exacerbations
in other failure modes. Pt can facilitate the creation of OOH radicals in the membrane, also
leading to H2O2 formation, by the process denoted in Equations 4.4,4.5 & 4.6.
H2 + Pt→ Pt−H (4.4)
Pt−H + O2 → ·OOH (4.5)
·OOH + Pt−H → H2O2 (4.6)
Pt can also act as a catalyst for carbon oxidation which can affect the catalyst support
and the GDL. Carbon can be oxidised to form CO2 at relatively low potentials. However the
kinetics of this process is so slow, that carbon is fine to use in FC applications. However when
Pt is present, it can speed up this reaction to cause cell degradation as per Equations 4.7 & 4.8.
C + H2O→ CO + 2 H+ + 2 e− (4.7)
CO + H2O→ CO2 + 2 H+ + 2 e− (4.8)
Equation 4.8 uses Pt to catalyse the reaction forming CO2 from the Carbon material in the
FC. The presence of Pt particles reduces the potential region form 1.1 V vs reversible Hydrogen
Electrode (RHE) for carbon corrosion, to 0.55 V vs RHE. The FC is far more likely to be
operating at the lower voltage and as such poses a significant risk of performance loss.
Pinhole Relationships
It has been highlighted that the basic events presented by Placca and Kouta have certain
relationships that make it difficult to make equivocal statements regarding the FT logic.
Pinholes were found to be three events listed as basic, but were all caused by certain con-
ditions or phenomena. Therefore they need to be broken down further to the basic events that
cause the pinholes.
Pinholes are a mechanical deformation of the membrane (as shown in Figure 4.14). Pinholes,
from previous research, were cited as three separate basic events explained as; (i) Pinholes
Production (mechanical degradation); (ii) Pinholes (due to exothermal combustion between H2
and O2); (iii) Formation of Pinholes (due to contamination by trace metal ion). These failure
modes were adapted to fit logically into the new tree, however further analysis has identified a
potential issue with this failure mode.
This mechanical deformation of the membrane leads on to mechanical degradation of the
FC. The descriptions given for previous basic events indicate the inherent further causal links
between lower level events and pinholes. This is to say that if an event is due to something else,
then it can be disseminated down to the said cause.
Pinholes were adapted into the presented tree as three basic events(as shown in Figure 4.15).
The membrane can indeed suffer pinholes from the exothermal combustion of H2 and O2,
however that is not the only chemical attack phenomenon that can lead to pinholes. Chemical
attack of any kind causes membrane thinning, which increases the risk of pinholes. Therefore
it would be prudent to try to group all the pinholes basic events into one group.
Pinholes Issue Pinholes pose a drawback when utilising FTA for PEMFC degradation mod-
elling, through its ‘vicious cycle’ tendency. Pinholes can be created through the exothermal
combustion of H2 and O2 which comes around from reactant gas crossover. Once a pinhole has
propagated through this process, more gas is allowed to cross over, resulting in more combus-
tion of gases, causing hot spots and consequently more pinholes. This vicious cycle starts an
exponential decay or PEMFC performance.
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Figure 4.14: SEM image of Pinhole damage to a membrane. ([62])
Figure 4.15: Pinholes logic within chemical and mechanical branches
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Figure 4.16: Pinhole cycle
Not only is the above true, but the knock on effects of Pt degradation also leads on to other
degradation phenomenon additionally.
This unearths difficulties in using a standard FT layout to model PEMFC degradation.
Increased Pressure in Cell
There are four basic events that can contribute towards an increase in the pressure of a PEMFC;
‘Incorrect BIP torque’, ‘Flooding’, ‘Ice Formation’ and ‘Oxide film formation’. ‘Incorrect BIP
torque’ during assembly can actively compress the internal component materials of the FC.
‘Flooding’ takes up room inside the cell and can push from the inside against the BIP walls.
‘Ice Formation’ acts in a similar fashion to flooding, however any frozen water will expand
further, and place more stress on the PEMFC. ‘Oxide film formation’ acts to increase the
internal pressure by building up a layer on the surface of the BIP, reducing the internal space
for the interior component materials of the cell. All of these individual components can cause
an increase in pressure in the cell, however combinations of the above will have increased affects
on FC performance.
Ice Formation
A hydrated membrane is essential to the operation of the cell, and this hydration is achieved
through a chemical bond of water to the membrane. Bound water cannot freeze to form ice
until -120◦C[16], and therefore ice formation in the cell is dependant upon water flooding in
the cell. Any unbound water behaves as expected and will freeze at 0◦C causing an issue.
4.5.2 Dependencies Summary
There are numerous circumstances in FC degradation where failure modes have dependencies
highlighted above. A key pitfall to using FTA is the fact that FTA cannot take this into account,
and therefore would require alternative methods either integrated into the FTA or a different
method used altogether.
4.6 Conclusions
This work has re-evaluated FT logic determined in the earlier work, including the addition of
previously omitted failure modes. The new FT layout developed here is a more logical progres-
sion of the failure modes in a PEMFC than shown previously, and as such is a step forward in
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the reliability analysis of PEMFC. Up to date validity of the causes of degradation in a PEMFC
have also been shown, enhancing the understanding of reliability issues in PEMFCs.
Figure 4.12 showed how certain basic events can lead on to others, and how they can also
make other events worse. In particular, this instance of making others worse, questions the
assumptions of the FTA techniques and its suitability for modelling these relationships with
the PEMFC. It is therefore suggested that further research should look at re-evaluating the
logic and structure of the presented FT. This would identify if FTA can be used for PEMFC
degradation analysis, and failure forecasting.
By examining the events in the FT it is felt that further advancements can be made with
regards to better portrayal of the event interactions. The main concern with the FT approach
used to evaluate a PEMFC, is the pitfall of intricate relationships. It is seldom the case that one
failure mode will be isolated from other failure modes influences. This flags a problem where
alternative reliability techniques may need to be exploited.
One of the main limitations with current FT analysis of PEMFCs is the lack of forged
links between different failure modes, where upon there exists key relationships between certain
failure modes in a PEMFC system.
The presented FTA goes on from the FMEA to graphically show the logical interactions
between failure mode areas. The FTA has highlighted where each failure mode stems from,
with reference to each physical component of a PEMFC. Although the FTA presented is a step
forward in the qualitative reliability understanding of PEMFCs, the work has uncovered the
fact that relationships and dependencies between failure modes exist that make a quantifiable
reliability analysis not totally accurate when using FTA methods. Dependencies have been
found to exist between failure modes which would discount FTA for a quantitative analysis
of a PEMFC. Specifically, any failure due to pinholes was highlighted as an area where loops
occur, and basic events are intrinsically linked through dependent relationships. As pinholes
can be caused by the crossover of gas, which increases the rate of gas crossover, which in turn
increases pinhole production. Additionally, due to the minimal cut sets being each individual
failure mode, the failure mode with the shortest η is the failure mode that will inevitably cause
the occurrence of the top event first.
Hence, although FTA can be seen as a tool to gain a greater understanding of how failure
occurs in a PEMFC, and what basic events lead on to in a cell, it has limited use in reliability
assessment as no useful quantification can be made. Hence, if a true understanding of the
probability or frequency of failure is required, a different approach must be adopted.
Markov modelling and Petri-Net simulation can take into account dependencies between
failure modes and could therefore be exploited in a PEMFC study. However, Markov Modelling
is not suitable for detailed component failure modelling dues to the sheer amount of states
that would be required for each of the many components in the system. As such, future work
will entail development of a Petri-Net model that can take into account dependencies between
failure modes and deal with the inherent issues with using FTA for quantitative analysis of
PEMFCs.
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Chapter 5
Proposed Petri-Net Analysis
5.1 Petri-Net Graphs
Based upon the previous FMEA and FTA, a Petri-Net has been developed to consider the
interactions between failure modes and operating conditions in a PEMFC. The overall ‘global’
Petri-Net is presented in Figure 5.1. The global net is a coloured type Petri-net as the system
state is determined by the data contained within the token that passes through each transition.
Figure 5.1: Global Petri-Net for PEMFC
The Petri-Net consists of an Operating State place, which can either transfer through the
Degradation transition, or through the Failure transition into the Failed State place.
5.1.1 Operating State - Place
The operating state will contain the performance data from a FC model by Fly, et al [63]. It uses
a model based upon Equation 1.8, using; Enernst, ηact,a, ηact,c, ηfc, ηohmic and ηconcentration.
Enernst is found for a PEMFC with liquid product, considering temperature and pressure dif-
ferences. The Tafel equation (Equation 1.9) is used for ηact,a, ηact,c and ηfc overpotentials.
ηconcentration values are determined from an empirical exponential relationship, and the re-
maining ηohmic value is determined from a membrane hydration model.
A PEMFC performance model was integrated into the Petri-Net degradation model, which
increases the accuracy of the predictions made by the degradation model over using simple
FC equations. A 1D dimensional FC model developed by Fly & Thring [64] is used to predict
FC behaviour based upon key operational parameters. Sub-systems of the FC are modelled in
separate blocks using Simulink including voltage, hydration, mass and energy balances, and are
discusse din more detail below.
The key output from the 1D model is that of the voltage for the cell. This is what is modified
by the degradation model to show a drop in performance.
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Cell Voltage
The cell voltage is calculated using Equation 1.8 in section 1.6 using the OCV, and subtracting
the losses due to activation, ohmic, mass transport and fuel crossover losses. OCV is found
using Equation 1.5, whereas the activation and fuel crossover losses are found using the Tafel
equation (Equation 1.9). The mass transport losses are determined by empirical exponential
relationships, whereas ohmics losses come from the membrane hydration model block. The
resulting voltage profile and potential loss mechanisms are shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Cell voltage polarisation curve [65].
Hydration
The hydration of the membrane, which is paramount to the performance of the cell/stack, is
calculated from the empirical model of Springer, et al. [18]. This includes the effects of electro-
osmotic drag and back diffusion across the membrane.
Mass Balance
The anode and cathode are modelled separately as lumped volumes, and the mass of each gas
is calculated from the first order differential mass balances in equations 5.1 - 5.5.
Cathode
dmN2
dt
= m˙N2in − m˙N2out (5.1)
dmO2
dt
= m˙O2in − m˙O2out − m˙O2reac (5.2)
dmH2O
dt
= m˙H2Oin + m˙H2Oreac − m˙H2Oout − m˙H2Otrans (5.3)
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Anode
dmH2
dt
= m˙H2in − m˙H2out − m˙H2reac (5.4)
dmH2O
dt
= m˙H2Oin − m˙H2Oout + m˙H2Otrans (5.5)
Where m is the mass of the gas species, in shows the species in, out shows the species out,
reac is the electrochemical reaction energy, and trans is the transport loss.
Energy Balance
The temperature of the FC is calculated using a single thermal capacitance model as shown in
equations 5.6 & 5.7.
msCps
dTs
dt
= Q˙reac − Q˙elec + Q˙in − Q˙out − Q˙loss (5.6)
Q˙ = m˙H2Ov∆Hv +
n∑
j=1
m˙jCpj(T − T 0) (5.7)
Where ms is the mass of the stack, Cps is the specific heat, Q˙reac is the heat released during
the reaction, Q˙elec is the electrical power generated by the cell/stack, Q˙in and Q˙out represent
the heat flows into and out of the cell/stack, Q˙loss is a term to represent the small amount of
energy lost from the cell/stack surface due to natural convection, and Hv is the enthalpy of
water vapour.
1D model overview
Figure 5.3 shows how these separate blocks interlink to give the FC voltage based upon an input
current. Cell voltage is determined in the ‘stack voltage’ block, hydration is determined in the
‘membrane hydration’ block, the anode and carthode mass balance equations are calculated in
the ‘cathode model’ and ‘anode model’ blocks, and the energy balance is determined in the
‘thermal module’ block. The current is fed into the model and is the determining factor for the
calculations. The cathode and anode blocks take the current, and determining variables from
Equations 5.1 - 5.5. The membrane hydration block uses the product of the mass balance equa-
tions to calculate the resistance of the MEA, and feeds back data into the anode and cathode
mass balance blocks. The resistance values feed directly into the stack voltage calculation block,
with its product being the stack power. The thermal block takes outputs from all of the other
blocks for its calculations.
The 1D model used is a highly complex model that is computationally intensive. As to
reduce the computational time required to solve the model, certain aspects that were not
required for the purposes of degradation were removed from the model. A significant area of
improvement in the reduction of calculation time was achieved by removing the hybrid battery
model. Automotive PEMFCs are always hybridised with conventional battery systems as to
help with regenerative braking and load smoothing. However, for this work, precise control
over the PEMFC current and voltage was required and therefore the battery system model was
deemed redundant. Removal of this sub-system increased calculation time significantly.
A large section of the anode model was removed that calculated the mass flow of water in to
the anode. This section was replaced with a more simple calculation of this value that doesn’t
effect the outcome of the performance model. The more complex calculations were used by the
creators of the 1D model to calculate heat transfer, and is not required for this work.
Additionally, simplifications were made to the RH calculations that gave a greater amount
of control over the values if required. Simplifications were also made to the cathode model
sub-blocks to reduce the computational time required while still retaining accuracy.
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The 1D model runs in Simulink software which means that the calculations vary per real
world second which could skew degradation results. Therefore the time-step was smoothed out
to only offer values for the degradation model to handle at one second time-steps.
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Figure 5.3: Modified simulink model of 1D FC model [65]
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Model Parameters
The FC performance model is run based upon initialisation data that sets key variables as listed
in Table 5.1. These data are the input data that are required before the running of the cell,
and are representative of the type of FC being modelled, and are used in the equations that
determine the FC performance during operation. The model can be run either in a steady state
load or dynamic load mode, indicative of a drive cycle to match what would be required in an
automotive environment.
The values presented in Table 5.1 are either representative of the test rig materials or
common operational conditions used in the industry. ‘Test cell’ denotes that the value is inherent
from the MEA used, ‘Standard’ denotes that it is common practise, ‘Test rig’ means that the
value is set due to the rig itself, ‘FC model’ shows that the value is taken from the FC model
by Fly & Thring [65], and ‘Calculated’ means that the value was derived from an equation for
the specific MEA.
Table 5.1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value Justification
Fuel cell
Fuel cell rated power 67W Test cell
Number of cells 1 Test rig
Cell active area 200cm2 Test rig
Cathode stoichiometry 2.5 Standard
Anode stoichiometry 1.5 Standard
Ambient humidity 55% Test rig
Membrane thickness (z) 27.5µm Test cell
Internal current density (in) 1.5× 10−4A/cm2 FC model
Mass transport coefficient (atrans) 3× 10−4 FC model
Mass transport coefficient (btrans) 3.0 FC Model
Exchange current density at STP (ioc,0) 3.2× 10−8A/cm2 FC Model
Water entrainment constant (δ) 2.0 FC model
Molar mass membrane (Mmem) 1.1 kg/mol FC Model
Dry density membrane (ρdry) 1.98g/cm
3 FC Model
Cathode activation energy (Ec) 66kJ/mol Standard
Resistance Correction Factor 1.62 Calculated
The resistance correction factor is used to modify the membrane resistance to accurately
represent the membrane and GDL used for comparison. The model uses the resistance value of
68.68mS/cm for the Nafion 117 membrane and no GDL resistance. The correction factor is based
upon the Nafion XL membranes conductivity of 50mS/cm which is used in the experimentation,
and the GDL resistance due to compression of an additional 0.018/cm2 [66] calculated based
upon the resistivity of the GDL material and the clamping force applied to the end-plates of
the test rig.
This modification of the 1D model is paramount to increasing the accuracy of this work. The
output of the 1D model is heavily influenced by the thickness of the membrane, and thus, the
resistance of said membrane. One of the main ways in which to increase the performance of a
PEMFC is to reduce the thickness of the membrane, and therefore reduce the resistance value.
However, a balance needs to be struck when thinning the membrane excessively, as too much
thinning will weaken its structure and therefore become more susceptible to damage during use.
It was therefore of paramount importance to make sure that the 1D model was modified in the
aforementioned manor as to be certain that the output of the model was indicative of the exact
materials being tested in the experimental rig.
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5.1.2 Degradation - Transition
For every time step, the degradation transition fires, which links a variety of more detailed
Petri-net modules related to failure modes from the FMEA & FTA work. Whether or not the
individual degradation Petri-Nets are enabled, depends on the relationships for said Petri-net.
These can include operating conditions and previous interactions of failure modes.Each failure
mode previously identified in the FMEA and FTA has a Petri-Net attributed to it, which
shows the logic contributing towards its activation. A total of 20 Petri-Net modules have been
identified and a selection are described, with the entirety available in Appendix D.
5.1.3 Failure - Transition & Failed state - Place
The failure transition will be fired based on a simple relationship between expected FC per-
formance, and actual FC performance. As per the previously identified PEMFC degradation
and lifetime requirements, if the actual FC performance drops below 5% of expected FC per-
formance, the transition will fire.
The ‘Failed’ place, is a state of FC failure as identified above.
5.2 Petri-Net Module Overview
The degradation modules that are contained within the ’degradation’ transition of the global
Petri-net are standard Pateri-nets with the tokens containing no data, and only being used to
determine degradation occurance due to their positions. The full list of the 21 Petri-Net modules
used for this study, and what they are composed of are listed in Table 5.2. Their interactions,
are displayed in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Interactions between Petri-Net Modules
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Module Place
ID
State Name
BIP Corrosion P1 No BIP Corrosion
P2 BIP Corrosion
Carbon Catalyst Degra-
dation
P3 No Carbon Catalyst Degradation
P4 Reactant Mal-Distribution
P5 Potential <0.55V & Loss of Platinum
P6 Loss of Platinum
P7 Potential <0.55V
P8 Potential <1.1V
P9 Catalyst Carbon Degradation
Creep P10 No Creep
P11 Initial Creep
P12 Dry Operation of cell
P13 Hot Operation of cell
P14 Wet Operation of cell
P15 Time <100min
P16 Time >100min
P17 Early Creep
P18 Late Creep
P19 Normal Creep
Excessive Heat P20 Normal Heat
P21 Excessive Heat
Gas Crossover P22 No Gas Crossover
P23 Low rate of GCO
P24 Pinholes
P25 Microcrack
P26 High rate of GCO
GDL Degradation P27 No GDL Degradation
P28 PTFE & Carbon Deg.
P29 Swelling
P30 Flooding
P31 Radical Attack
P32 Freezing
P33 GDL Degradation
H2O2 Degradation P34 No H2O2 Degradation
P35 H2O2 Degradation below 30%
P36 Pt dissolution
P23 Low rate of GCO
P2 BIP Corrosion
P26 High rate of GCO
P37 Potential >0.695V
P38 H2O2 Degradation
Ice Formation P39 No Ice Formation
P30 Flooding
P32 Ice Formation
P40 Temperature >0C
Increased Pressure P41 Normal Pressure
P29 Swelling
P3 Incorrect BIP Torque
P43 Increased Pressure
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Pinholes P44 No Pinholes
P19 Creep
P38 H2O2 Degradation
P45 Radical Attack
P26 High rate of GCO
P12 Dry operation of cell
P46 Intermidiate Pinhole
P24 Pinholes
Immature Platinum Ag-
glomeration
P47 No Im. Pt. Agg.
P48 Operating time <40 hours
P49 25% RH or less
P50 Potnetial >1.0V
P51 Im. Pt. Agg.
Mature Platinum Agglom-
eration
P52 No Mat. Pt. Agg.
P53 Operating time >40 hours
P49 25% RH or less
P50 Potnetial >1.0V
P54 Pt. Agg.
Radical attack P55 No Radical attack
P2 BIP Corrosion
P38 H2O2 Degradation
P56 Inhibitor
P57 Radical attack
Reactant Mal-
Distribution
P58 Normal Reactant Distribution
P62 Reactant flow obstruction
P63 Catalyst poison by contaminant
P32 Ice formation
P64 Flooding
P65 Startup/Shutdown Cycling
P26 High rate of Gas Crossover
P4 Reactant Mal-Distribution
Flooding P66 No Flooding
P67 Flooding
Microcracks P44 No Microcrack
P45 Pinhole effects
P46 RH cycling
P19 Creep
P47 Microcrack effects
P48 Microcrack
Start-up/Shut-down Cy-
cling
P68 No Start-up/Shut-down Cycling
P65 Start-up/Shut-down Cycling
RH Cycling P69 No RH Cycling
P70 RH Cycling
Dry Operation of the Cell P69 No Dry Operation of the Cell
P70 Dry Operation of the Cell
Swelling P69 No Swelling
P70 Swelling
Table 5.2: List of Places and Transition in all Modules
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Summary of the Petri-Net Model
The Petri-Net degradation model developed in this work is a comprehensive model of the inter-
actions between the previously identified failure modes in a PEMFC of standard construction
(PTFE based membrane, Carbon/Pt catalyst, steel BIP, carbon GDL). The individual modules
range from relatively simple relationships with 2-3 places and a low number of transitions, to
larger modules with 8 places and 8 transitions. It contains 21 separate modules that interact
to both; deliver a voltage degradation value, and further interact with other failure modes.
However, if further interactions or modules are discovered that need to be added, the Petri-Net
model can easily facilitate this occurrence, with a simple addition to the script files.
5.2.1 Example net: H2O2 Degradation
Figure 5.5 shows an example of a Petri-Net module for a given failure mode: ‘H2O2 Degradation’.
Figure 5.5: Example Petri-Net for H2O2 Degradation
P34 is the initial place, and is enabled with a token on the first running of the model. It
is indicative of a healthy PEMFC and is enabled from the first running of the model, with no
H2O2 degradation. T17 can only fire when there is a token in P35 and P34 at the same time.
P35 is used to indicate a state of H2O2 degradation, agglomerating the lower level transitions.
This is for the integrity of the transition logic. The firing of this transition would enable P38,
indicating a state of H2O2 degradation, and would have an output affecting the performance
of the PEMFC and potentially linking into another Petri-Net module. There are a number of
contributors to P35, stemming from places P36 ‘Pt dissolution’, P23 ‘Low rate of gas crossover’,
P2 ‘BIP corrosion & release of metal ions’ and P26 ‘High rate of gas crossover’. P23 is enabled
by an interaction from a separate Petri-Net module, and indicates the presence of Pt which
acts as a catalyst for H2O2 formation (LaConti, et al. [45]) shown in Equations 5.8-5.10.
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H2 + Pt→ Pt−H (5.8)
Pt−H + O2 → ·OOH (5.9)
·OOH + Pt−H→ H2O2 (5.10)
Therefore for T18 to fire, P36 and P23 need to be enabled. This would show that there is
gas crossover and a free Pt presence to cause a rate of formation of H2O2.
All transitions for this example are instant transitions, and therefore rely on the combina-
tions of previous token movements for its output degradation place marking.
As has been previously mentioned in Equations 3.6-3.11, H2O2 can form from the crossover
of the reactant gasses through the membrane. Thus, for a high rate of gas crossover, a corre-
sponding rate of H2O2 formation is attributed, however if a low rate of gas crossover is observed
a separate value is used. This enables the Petri-Net modelling of T19 and T21 firing and a
corresponding degradation of PEMFC overall performance. Consequently if P26 is enabled,
T21 will fire, placing a token in P35, and if P23 is enabled, T19 will fire a token into P35.
Pozio, et al.[46] also showed that the presence of Fe+2 and Cu
+
2 (Iron and Copper ions)
released from BIP corrosion greatly accelerate the degradation due to H2O2 formation when
there is gas crossover.
‘P37’ is an inhibitor and serves to prevent the transition of ‘T18’, ‘T19’, ‘T20’ & ‘T21’.
Borup, et al.[16] state that the potential for H2O2 formation (E
o H2O2) is equal to 0.695 V,
and that any potential greater than this would inhibit the formation of H2O2 in the PEMFC.
5.3 Simulation of the Petri-Net
5.3.1 Petri-Net Firing
The firing of the Petri-Net uses the following equation:
Mn = M0 +A
T
∑
(5.11)
Where Mn is the final marking, M0 is the initial marking, A
T is the incidence matrix for
the module, and
∑
is the transition firing count vector.
For each individual Petri-Net module contained within the ‘Degradation’ transition of the
global Petri-Net, there is a corresponding incidence matrix as in Equation 5.12 for H2O2 degra-
dation.
AT =
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
−1 0 0 0 0
−1 1 1 1 1
0 −1 −1 0 0
0 −1 −1 −1 0
0 0 −1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0

(5.12)
The logic behind each transition from place to place is noted in each AT matrix for each
module. A ‘−1’ indicates the taking of a token from a place, and a ‘1’ indicates the placing of
a token into that place.
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5.3.2 Petri-Net Simulation Logic
The Petri-Net logic is presented in Figure 5.6, and shows the progression of the process during
running of the Petri-Net simulation. The global script is the overall code that runs the Petri-
Net system model. It sets all current loss variables to ’0’ as the model is due to run numerous
times and repetition of results per simulation is not desired. Any starting variable are then
set, such as the amount of Start-up/Shut-down cycles for the simulation that are not inherent
within the model. The incident matrix for the global net is then generated and the loop is
started that runs the degradation parameters per time-step. For every time-step, each module
of degradation phenomena have their incidents matrices generated first, then each step the
logic is fired to ascertain degradation. Throughout this process, the degradation level is checked
against a pre-determined failure level, and if this threshold is exceeded, the simulation is stopped
and results recorded.
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Activation of ‘Global’ script
Generate incident matrix for individual 
model Petri-Nets
Loop running of Global Petri-Net for pre-
set ‘EndTime’
Set loss variables to zero
Run PNIce.m etc.
Run PNGlobalPN.m script
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degradation transition 
firing?
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Run Petri-Net firing script Run PNIcePN.m etc.
Update Degradation 
VariablesIs Degradation more 
than 5% ?
No
Fire into ‘Failed State’.
End Simulation
Yes
Figure 5.6: Petri-Net Logic Flow Chart
91
5.3.3 Token movement
The firing of transitions and the movement of tokens can depend on various parameters. Some
depend on an operating condition of the degradation model, some depend on previous token
movements, and some on specific time related conditions. An example of the movement of a
token through a specific starting module in the Petri-Net model is presented in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Petri-Net module for Ice formation
Figure 5.7 shows the module for ice formation, and would have the token placed in P39
when the degradation model is first run. The transition can only fire if there is excess water
present, placing a token in P30. Additionally if P40 has a token in (which depends on the
cell/stack temperature operating parameter from the performance model) then the transition
can’t fire. The movement of the token from P39 to P32 of this module would require two
operating parameters from the 1D model to be in certain bounds. This example requires the
cell/stack temperature to be below 0, and the RH of the cell to be above 100%. Once these
conditions are met, the token will be moved from P39 to P32.
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Figure 5.8: Petri-Net module for Swelling
The token placement resulting from the firing of the transition in Figure 5.7 then transfers
tokens to other areas of the Petri-Net model. Figure 5.8 shows the module for swelling, and
would have P32 and P30 harbouring tokens after the interactions were true. If P32 has a token
in Figure 5.7, then P32 will contain a token for the next interaction of the degradation model.
T36 in Figure 5.8 will fire if there is a token placed in P32 being an instantaneous firing. This
would place a token into P58 which again triggers an instantaneous transition in T35, as long
as there is currently no swelling (a token placed into P57 ).
A token placed into P29 of the swelling module triggers a degradation relationship that is
derived from a combination of experimental results and data from the literature, and is covered
in more detail in Chapter 7.
In addition to triggering a key hydration related degradation phenomena (covered in more
detail in section 6.4.1), a token placed in P29 of the swelling net influences degradation due to
GDL degradation in the such named net (as detailed in Figure 5.9).
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Figure 5.9: Petri-Net module for GDL Degradation
As can be seen in Figure 5.9, both P29 and P30 enter this module from previous modules.
The token that was in P29 from the last time-step is now not only directly affecting performance,
but is also influencing logic in the GDL Degradation module by becoming an input into T12.
The movements of tokens through all of the other Petri-Net modules occur in a similar
fashion.
5.4 Derived Rates
There are two aspects of PEMFC operational failure mode analysis that need to be considered:
Firstly, the operational condition that causes an initial effect on the system voltage. Secondly,
how this operational condition can lead onto the failure modes.
This section presents examples of where the degradation rates are determined from in the
literature.
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5.4.1 Platinum Agglomeration
As stated in Chapter 3, the catalyst used in FCs is comprised of a Pt ink. During normal
operation of a FC, the materials within are subject to strong acidic environments, oxidising
conditions, high current loadings and large potential gradients. These difficult conditions mean
that degradation to the catalyst itself can occur, specifically in the form of Platinum Agglom-
eration. The full explanation of the mechanics of Platinum Agglomeration are discussed in
Chapter 3.
Figure 5.10: Platinum Agglomeration [47]
As can be seen in Figure 5.10, Platinum Agglomeration results in the increase in particle
size of the (initial) nano particles, therefore reducing the surface area, and thus reducing the
catalytic activity and reaction sites.
The failure logic for the petri-net module for immature and mature platinum agglomeration
is presented in Figures 5.11a & 5.11b.
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(a) Petri-net for mature platinum agglomeration
(b) Petri-net for immature platinum agglomeration
Figure 5.11: Petri-net modules for immature and mature platinum agglomeration
The inhibitors work by stopping the transition’s ability to fire if predetermined conditions
are met. P49 in Figure 5.11 for example, is in an inhibitor related to the RH of the feed gasses
going into the FC. If at any point during the running of the model the RH drops below the 25%
threshold, Transitions T32 and T31 can’t fire the token from P52 and P47 to P51 and P54
respectively. Therefore if a varying RH is experienced as in Figure 5.12, then the degradation
will depend on the level of RH.
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Figure 5.12: Threshold for Pt Agglomeration degradation in relation to RH
Figure 5.13: Simulink model of Platinum Agglomeration
Experimental work by [60] showed the degradation of FC performance in relation to imma-
ture and mature Platinum agglomeration. They found that the rates of particle growth differed
when measured from 0-40 hours, and thereafter. The initial 40 hours of operation saw an in-
crease in Pt nanoparticle size from the initial 1.35 nm, to 3.5 nm. However, from that point
until 1,784 hours of operation, the particles only grew to a maximum of 3.52 nm. This leads
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to differing degradation rates for the first 40 hours of operation (henceforth known as ‘Imma-
ture Platinum Agglomeration’), and the lifetime from 40 hours onwards (henceforth known as
‘Mature Platinum Agglomeration’).
Figure 5.14: Voltage drop data by [60]
The degradation rates were derived from the data presented in Figure 5.14, and applied
to the model through a single interaction with overall voltage performance per iteration of
the model running. The rate of degradation for the OCV slope was calculated as 2.083x10−7
Vh−1, at 160 mA/cm2 it was 3.472x10−7, at 800 mA/cm2 it was 2.7x10−7, and at 1160 mA/cm2
degradation was 6.94x10−8. These degradation rates were then normalised to represent a degra-
dation of voltage per second and in-putted into the four gain blocks of the Simulink simulation
in Figure 5.13. The gain blocks are used to multiply a value by a constant, therefore the 1 or 0
exiting the Petri-net module block will either multiply said 1 or 0 by the gain constant which
is set as the degradation rate.
5.4.2 Membrane Flooding
The initial drop of voltage due to the operating condition can be derived from data in the current
literature regarding PEMFC degradation. Le Canut, et al. [56] performed degradation tests on a
Hydrogenics production-type PEMFCs stacks including; membrane drying, membrane flooding
and stack poisoning by CO. The data from these studies can be adapted to be used as outputs
from the main Petri-Net, to be fed back into the main PEMFC simulation.
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To ascertain the degradation in voltage due to flooding, a study by La Canut, et al [56] was
analysed.
Figure 5.15: PEMFC Membrane flooding degradation test [56]
The flow rate of cathode supply feed was decreased to induce flooding effects in the cell,
and produced the results presented in Figure 5.15. Two tests were conducted, and for integrity
of results, both test will be considered and averaged for the overall voltage drop due to cell
flooding.
In the first test, the initial voltage produced by the cell was 0.72V and dropped to 0.54V,
indicating a drop of 0.18V over 27 minutes. This is a rate equal to 6.0 x 10−3Vmin−1, and
extrapolated to represent an hourly rate, we observe a voltage degradation rate of 0.4Vh−1.
In the second test, the initial voltage produced by the cell was 0.73V and dropped to 0.63V,
indicating a drop of 0.1V over 180 minutes. This is a rate equal to 5.55 x 10−4Vmin−1, and
extrapolated to represent an hourly rate, we observe a voltage degradation rate of 0.03Vh−1.
The average of the two rates gives a voltage degradation rate due to flooding, of 0.215Vh−1.
Therefore if the output place contains a token it causes a 0.215V decrease in output per time
step.
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5.4.3 Relative Humidity Variation
RH cycling has been identified as a basic event (See Appendix A) that impacts upon the
mechanical strength of the membrane, however there is also a performance drop relative to the
RH values in a PEMFC. The model of a PEMFC used in this work uses an empirical relationship
of RH in the cell cathode which can show the performance drop due to changes in RH values
in the cathode. Figure 5.16 shows the performance model running at 120% RH, and again at
20% RH (dehydrated). There is a noticeable degradation in performance in the lower humidity
polarisation curve, and is solely due to the inhibiting effects of low levels of hydration in the
membrane. The jump of performance at the higher current range is due to the model not being
able to handle less than 0V and errors occurring that wouldn’t happen in normal operation of
the cell.
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Figure 5.16: Modelled performance drop due to RH drop from 120% to 20%
5.4.4 Hydrogen Peroxide
H2O2 degradation is usually studied as far as fluoride release rates are concerned, and the
experimental technique is usually the process of boiling a section of the membrane in a H2O2
solution to observe fluoride release over time, such as in [44]. This method of testing is valuable
to show the effect of H2O2 on the membrane itself, however, a degradation rate cannot be
attributed to this kind of work. Therefore for an accurate degradation rate to use in the Petri-
Net, OCV voltage degradation over time was analysed, where a voltage drop was observed.
Teranishi, et al. [59] observed a drop in voltage over 24 hours of OCV operation. Due to
the presence of H2O2 and HF in the exhaust gas stream, the authors attributed the drop in
performance to the presence of H2O2 in the cell, resulting from H2 gas crossover from the anode.
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Figure 5.17: Observed voltage drop at OCV due to H2O2
The rate observed from the voltage drop in Figure 5.17 is 1.3mVh−1, and is therefore used
in the Petri-Net model when the failure mode of H2O2 degradation is activated.
5.5 Quantification Data
Not all Petri-Net modules have a degradation rate associated with them as some serve as to
input degradation logic into Petri-Nets that do determine degradation. For example, ‘Swelling’
does not have a direct effect on voltage output in this degradation model, however it does feed
into other modules that calculate the pressure imparted on the cell, and thus its effect on the
voltage drop of the cell.
The Petri-Net modules that do have a direct relationship with voltage drop in the model
are listed in Table 5.3, alongside their associated degradation rates and source.
As with the FT work in Section 4, Weibull distributions were used to offer a random variable
input into the degradation data. Therefore numerous simulations can be completed to give an
estimation of real world degradation levels using flat rate data as the basis.
The Weibull values used for each degradation module are listed in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.3: List of Degradation Parameters Used
ID Failure Mode Parameter Value (Vs−1) Ref
FM01 Immature Pt Agglomeration - [60]
a Cell V >0.8 2.083 x 10−7 -
b Cell V between 0.8 & 0.65 3.472 x 10−7 -
c Cell V between 0.65 & 0.41 2.7 x 10−7 -
d Cell V <0.41 6.94 x 10−8 -
FM02 Mature Pt Agglomeration - [67]
a Cell V >0.9 6.23 x 10−9 -
b Cell V between 0.9 & 0.8 7.79 x 10−9 -
c Cell V between 0.8 & 0.65 9.34 x 10−9 -
d Cell V <0.65 1.56 x 10−9 -
FM03 H2O2 Peroxide Attack - [59]
a Normal Rate 3.61 x 10−7 -
b w/Fe+ presence 5.957 x 10−7 -
c w/ High Gas Crossover 7.22 x 10−7 -
FM04 Radical Attack 3.61 x 10−7 [59]
FM05 Carbon Catalyst Degradation 2.77 x 10−8 Prop.
FM06 Pinholes 1.6 x 10−5 [68]
FM07 Creep 2.77 x 10−8 Prop.
FM08 High Gas Crossover 2.77 x 10−6 Prop.
FM09 Low Gas Crossover 0 Prop.
FM10 Ice Formation 1.3 x 10−4 Prop.
FM11 GDL Degradation 3.33 x 10−4 [69]
FM12 BIP Corrosion 8.796 x 10−7 [70]
FM13 Flooding 5.972 x 10−5 [56]
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Table 5.4: Table of Weibull distribution data used
ID Deg. Rate Mu (t) Scale Parameter Gamma
Function
Shape
Charac-
teristic
λ(t) µ(t) η Γ(α) β
FM01a 2.083 x 10−7 4.800 x 106 4.248 x 106 1.13 0.8
FM01b 3.472 x 10−7 2.880 x 106 2.549 x 106 1.13 0.8
FM01c 2.7 x 10−7 3.704 x 106 3.278 x 106 1.13 0.8
FM01d 6.94 x 10−8 1.441 x 107 1.275 x 107 1.13 0.8
FM02a 6.23 x 10−9 1.605 x 108 1.420 x 108 1.13 0.8
FM02b 7.79 x 10−9 1.284 x 108 1.136 x 108 1.13 0.8
FM02c 9.34 x 10−9 1.071 x 108 9.475 x 107 1.13 0.8
FM02d 1.56 x 10−9 6.410 x 108 5.673 x 108 1.13 0.8
FM03a 3.61 x 10−7 2.770 x 106 3.112 x 106 0.89 2
FM03b 5.957 x 10−7 1.679 x 106 1.886 x 106 0.89 2
FM03c 7.22 x 10−7 1.385 x 106 1.556 x 106 0.89 2
FM04 3.61 x 10−7 2.770 x 106 3.112 x 106 0.89 2
FM05 2.77 x 10−8 3.600 x 107 4.045 x 107 0.89 2
FM06 1.6 x 10−5 6.25 x 104 7.022 x 104 0.89 2
FM07 2.77 x 10−8 3.600 x 107 4.045 x 107 0.89 2
FM08 2.77 x 10−6 3.600 x 105 3.186 x 105 1.13 0.8
FM09 0 0 0 0 0
FM10 1.3 x 10−4 7.692 x 103 7.692 x 103 1 1
FM11 3.33 x 10−4 3.003 x 103 3.374 x 103 0.89 2
FM12 8.796 x 10−7 1.137 x 106 1.277 x 106 0.89 2
FM13 5.972 x 10−5 1.674 x 104 1.674 x 104 1 1
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The Petri-Net was modelled in Simulink software and integrated with the performance model
to gain a higher accuracy than assuming voltage or using very basic FC equations. Matlab blocks
were used to code the Petri-Net firing and matrices generation. Figure 5.18 shows the Simulink
model front for the Petri-Net module ‘Immature Platinum Agglomeration’.
Figure 5.18: Example of Petri-Net in Simulink
Influential data from the performance model is brought in from the left, such as the time
‘t’, voltage ‘Vcell’ and the relative humidities at the anode and cathode ‘Rhumiditya’ &
‘Rhumidityc’. The Matlab block contains the Petri-Net coding for the matrices and firing logic,
which outputs a ‘1’ or ‘0’ to indicate if there is degradation or not. Therefore if the output place
of a module contains a token, a ‘1’ is sent out. This is then smoothed out by a ‘Rate Transition’
block to make sure that either a ‘0’ or ‘1’ is actually being produced. This is because Simulink
can sometimes output numbers close to ‘0’ or ‘1’ when indeed you need the full integer. After
processing through the rate transition block, the signal is sent to the Weibull distribution block
containing the degradation calculations as can be seen in Figure 5.19.
Figure 5.19: Example of Weibull calculation block
Figure 5.19 shows the Simulink block structure for calculating the degradation rate based
upon the Weibull distribution. The Weibull equation 4.1 used in Chapter 4.4.2 was modified
to give a degradation rate based upon a random variable, rather than a time to failure. The
rearranged equation is presented in Equation 5.13.
η
[− ln(x)] 1β (5.13)
If a ‘1’ is input, the block processes the Weibull distribution calculation of degradation, if
a ‘0’ is input, nothing occurs. Due to the fact that Simulink and Matlab use a predetermined
(but very large) data set for their random numbers, the random number generator sets a seed
number from that data set that corresponds to the current time in epoch. This ensures that
no matter how many times the model is run, a truly random number would be generated. If
this method was not used, the random numbers would be the same set of random numbers per
simulation run.
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The number that leaves the Weibull block is then summed from previous time steps by
the ‘Integrator’ block. If this block was not used, the number would reset on every time step
and would not represent degradation over time. The number is then restrained from being
sent to the overall voltage drop summation by another rate transition block, which makes sure
that only one degradation value is sent per time step. The Simulink model can run the FC
performance calculation at up to 100 iterations per second, however this block makes sure that
only 1 degradation value goes through per second, and not 100. Finally the degradation value
is sent to a ‘Mux’ block that sums the entire Petri-Net modules’ values into a voltage drop
variable. This can be compared to the degradation threshold value to tell the model when to
stop.
Additionally, output data from the degradation modules can feed back into the 1D model
to change the performance of the PEMFC being simulated. For example, if a failure mode
occurs that would increase the resistance in the membrane in the real world, the output of that
failure mode module would output a value of degradation applied to the membrane resistance
coefficient value held in the 1D model.
5.6 Integration into Petri-Net Model
The degradation model operates by taking key variables from the 1D model’s output that
pertain towards whichever specific failure mode module is being simulated. The data is used to
determine the behaviour of the transition firing, effect the rate of degradation, and relay back
any changes to the 1D model as an output. Some degradation modules loop back into the 1D
model and change operating variables that effect the output voltage.
All of the degradation data ascertained in this section was integrated into the Petri-Net
model to form an accurate degradation model. As presented in Figure 5.20, parameters from
the performance model that would have an effect on the degradation logic are pulled from
the performance Simulink model and fed into the Petri-net degradation blocks (indicated by
the ‘Increased Pressure’ MatLab function block). For this example, V cell is the cell voltage,
R humidity a is the relative humidity at the anode, and R humidity c is the relative humidity
at the cathode. Due to the inherent relationship between the humidity in the cell and the
pressure in the cell due to swelling (discussed in Section 6.4.1), the variables for that time
step from the performance model are drawn upon to get an accurate indication of performance
degradation due to swelling.
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Figure 5.20: Simulink model block of membrane resistance increase due to swelling of the mem-
brane
5.6.1 Informed data generation
Due to the severe lack of data in the field, some degradation rates were proposed from expert
opinion and informed prerequisites. For example, there is no available data for how freezing
conditions affect cell performance in the literature. As the laboratory facilities could not provide
sub-zero operating conditions of our experimental cell/stack, rates had to be proposed from
informed backgrounds. During operation of the experimental rig for alternative reasons, a very
poor performance was observed when the blockage occured - peak power reached no more than
5.2W whereas a healthy cell should provide around 52W of power.
As can be seen in Figure 5.21, a mechanical failure of the graphite BIP material caused
the physical blockage of the H2 from the gas channels on the MEA side of the plate. This
blockage was the cause of the drop in performance from 52W peak power, to 5.2W. Under
freezing conditions, the gas channels would be subject to blockages given that water was present.
Therefore, it was stipulated that a similar drop in performance would be noticed through
freezing conditions creating a blockage due to frozen water in the gas channels or distribution
manifold. Only under highly humidified conditions would this occur, and only after the cell
had been inactive for a period of time. This is because the FC stack would create its own heat
during operation, and therefore would struggle to freeze during operation, and would also need
water present to freeze. It is therefore assumed that the degradation due to freezing conditions
would emulate what was found in Figure 5.21, and is the reason why that drop in performance
is used for the freezing degradation failure mode block.
5.7 Petri-Net Conclusions
This section has presented the methodology used in the Petri-Net model, and the logic behind
the modules interactions. The total of 20 modules contain the failure logic that has been devel-
oped in previous chapters, and created an accurate degradation methodology using Petri-Net
modelling techniques. The data used is the most up-to-date available, and is broken down to
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(a) Blocked H2 inlet (plate side)
(b) Blocked H2 inlet (MEA side)
Figure 5.21: Images showing mechanical failure of BIP material blocking feed gas
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the most detailed level possible as such with the varying potential degradation rates of the
Platinum Agglomeration modules. Data for the degradation phenomena in each quantifiable
module was either taken from in-depth experimental studies, or proposed where not available.
The product of the detailed interactions of Petri-Net modules, and highly accurate degradation
data, make this model robust.
The model can be run numerous times as to make the most of the Weibull distribution used
to ascertain a realistic view of degradation in a FC in the real world. A cumulative average can
then be taken of the lifetimes of each simulation run to gain an estimation of FC lifetime when
run under specific conditions.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Rig & 1D Model
Validation
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a detailed look at the experimental rig that was built to validate the
degradation model described in Chapter 5. Detail regarding the design and capabilities of the
rig are discussed, followed by details of MEA characterisation. An MEA was characterised to
provide a conditioned MEA, ready to be used in a validation exercise. This MEA was then used
under the same operating conditions that were used in a simulation run, as to ascertain whether
the 1D model can accurately reproduce the desired outputs that are observed in the real world.
Conclusions are then drawn from the experimental work. The validation was required as the
1D model that was used was modified to such a great extent that the existing validation by the
authors of the model was redundant.
6.2 Fuel Cell Experimental Rig Development
In order to verify the numerical models (both the 1D FC model and the Petri-net degrada-
tion model), a PEMFC experimental rig was built. The experimental rig has the capability to
accommodate either a single cell or 7 cell stack as per the schematic in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 from left to right shows the gas panel that serves Air, H2 and N2 inlets to the
laboratory, and the H2 and Air outlet valves. Every inlet pipe leading to the test rig has a
non-return valve to block any gasses trying to return to the gas panel. To facilitate the choice
between H2 or N2 going into the mass flow controller on the anode side, two ball valves were
installed. The opening of one, and the closing of the other would allow the choice of one of
the feed gasses entering the mass flow controller. After the gasses pass through the mass flow
controllers, they pass a gas pressure sensor before entering the humidification bottles. Before
entering the cell, pressure, temperature and humidity sensors interact with the gas flow. After
leaving the cell, the gasses make their way to their associated outlet valves. Individual cell
potential voltmeters were used dependent upon the type of test being undertaken.
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Figure 6.1: Complete test rig schematic
For example, one is used to monitor single cell performance, however two are used for two
cells which allows to monitor individual cell potential. For single cell operation, the hot water
tank pumps deionised water throughout the cell to bring it to a desired operating temperature.
A PEMFC stack was purchased from Pragma industries (see Figure 6.2), comprising of 7
cells. The cell active area was 100cm2 providing a nominal power output of 470W.
Figure 6.2: Pragma 7 cell, 470W research development stack
The stack contained pre-made MEAs from the manufacturer of the stack. The membrane
was Nafion XL with a thickness of 27.5µm, sandwiched with a catalyst layer of Platinum ink
with a loading of 0.2 mg Pt/cm2. Carbon paper type GDL were used to finish the MEA (See
Figure 6.3).
The stack is water cooled, or heated, using deionised water sent through a serpentine channel
in between each cell in the stack, as in Figure 6.4.
The gas flow field plates were of a square serpentine configuration as shown in Figure 6.5.
H2 was sourced from a 350 bar gas bottle, and was 99.99999% pure hydrogen as per the
international standard [38]. Air was used as the cathode feed gas, sent from an air compressor
with filters for oil and water. Both gases were regulated through Hastings mass flow controllers,
to accurately control the flow rates of the gas entering the stack at any time.
The gasses were humidified through Nafion tube, bubbler type humidifiers, and were speci-
fied to humidify the feed gases at the range of flow rates to be used. Dry gas is passed through
the bottle which is filled with grade 1 deionised water. The gas then picks up moisture and is
passed through a heated tube section before entering the cell/stack. Temperature was controlled
both at the bottle and the heated length of tube. Modifying these two temperatures means that
a level relative humidity can be obtained for experimentation.
An electronic load bank was used to ‘waste’ the energy developed by the stack and log/dis-
play the energy use in real time. A TDI Power Systems load bank was used, with a range of
0-150A and 0-800W, as shown in Figure 6.6.
The gas leaving the humidifiers was passed through a custom manufactured humidification
sensor T-piece, as seen in Figure 6.7. These sensors measure the humidity levels in the gas
stream before entering the stack.
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Figure 6.3: MEA assembly
Figure 6.4: Coolant channels in between each cell
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Figure 6.5: Gas channels in between each cell
Figure 6.6: TDI Power load bank
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Figure 6.7: Humidity sensor T-piece detail
Figure 6.8: Complete test rig
Two set-ups for heating or cooling the stack were built. If the test rig was using a stack, the
heat that the stack would produce during operation would require the use of a cooling system.
Therefore the water flowing through the stack is passed through an oil cooler type radiator with
a funnel cowling exhausting the warm air up into a fume cupboard (see Figure 6.9) with the
help of dual 15cm electric fans. A thermocouple is used on the coolant exit from the stack to
monitor stack temperature.
If the rig is used for only a single cell, the cell cannot create enough heat to operate at the
required temperature, and therefore cell heating is used. A heating element in the header tank
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heats the ‘coolant’ water to the desired temperature for the cell, and is pumped through the
system, creating heat.
Figure 6.9: Stack cooling system
The finished single cell test rig is presented in Figure 6.8 and shows all contributing com-
ponents in the fume cupboard, which is used for leak extraction.
A fuel cell monitoring software package was created to monitor fuel cell parameters in real
time, and log these variables for data analysis at a later date (see Figure 6.10). The software
was built in LabView, and uses data logging equipment supplied by National Instruments. The
data logged is shown in Table 6.1.
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Figure 6.10: Front end of the software developed for the fuel cell test rig
The desired flow rates for the gasses into the cell can be chosen by entering the flow rate
into the central control block seen below the fuel cell image in Figure 6.10. This sends a signal
of between 0 and 5 Volts to the mass flow controllers to meter gas flow to the rig. The exact
value of the flow rate is displayed and logged to file four times per second. The gas pressure is
measured before it enters the humidification bubblers as to make sure that the upper limits of
the humidifiers are not exceeded during operation. The gas pressure, temperature and humidity
is displayed and logged before it enters the cell. The cell temperature is set by the heated water
tank and pump system. This is done by entering the value the operator desires into the central
control box located under the fuel cell image. This sends a signal to a heating element that
uses simple logic to turn off when a target temperature is met. To increase the accuracy of this
system, a thermocouple is located at the cell inlet to accurately turn off the heater tank when
the temperature set point is achieved.
All gauges and indicators were verified by external calibration of each instrument used.
6.3 Characterisation of MEA
The rig developed was used to characterise a MEA. As is normal with unused MEAs, they
must be used in a specific way to bring the MEA up to its optimum performance before use.
This process is the initial bedding in of the key layers of the MEA such as the CL. Common
practise among the fuel cell community is to run the new MEA at a steady state for around one
to two hours (as to let the membrane fully hydrate), then run groups of polarisation curves at
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Table 6.1: Table of parameters logged
Parameter Unit
Time Seconds
Relative Humidity @ anode inlet %
Relative Humidity @ cathode inlet %
Anode pressure before humidifier bar
Anode pressure before cell bar
Cathode pressure before humidifier bar
Cathode pressure before cell bar
Ambient temperature oC
Cell temp 1 - 7 oC
Anode mass flow rate slpm
Cathode mass flow rate slpm
Cathode gas temperature (inlet) oC
Anode gas temperature (inlet) oC
Coolant temperature oC
Heater tank temperature oC
Set Point Anode mass flow rate slpm
Set Point Cathode mass flow rate slpm
Set Point heater tank temperature oC
regular intervals as to cycle the MEA through its full current range. Once the cell has reached
an equilibrium at its highest current range, the MEA is considered conditioned.
After a full conditioning run (required before each use), an MEA was characterised using
polarisation curve and EIS techniques to form a comparison baseline for degradation testing.
EIS is an experimental technique where the different loss mechanisms observed in a fuel cell can
be quantified. It is a non-intrusive technique that doesn’t degrade the cell whereas techniques
such as Cyclic Voltammetry (CV) would. During operation of the cell, AC potential is applied
through the fuel cell and the current through the cell is measured. The resulting data is often
displayed via a Nyquist plot similar to Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11: EIS Nyquist plot interpretation [71]
As can be seen in Figure 6.11, the three main potential loss areas can be observed through
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the use of EIS techniques. This tool was used to increase the confidence in certain failure mode’s
affects on certain regions of the potential losses. EIS techniques are ran in either galvanostatic
or potentiostatic conditions (current held, or voltage/potential held respectively).
For the conditioning runs, the MEA was run for one hour, then at 30 minute intervals after
that point, polarisation curves were run in sets of 5 in order to ascertain the health of the
cell. Galvanostatic EIS was also undertaken at low, medium and high current densities (0.2,
0.4 and 0.6 A/cm2 respectively). This technique was repeated until the MEA showed no more
signs of improvement. At this stage, the MEA was considered to be characterised in its highest
performance.
The test was run with feed gas pressures of 0.55 bar, the temperatures of the gas feeds
at around 30◦C, and the cell temperature kept at 39◦C as in Figures 6.12 & 6.13. The cell
temperature was kept higher than the gas feeds as to avoid the flooding of the cell due to
condensation occurring in the cell when a higher temperature gas meets a lower temperature
environment.
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Figure 6.12: Gas feed pressures
The variation in H2 gas pressure in Figure 6.12 is due to other lab users demanding H2 from
the same bottle being used during the experiment. The variation is negligible at around 0.05
bar, and therefore won’t affect the results of the validation. The final variations in pressures
are experienced during the shut-down of the rig, and are after the FC was operated.
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Figure 6.13: Cell and gas feed temperatures
The initial spike in temperature seen in Figure 6.13 is due to the transient response delay
of the system control, where the heating element overshoots their target, then returned to the
set-point. This will not have an impact upon results as the testing is only commenced when all
operating parameters has reached their desired values.
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Figure 6.14: Feed gas flow rates
Gas feed flow rates were kept at a hydrogen stoichiometry of 1.2 and air stoichiometry of
around 2.5. The flow rates for the experimentation run can be seen in Figure 6.14. The first
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spike in flow rate is due to the N2 purge at the beginning of the cell operation, and the final
spike at around 1.9x104 seconds is due to the shut-down N2 purge as is expected.
Relative humidities were set at 70%, however due to the nature of the bubbler type humidifier
system, an error of ± 5% was found in the air supply, and an error of ± 10% was found for the
H2 humidifier during operation. As can be seen at 1.4x10
4 seconds in Figure 6.15, the hydrogen
feed RH sensor experienced a flooding event, and became unreliable. However, the values from
this point are assumed to be the same as what was experienced previous to the flooding event
at around 70%. This assumption can be made when analysing the data from 0.7x104 seconds
to 1.3x104 seconds. Here it can be assumed that (as with the Air feed) the RH measurements
were levelling out after the initial fluctuations of transient response delay experienced from 0
seconds to 0.7x104. Therefore, from a visual analysis of the Figure, it is assumed that the RH
levels would carry on to repeat what was seen from 0.7x104 seconds to 1.3x104 seconds.
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Figure 6.15: Feed gas relative humidities
Once steady state had been reached with the operational variables, the characterisation
commenced. Cell potential was maintained at 0.65V in order to avoid degradation as much as
was practicable (see Figure 6.16).
Figure 6.16 shows the voltage and current profile over time for the conditioning run of the
MEA. Once all of the ancillary equipment was up to pressure and temperature, the H2 supply
was passed through the cell. As soon as the chemical reactions began, the voltage of the cell
was set to 0.65V as is common practice with MEA conditioning. After 3600 seconds the cell
was temporarily cycled to its maximum current capability to ascertain the performance of the
cell. It was assumed at this stage that the cell needed a little longer to hydrate before the full
polarisation runs were to be started. At 0.5x1004 seconds the first set of polarisation runs were
started. The green line shows how the voltage of the cell starts at its highest (OCV), then as
the current is increased per time-step, it drops to its lowest value. The blue line shows how the
current starts at 0, and is increased per time-step to its highest value before the cell voltage
gets to its saturation limit. The five peaks in the green line indicates that the polarisation runs
were completed five times per polarisation run.
This process was repeated three more times as can be seen by the profiles in Figure 6.16,
until equilibrium was reached and the MEA was deemed conditioned. The process of closing
down the test rig saw the slow drop off of the current as to not shock the newly conditioned
MEA until the cell was no longer producing current, then the rig was purged and shut down.
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Figure 6.16: Current and Voltage profile throughout test
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The tail off of the green voltage profile at the very end of the test is due to the N2 purge
replacing all of the fuel H2 in the cell during the purge, and therefore the OCV dropping to low
levels until the operator is sure that there is no more H2 in the system.
The overall operating parameters throughout the characterisation are listed in Table 6.2:
Table 6.2: Table of fuel cell operational parameters
Parameter Value Unit
Relative Humidity 70 ±5 %
Pressure 0.55 bar
Flow Rate H2 1.5 slpm
Flow Rate Air 8.5 slpm
H2 Temp 31 Celsius
Air Temp 30.5 Celsius
Cell Temp 39 Celsius
The RH, pressure and flow rates were all desired values that are commonly used in the FC
community. However, the temperatures were the maximum values available from the FC rig.
All three temperatures would ideally need to be at 70-80 oC.
The averages of each of the sets of five polarisation curves were taken and plotted on the
same figure in order to ascertain the health of the cell, see Figure 6.17.
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Figure 6.17: Polarisation curve averages for each set of tests
It can be seen that after the 3rd set of polarisation curves, an equilibrium state was achieved,
and the health of the cell could be assumed to be optimum. We can see that the polarisation
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curves start to correlate quite positively after 3 cycles. A visual indication of an equilibrium of
performance is all that is needed to signify an activated MEA.
6.4 Validation of the model
After the MEA was characterised and assumed to be at its peak operating condition, the
fuel cell was run for a final polarisation curve. The operating conditions experienced during
the experimental polarisation test were input into the performance fuel cell model, and the
simulation results were plotted against the experimental (see Figure 6.18). This was done to
show how accurate the 1D model replicated what was found during the experimentation on the
test rig. If the values correlate on a plot, the 1D model is validated against the test rig.
The fuel cell was run using the previously identified parameters for one polarisation curve.The
1D model with the Petri-net degradation model was then run for one polarisation curve with a
broad sweep from low to high current density. The input data for the 1D model was that of the
data logged during the polarisation curve on the test rig. The results are presented in Figure
6.18.
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Figure 6.18: Comparison of modelled system performance, and experimental data
As can be seen, the agreement is good and therefore justifies the use of this 1D performance
model in the degradation modelling through the Petri-Net analysis. It also shows that one can
be confident that any manipulation of operational parameters to the 1D model as a result of
degradation modelled by the degradation Petri-Net are robust and justified. This is to say that if
the Petri-Net model determines that a certain parameter of the 1D model should be modified to
represent degradation (cell resistance for example), one can be sure that this change of variable
will have an accurate effect on the performance output of the cell.
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6.4.1 Experimental Data
Due to the lack of data currently available for fuel cell degradation and reliability analysis, key
failure modes that currently have no data readily available in the literature were studied using
the developed experimental set-up.
One of the failure modes that is mentioned numerous times throughout the literature is the
issue surrounding BIP torque. However, no data was found in the literature that shows how
changes in BIP torque affect the performance of the cell, and as such, is one of the failure modes
where experimentation was undertaken.
Experimentation of how BIP Torque affects fuel cell performance
The fuel cell provided by Pragma industries had an associated specification sheet that showed
the compression pressure felt in the cell due to a corresponding endplate torque (see Figure
6.19).
Figure 6.19: Look-up table of endplate bolt torques against MEA pressure [72]
However, there was no information available that shows how a change in pressure affects the
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performance of the cell in general. Due to this lack of data, a set of experiments was undertaken
to fill the knowledge gap, and use the data gained to inform the degradation model.
Polarisation curves were performed in-between tightening the endplate bolts from 2.5 Nm
to 6.5 Nm in 1 Nm increments, and are shown in Figure 6.20.
As can be seen in Figure 6.20, from the initial endplate torque of 2.5 Nm, fuel cell perfor-
mance increased with torque. This corresponds to an initial pressure on the MEA of around 0.4
MPa, and a final MEA compression pressure of around 2.0 MPa.
The MEAs used were unused and unconditioned, and as such, a large increase in performance
was seen from initial to final torque levels due to the initial compression of the components
of the MEA. When a new MEA is created, there is a large resistance involved due to the
lack of interfacial contact between the core components. When the fuel cell is tightened as
in this experiment, the contact patch is increased as the GDL material is crushed between
the membrane and the BIPs. Interfacial contact resistance is therefore reduced through the
increased endplate bolt torque.
After a period of conditioning of the new MEA, the fuel cell was stopped and the endplate
bolts torques reduced back to the initial 2.5 Nm. The polarisation curves were then performed
using the same torque levels up until 5.5 Nm as 6.5 Nm was at the very upper limit of the BIP’s
mechanical integrity and as such was avoided. These results are shown in Figure 6.21.
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Figure 6.20: Polarisation curves for different endplate torques before conditioning
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Figure 6.21: Polarisation curves for different endplate torques after conditioning
As can be seen in Figure 6.21, the fuel cell out-performs the pre-conditioning runs by a
significant amount. Where the initial runs at 2.5 Nm had a peak current of 27.01 A, the latter
run reached a peak current of 89.55 A. This significant gain in performance is partially due
to the conditioning period for the MEA, however the newly compressed MEA has irreversible
mechanical changes to its structure, and therefore the interfacial contact resistance is still
reduced as when compressed to a higher level. It can be seen from Figure 6.21 that the lower
torque level still performs badly compared to the higher increments.
EIS
EIS techniques were used to determine the resistance experienced under different endplate
torques at 0.2 A/cm2, 0.4 A/cm2 and 0.6 A/cm2. Galvanostatic EIS sweeps from 500 to 0.1 Hz
were undertaken with an amplitude of 20mV. The results were compared and analysed to show
resistance in the cell.
As can be seen in Figure 6.22, the EIS Nyquist plots were very successful, having little to no
noise in the signal. A lot of useful information can be determined from Nyquist plots in relation
to resistance.
Curve interpretation
The point at which the curve intersects the X axis at the left of the graph is indicative of the
overall resistance experienced in the cell, and therefore the Ohmic losses. Therefore for 5.5 NM
at 0.6 A/cm2, the resistance of the cell can be considered to be 0.2047 Ω − cm2. The area
of the Nyquist plot from the first intersect to the last is indicative of the anode and cathode
activation losses and the mass transfer effects. In a perfect world there would be a small curve
126
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Z’ (Ω−cm2)
Z’
’ (Ω
−
cm
2 )
 
 
2.5 Nm
3.5 Nm
4.5 Nm
5.5 Nm
(a) 0.2 A / cm2
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Z’ (Ω−cm2)
Z’
’ (Ω
−
cm
2 )
 
 
2.5 Nm
3.5 Nm
4.5 Nm
5.5 Nm
(b) 0.4 A / cm2
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Z’ (Ω−cm2)
Z’
’ (Ω
−
cm
2 )
 
 
2.5 Nm
3.5 Nm
4.5 Nm
5.5 Nm
(c) 0.6 A / cm2
Figure 6.22: Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy of different endplate bolt torques at dif-
ferent current densities
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for the anode activation losses, a larger curve for the cathode activation losses, and finally a
smaller curve for the mass transport losses as in Figure 6.11. However, in practise EIS is more
likely to produce either one large curve as in Figure 6.22a which shows the anode, cathode
activation and mass transport losses combined, or one large curve and one smaller as in Figure
6.22c which shows the anode and cathode activation combined, and the mass transport region
is clearly visible.
Extrapolation of degradation data
Data affecting the performance of the cell was extracted from the above experimentation anal-
ysis of BIP torque in fuel cells. The overall resistance was taken from the x axis intercept for
each current density and averaged to give the average resistance per torque level over the entire
current range of the cell. The average resistance for 2.5 Nm was 0.249Ω − cm2, with average
resistances of 0.234, 0.221 and 0.2145Ω− cm2 for 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 Nm torque levels respectively.
These values were then plotted against the corresponding cell interior pressures with the data
from Table 6.19.
Figure 6.23: RH and resistance equation derivation
Once the resistances for each pressure have been determined, the data can be plotted against
data ascertained from the literature regarding operating conditions that would affect pressure;
the relationship between water content in the membrane and pressure. A study by Serincan &
Pasaogullari [73] detailed the relationship between RH across the cell and the pressure in the
cell in their 2011 study. The pressures in the cell for 0%, 30% and 70% RH were taken from
this work and plotted against the data obtained from the experimentation (see Figure 6.23) to
give the relationship equation; −0.0009 ∗RelativeHumidity + 0.264.
This can be used by the degradation model to show how an increase in cell pressure can
increase cell resistance, thus affecting the Ohmic region of the polarisation curve, as in Figure
5.20.
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6.5 Conclusions
The 1D model used for this work is an accurate mathematical representation of the chemical
interactions of a FC, proved by the validation experimentation. The model was validated against
an experimental rig, and the correlation between model and test data was very strong. Advanced
techniques such as EIS were used to ascertain improved data over basic polarisation curves to
look into resistances in the cell. The EIS data ascertained in this work, combined with numerous
data sources from the literature regarding cell pressure and RH, mean that a highly accurate
relationship between cell RH and performance can be implemented in the the Petri-net analysis.
During operation, failure occurred that could be considered to match failure of other sources,
this occurred when a gas inlet channel was damaged, partially blocking the gasses from entering
the cell. This could be assumed to emulate the occurrence of an ice blockage in the channel,
and as such, is used in the quantification of the Petri-net analysis.
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Chapter 7
Degradation Simulation Results
Each of the failure rates, both proposed and taken from literature, were inserted into the Petri-
Net model and ran both individually and as part of different operating modes to ascertain fuel
cell lifetime. The entirety of the individual Petri-Net modules are omitted for brevity, however
key examples are listed below. Additionally, the total results of the interactions of all Petri-Net
modules are presented.
This chapter starts with two examples of what degradation logic occurs on an individual
basis for two failure conditions. Startup Shutdown Cycling (SSC) results are presented that
show where the degradation data comes from, and what the result is when only SSC is being
observed in a FC. The degradation modelled through Petri-Net analysis is then validated by
being run under the same conditions as a test undertaken on the FC experimental rig, with
results shown. Finally, the Petri-Net model results are shown for the entire interaction of all
the Petri-Net modules during operation under an automotive life cycle. Conclusions are then
drawn in light of the results.
7.1 Stop/Start Cycling
7.1.1 Data extrapolation from literature
A 2010 study [74] showed how the ohmic and mass transport regions of the polarisation curve
are affected by SSC in different relative humidity conditions. The in depth study looked into
the effects of three humidity levels on the degradation due to SSC for up to 1500 cycles.
Figure 7.1 shows the experimental results for the three RH conditions from initial operation
to 1500 SSCs. The work showed how there was no increase in gas crossover and no increase
in membrane resistance, ruling out any membrane degradation. Therefore for the Petri-Net of
SSC in this work, the membrane variables relating to gas crossover and resistance were not
altered. Instead, the exchange current density and mass transport coefficients were modified in
line with what was found in [74], to replicate the results.
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Figure 7.1: Experimental results of SSC during (a)0% (b)50% and (c)100% RH [74]
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By extrapolating data from Figure 7.1, we find that the degradation drop from initial con-
ditions, to 1500 cycles at 0% humidity is comparable to a drop of exchange current density by
an order of magnitude from the healthy 3.2x10−8 to 3.2x10−9. The mass transport changes are
observable through modifying the mass transport coefficient from a healthy cell value of 3, to
5.5 for 50% RH, and to 5.75 for 100% RH. These values are back calculated from measuring
the performance drop from the experimentation, and implemented to emulate the same drop
in performance in the model results. The change in model parameter over 1500 cycles is simply
divided by the number of cycles to give the degradation due to SSC per cycle.
As the FC model could run anywhere between 0 and 100% RH, an assumption had to be
made to make the degradation data span more then just 0, 50 and 100% regions. Therefore
it is assumed that the degradation rate experienced under 0% RH in [74] would span the first
third of the RH at the cathode. The degradation rate experienced under 50% RH is assumed
to be true for the second third of the RH range, and finally the 100% RH degradation rate is
assumed to be true for the final third of the RH range at the cathode.
Figure 7.2: SSC module in SimuLink model
As shown in Figure 7.2 the degradation calculation takes data from the voltage of the cell
(V cell), the current (I) and the RH at the cathode (RH c). Inputs are also taken from the
outputs of memory loops, and are used to change the values of the exchange current density
(I oc 0) and the mass transport coefficient (n trans). The vertically aligned boxes below the
Matlab function block are used to give the Petri-net logic memory, where an output is then fed
back into the input on the next iteration.
The logic for calculating SSC degradation is presented in Figures 7.3 & 7.4.
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Run SSC Block
Set incidence 
matrix for SSC
Has FC current hit 0 
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IS SSC P68 
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No
Yes
Decision Block
End
End
No
Yes
Figure 7.3: SSC logic flow diagram
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Figure 7.4: SSC logic flow diagram continued
134
Figure 7.3 shows that the first step is for the Petri-net module to set the incidence matrix
for that particular module. The code then checks to see if an instance of SSC has occurred. To
do so, the model checks the operational current to see if the current hits 0, then increases above
this value. If this is not occurring, the module is skipped. If this is occurring, the model then
checks to see if P68 in the net is enabled, signifying that there is currently no SSC happening,
see table 5.2. If this is satisfied, the main decision logic is run.
Figure 7.4 shows how the Petri-net module for SSC is dependent upon key input variables.
The 1D model output for that time step is tapped into to ascertain the RH at the cathode, cur-
rent, voltage the exchange current density (i oc 0) and the mass transport coefficient (n trans).
These values are needed for the Petri-net module to calculate when to fire, and what values to
alter in the 1D model.
The module code then determines which RH threshold the 1D model is operating in, which
determines the extent of the degradation due to SSC. If there is a token in P65 ‘No SSC’ and
the RH at the cathode is more than or equal to 66%, the exchange current density is reduced by
1.92x10−11. The mass transport coefficient is increased by 0.00183 per SSC at these operating
conditions.
If any of the thresholds are experienced, the variables from the 1D model are altered so
that the next time step of the model incurs degradation due to the alterations. The token is
also taken from P68 and placed into P65. However due to this being a reversible degradation
pathway, the tokens are reset for the next time step.
As can be seen in Figure 7.5, the modelled degradation correlates with the experimental
results obtained in [74].
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Figure 7.5: Modelled SSC degradation for (a)0% (b)50% and (c)100% RH
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7.2 Degradation Validation Test
As to ascertain the accuracy of the degradation model, experimentation was undertaken to
operate a FC in the same conditions as the model, and degradation over that time was compared
between the two.
The FC was operated as if the FC was the sole power source in a road car with the require-
ments shown in Table 7.1:
Table 7.1: Table of vehicle parameters
Parameter Value Description Unit
m 1200 Vehicle mass kg
a tyre 0.01 Mass related tyre friction
coefficient
-
b tyre 0.01 Velocity related tyre fric-
tion coefficient
-
rr 0.325 Tyre rolling radius m
Cd 0.26 Drag coefficient -
A f 2 Frontal area m2
The vehicle model uses proposed values for an average consumer vehicle. This is required
for the model to accurately calculate how much power is needed from a FC stack or single cell
to propel the car.
The vehicle was run through the NEDC five times, before being shut-down. Five repetitions
are proposed as these five cycles take just over 1.5 hours to complete, which is a feasible amount
of time to run the experimental rig for validation of results. This process was repeated for five
cycles by programming the current profile for one cell out of the vehicle’s stack on the NEDC,
into the loadbank, repeated 5 times (see Figure 7.6). One cell was modelled that would be a
contributing cell in the stack of this theoretical vehicle. As the current is the same throughout
the stack, modelling one cell is justified.
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Figure 7.6: Current profile of the FC vehicle for 5 NEDCs
The FC operating conditions were kept as per the characterisation run (see Table 7.2):
After running the load profile of five NEDCs, six polarisation curves were undertaken with
EIS curves at low, medium and high current densities. After the sixth polarisation curve, the
performance of the cell had reached equilibrium, however the entire run of curves were averaged
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Table 7.2: Table of FC operational parameters
Parameter Value Unit
Relative Humidity 65 ±5 %
Pressure 0.5 bar
Flow Rate H2 1.5 slpm
Flow Rate Air 8.5 slpm
H2 Temp 31 Celsius
Air Temp 30.5 Celsius
Cell Temp 39 Celsius
to ascertain the performance of the cell after the load profiles. Figure 7.7 shows the averaged
polarisation curves for five cycles of the five NEDCs.
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Figure 7.7: Experimental polarisation curves
As can be seen in Figure 7.7, due to the resolution of data points, the curves are difficult to
interpret. Therefore the curves were fitted using a fifth order polynomial trend-line as in Figure
7.8. The fifth order polynomial trend-line was chosen for its ability to closely link data points
to give a good graphical representation of the results.
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Figure 7.8: Fitted experimental polarisation curves
The fitting of the trend-line smooths out the polarisation curve, making it easier to analyse,
however the initial activation drop region is changed from what is expected with the raw data
(see Figure 7.9).
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Figure 7.9: Comparison of raw data vs fitted for cycle one
This is due to the relatively low resolution of the raw data. The polarisation curves were
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set to run for 15 minutes, and had to equalise at each current density to take a reading. The
initial activation loss region changes voltage quite dramatically under low current changes, and
as such there is a large gap between data points in this region. Further down the polarisation
curve shows how the gap between data points is smaller, as the change in voltage is lower in
the ohmic and mass transport regions. What must be taken into account when considering the
following analysis, is that the polarisation curve for the fitted experimental data will be higher
than usual in the region of 1A to 5A, and lower in the region of 5A to 20A. In an ideal world,
the curves would be run for a longer time period, as to get a higher resolution in the initial
activation loss region.
The experimental data was then plotted against the 1D & Petri-Net degradation model’s
results, running under the same operating conditions, and under the same load profile. The
results of which are shown in Figure 7.10. The model was run simply to perform one polarisation
curve, and therefore no degradation is expected for the one curve. The point of this exercise
is to see how accurately the experimental results of a polarisation curve, match that of the
model’s.
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Figure 7.10: Modelled degradation vs experimental degradation
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Figure 7.11: Modelled degradation vs experimental degradation zoomed
The solid blue line represents the simulation’s first polarisation cycle, whereas the blue
dashed line is indicative of the performance of the cell after five cycles. The solid red line
represents the measured performance of the cell in the experimental rig on its first cycle. The
dashed red line shows the drop in performance that was measured after five cycles in the test
rig.
As can be seen in Figure 7.10 & 7.11, the degradation observed in the experimentation
matches closely with the degradation that is a product of the Petri-Net modelling for this case.
The drop in performance of the experimental data from 5A to 20A is a result of the polynomial
fit applied to smooth the raw data, as explained above. The zoomed section shows more clearly
the visual agreement of the drop in performance over five cycles in the experimentation, and
the same operating data used to run the degradation model.
7.2.1 Analysis
The most significant contributors to degradation for this simulation was Pt agglomeration, more
specifically the immature Pt agglomeration that occurs in the first 40 hours of operation. This
type of degradation is unavoidable and expected during the initial stages of operation. Other
contributors to the overall degradation come in the form of H2O2 degradation. This failure mode
was triggered when operating conditions met the criteria of the inhibitor related to potential of
the cell. This is observable through a visual inspection of the cumulative voltage drop variables
that can be seen when running the model.
7.2.2 EIS data
To further ascertain if the FC had degraded during its operation, EIS plots were undertaken at
low, medium and high current densities (0.2, 0.4 and 0.6A/cm2 respectively) after each cycle.
Figure 7.12 shows the three plots corresponding to each current density.
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The EIS curves show that for each cycle, the total area of the curve is reduced. This is
indicative of a reduction in the activation area of the FC. The EIS data strengthens the claims
that immature platinum agglomeration is a major influencer of FC lifetime, showing that the
activation area of the EIS plot decreases with each cycle.
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Figure 7.12: EIS plots for each current density after each cycle
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7.3 Weibull Degradation
The Weibull distribution was used to vary the degradation of each failure mode per time step.
This was done to integrate a random number into the degradation calculations and offer a more
realistic view of what would happen in a real world system.
Weibull was chosen as the type of distribution to use due to its ability to modulate the
degradation rate based upon a shape parameter. Some failure modes that can be experienced
in a FC are more severe in the early ‘bedding in’ period, some failure modes have a more linear
‘useful life’ affect, whereas others are more prominent only in the ‘wear out’ period towards
the end of life. The Weibull distribution is a good tool to make use of these characteristics by
having differing shape parameters as described in section 5.5.
Figure 7.13 shows a comparison between a flat rate of degradation vs a single run of a Weibull
integrated degradation under the same operating conditions. Flat rate refers to the constant
rate of degradation that, whereas the Weibul degradation line shows how the degradation rate
varies based upon the Weibul data input.
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Figure 7.13: Flat rate degradation vs Weibull distribution degradation
As can be seen in Figure 7.13 the Weibull degradation rate is within the range that is
expected if using the flat rate of degradation, however it varies dependent upon the random
number that was introduced.
Using the Weibull distribution means that one must repeat simulations a number of times
to gain an accurate understanding of the total lifetime of the FC. The simulations were run
numerous times until confidence was achieved with the cumulative average lifetime for each
simulation run.
The overall running of the combined 1D and Petri-net degradation model is shown in Figure
7.14. For the models to run, the initialisation data detailed in section 5.1.1 are input so that
the 1D model knows the specification of the MEA. The time and current profiles are needed
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Figure 7.14: Flow diagram of overall degradation model running
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for the models to know what cycle the FC is running. After this data is input, the simulation
process can start.
The degradation model was run until confidence was sought with the cumulative average
lifetime. As can be seen in Figure 7.15, the average lifetime varies significantly during the first 40
simulations, then starts to level out, with a minor fluctuation between 60 and 120 simulations.
Confidence in the average lifetime is assumed at 151 iterations of the simulation at a lifetime
of 1.224 x 105 which is equal to 34 hours of operation. The most significant contributors to the
degradation in this time period were immature platinum agglomeration and H2O2 degradation.
This was determined by evaluating the contribution of that module versus the others via the
real-time value output block of a scope during operation.
The final value ascertained from the degradation simulation performed in this work sits well
between the bounds given by the experimental data collected by Borup, et al. [16] in Table 9
of their paper. Their values of 24 hours lifetime due to H2O2 degradation and a lifetime of 50
hours due to H2O2 degradation and pinhole production agree well with the simulated lifetime
of 34 hours with H2O2 degradation being a significant contributor to the degradation.
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Figure 7.15: Cumulative average lifetime of the cell over 151 simulations
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter has presented the quantitative results of the Petri-Net degradation modelling. The
individual results of SSC were presented and showed a strong correlation with experimental
results from the literature. It is therefore assumed that degradation due to SSC in the overall
Petri-Net model is justified. When the entire Petri-Net model’s modules are run with their
interactions, the overall lifetime of a cell under the NEDC based drive cycles was ascertained.
Due to using Weibull distributions of the degradation data that included the input of a random
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number, numerous iteration of the simulation were run until confidence in an average lifetime
was gained. This was assumed to be after 151 cycles and was 1.224 x 105 seconds, which is
equal to 34 hours of operation. This falls within the boundaries of the experimentation in the
literature, and therefore is considered accurate.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Introduction
The research carried out has achieved the aims and objectives discussed in section 1.7 of chapter
1:
1. An understanding of current PEMFC degradation phenomena and modelling methods
was gained through the use of a literature review and FMEA/FTA.
2. A greater understanding of PEMFC reliability studies was ascertained through an in-
depth literature review and analysis of previous work in this area.
3. Based upon the literature review;
i A comprehensive FMEA including 21 failure modes was developed from knowledge
gained from the literature review, and is presented as the most comprehensive and
up-to-date FMEA currently published. The membrane had 8 main failure modes, the
catalyst layer contained 7 failure modes, the GDL had 4 and the BIP had 2 failure
modes associated with it.
ii A new FT was developed based upon the failure modes identified in the FMEA, and
is also presented as the most up-to-date and specific FT currently in the literature.
The quantification of this model used Weibull distributions of degradation data taken
from the literature.
4. Interactions and dependencies in a PEMFC were analysed and conclusions presented
regarding their effect on reliability analysis.
5. A quantitative degradation model was developed using Petri-net analysis techniques,
which predicts fuel cell lifetime under certain operating conditions. 20 failure modules
were developed which represented all of the failure modes previously ascertained through
the FMEA and FTA research. The product of the work was an estimated lifetime of a
cell operating in a certain cycle using Weibull distribution degradation data.
6. The degradation model is validated using an experimental rig that was purpose built,
from the ground up. The rig strengthened the confidence in the results of the degrada-
tion model by accurately matching the data from previous simulation runs. The rig also
offered degradation data to be used in the Petri-net model and filled gaps in the data for
degradation of PEMFCs.
The aim of this work was to develop an effective model to predict the lifetime and degrada-
tion of a FC in an automotive environment. This has been achieved through the development
and presentation of three reliability techniques used to analyse the degradation in a FC system,
and the main conclusions are given in 8.2.
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8.2 Major contributions in the area of reliability
This research has produced the following enhancements to the area of FC reliability research:
• A fully comprehensive FMEA has been produced that is the most up-to-date tabular
analysis of the differing failure modes that could be experienced in a FC environment
used in automotive load cycles [75]. This work improved some existing work in the area
by Rama, et al. [30].
• A FT has been developed that uses the knowledge built during the completion of the
FMEA, to show a top-down approach to reliability analysis. Quantification of the FT
was completed using Weibull distributions of data ascertained from the literature for the
key failure modes that were identified [49]. The work also demonstrated that FTA is not
an accurate method to quantify FC performance due to dependencies and restrictions in
logic.
• Petri-Net analysis was used to overcome some key pitfalls of the FT approach, and was
used to accurately quantify FC degradation during an automotive drive cycle.
• The Petri-Net modelling was integrated with a 1D fuel cell model that vastly increases
the accuracy of the results due to having a link to key operational variables that affect
degradation such as RH and cell voltage.
8.3 Experimentation
To help validate and strengthen confidence in the results of the degradation model in terms of
real world application, an experimental test rig was built.
• A FC test rig was built and commissioned to verify the degradation data ascertained from
the Petri-Net model.
• Experimentation was undertaken to record real world degradation levels of a FC under
automotive drive cycles. The drive cycle was created from the NEDC and repeated for
duration.
• The time-stamp and corresponding current for the load was logged and was used to feed
into the Petri-Net simulation to make sure that the simulation was exactly replicating the
experimentation.
8.4 Future Work
This work offers a novel application of Petri-Net modelling to FC degradation and lifetime
analysis, and fills a large gap in the literature regarding FC reliability modelling. However, the
model is as reliable as the input degradation data, and as such could be slightly improved upon.
Due to the lack of data in this field a range of data from a range of different tests was entered
into the simulation. As the majority of data used was from accelerated stress tests, it could
be assumed that the overall lifetimes ascertained from the simulation may be lower than real
world conditions.
Although the verification appears successful when compared to a study presented in [16],
other studies in the same paper show a longer lifetime, with fuel cells operating between 18
and 2500 hours. These could be due to differing operational parameters and load profiles, and
as such other load profiles should be analysed. It is assumed that a FC will degrade less at
potentials in the 0.6V region, and therefore if kept there, the lifetime may increase.
To make the degradation model 100% reliable, all input data would need to be ascertained
through experimentation with the exact core materials and operating conditions, singling out
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each individual failure mode. This would require an infeasible amount of time and fuel for
one organisation, however if testing procedures were standardised, a conglomerate of research
groups could create a data set of reliable data.
Expansion of this modelling could also include degradation analysis due to the balance of
plant for a FC system. A degraded humidifier for example would cause leached impurities and
contaminants entering the FC which are not modelled fully in this work. However, this would
require the accurate modelling of humidifier degradation. The integration of any such works
would be easy to facilitate due to the nature of Petri-Nets.
Another possibility is to use this degradation model to diagnose real-time degradation in
fuel cells to lengthen the life of a unit. If operational states are seen to be degrading the FC,
reverse engineering through this model will show what part of the FC is being degraded using
information from the FMEA and Petri-net model.
Stack level modelling can currently be replicated through this research, however it does not
take into account the effects of degradation in one cell affecting the adjacent cells. Future work
could include the ability of this model to take into account effects of stack level degradation by
looking into gas consumption along the stack when pinholes or other gas related failure modes
are occurring, and temperature differentials along the stack.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Failure detec-
tion method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
1.0 Polymer
Electrolyte
Membrane
The ’heart’ of
the PEMFC.
Forms the
electrolyte
at the centre
of the cell.
Blocks pas-
sage of gasses
and electrons,
but facilitates
passage of hy-
drogen protons
from anode to
cathode side.
1.0/1.1 Incor-
rect BIP torque
Local mechan-
ical stress due
to increased
pressure.
Increase of
membrane
resistance,
consistent with
the viscoelastic
compression of
the membrane.
Reduced pas-
sage of H+
protons. Re-
duction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Lin-
ear sweep
Voltammetry,
Electrochemi-
cal Impedance
Spectroscopy
Check bipolar
plate compres-
sion torque is
suitable for the
application
Oxide Film
Formation
(BIP), Flood-
ing, Ice Forma-
tion, Creep.
Satterfield,
et al. (2006)
Mechanical
properties of
Nafion and
titania/Nafion
composite
membranes
for polymer
electrolyte
membrane
fuel cells. &
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87) \&
Borup, R, et
al. (2007) Sci-
entific aspects
of polymer
electrolyte fuel
cell durability
and degrada-
tion. Chemical
Review, vol.
107, pp3927.
1.0/1.2 Poly-
mer membrane
’creep’
Causing mem-
brane thinning
and pinhole
formation
Reduction in
voltage out-
put, leading
to ultimate
catastrophic
degradation
Polarisation
Curve, Lin-
ear sweep
Voltammetry
Check bipolar
plate compres-
sion torque is
suitable for the
application
Can take
1000’s of hours
to cause catas-
trophic failure
when at nor-
mal operating
conditions
(hydrated and
below 80oC)
Membrane rel-
ative humidity,
mechanical
damage,
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
1.0/2.1 OH and
OOH radicals
\& H2O2 con-
tamination to
PTFE
End group
unzipping. The
Polytetraflu-
oroethylene
(PTFE) core
material is
modified with
side chains
of Perfluoro-
sulfonic acid
Ionomers.
These can be
lost through
OH and OOH
radical at-
tack. (PFSI)
membrane
Weaker mem-
brane, and
therefore in-
crease in risk
of mechani-
cal damage.
Reduction in
voltage output.
Additional
effect from
poisoning of
active sites
Electron Spin
Resonance
(ESR) spec-
troscopy,
Polarisation
Curve, Lin-
ear Sweep
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
Modifying
polytetraflu-
oroethylene
with in situ
sol-gel poly-
merization
of titanium
isopropoxide
to gener-
ate titania
quasinetworks
in the polar
domains of
a polymer
electrolyte
membrane fuel
cell, can mit-
igate against
the risk of H2
and O2 gas
crossover.
Low humidity
and OCV can
exacerbate the
attack and
degradation
Protonic resis-
tance of mem-
brane, H2O2
formation,
Mechanical
Damage
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
1.0/3 Pres-
ence of foreign
cationic ions:
Dissolution of
metal ions from
BIP corrosion
/ Contam-
inant from
humidifier/air
pipe/gas impu-
rity
Adsorbation
onto membrane
or catalyst.
Foreign ions
have stronger
affinity with
H+ ions in
membrane.
Attenutated
water flux
and proton
conductiv-
ity, extensive
and fast de-
hydration of
membrane
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
Source could
be BIP corro-
sion, humidifier
or inlet piping
ion leach
Metal ion
release from
Bipolar plate
can catalyse
the OH &
OOH radical
formation
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
durability:
Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
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1.0/3.1 Ice For-
mation
Severly im-
paired mechan-
ical strength
due to water
molecules not
bonded to
membrane can
freeze below
0deg. Freeze
cycling rear-
anges ionomer
at molecular
level
Reduction in
membrane
strength, de-
creases voltage
output
Polarisation
Curve, Ther-
mocouple
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
Inmproves
through-the-
plane condc-
tivity, however
reduces the
mechanical
strength of
the membrane
material
Swelling of
membrane,
reactant mal-
distribution
McDonald, et
al. (2004) Fuel
Cells 4
Severly im-
pairsed gas
impermiability
Reduction in
membrane
strength, in-
creases voltage
output
Polarisation
Curve, Ther-
mocouple
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
McDonald, et
al. (2004) Fuel
Cells 4
Severly im-
paired ionic
conductivity
Reduction in
membrane
strength, in-
creases voltage
output
Polarisation
Curve, Ther-
mocouple
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
McDonald, et
al. (2004) Fuel
Cells 4
Swelling of
membrane,
increased
pressure on
membrane
and reduced
protonic con-
ductivity
Reduction in
membrane
strength, in-
creases voltage
output
Polarisation
Curve, Ther-
mocouple
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
McDonald, et
al. (2004) Fuel
Cells 4
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1.0/3.2 Fatigue
from Relative
Humidity and
Temperature
cycling
Weakness in
mechanical
strength of
membrane
Increased prob-
ability of pin-
hole formation
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy,
Linear Sweep
Voltammetry
Control strat-
egy to maintain
linear level of
RH and tem-
perature
Dehydration
causes weak-
ening of mem-
brane.
1.0/3.3 Ex-
cessive Heat
Degradation
Sulphur Diox-
ide OH radical
formation
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve
Don’t allow
operating
temperature
to exceed
expected range
Relative hu-
midity
Placca, L \&
Kouta, R.
(2011) Fault
tree analysis
for PEM fuel
cell degrada-
tion process
modelling. Vol.
36. pp12393-
12405
Glass transi-
tion of PSFA
polymers
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve
Don’t allow
operating
temperature
to exceed
expected range
Relative hu-
midity
Placca, L \&
Kouta, R.
(2011) Fault
tree analysis
for PEM fuel
cell degrada-
tion process
modelling. Vol.
36. pp12393-
12405
Drop in pro-
tonic con-
ductivity due
to lack of
membrane
hydration
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve
Don’t allow
operating
temperature
to exceed
expected range
Relative hu-
midity
Schmittinger,
W \& Vahidi,
A. (2008) A
review of the
main parame-
ters influencing
long-term per-
formance and
durabiolity of
PEM fuel cells.
Journal of
Power Sources
180 (2008) 1-14
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1.0/4 Flooding Swelling of
membrane,
increased
pressure on
membrane
and reduced
protonic con-
ductivity
Reduced
protonic con-
ductivity.
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy,
Cyclic Voltam-
metry
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles
Swelling of
membrane, rel-
ative humidity
2.0 Catalyst
Layer
Layer sand-
wiched be-
tween PEM
and GDL.
Facilitates
electrochemical
reaction kinet-
ics of the HOR
and ORR.
2.0/1 Pt ag-
glomeration
and particle
growth
Pt nanopar-
ticles have
inherent ten-
dancy to
combine to re-
duce their high
surface energy.
This algglom-
eration reduces
the electro-
chemically
active surface
area. Reducing
voltage output
Reduction in
voltage output
Ex situ
transmis-
sion electron
microscopy
(TEM), X-ray
diffraction
(XRD) us-
ing Averbach
Fourier trans-
form method
for deter-
mination of
weighted crys-
tallite sizes.
Polarisation
Curve. Cyclic
Voltammetry
Borup et al
(2006) showed
that Pt par-
tical growth
increases with
temperature.
Critically when
increasing
temp from 60 -
80oC. Ref (p12
in Wang book)
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87) \&
Borup, R, et
al. (2007) Sci-
entific aspects
of polymer
electrolyte fuel
cell durability
and degrada-
tion. Chemical
Review, vol.
107, pp3927.
2.0/2 Pt Ele-
mental loss
Pt nanoparti-
cles detaching
from carbon
support and
dissolving into
PEM without
redisposition
Reduction in
voltage output
Atomic Ad-
sorption
Spectroscopy
(AAS) \& In-
ductively Cou-
pled Plasma
with Mass
Spectroscopy
(ICP-MS).
Cyclic Voltam-
metry
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
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2.0/3 Pt Mi-
gration
Pt nanoparti-
cles move from
origninal posi-
tion to other
areas of the
cell, such as
the membrane
or other areas
of the catalyst
layer.
Reduction in
voltage output
Atomic Ad-
sorption
Spectroscopy
(AAS) \& In-
ductively Cou-
pled Plasma
with Mass
Spectroscopy
(ICP-MS)
Cyclic Voltam-
metry
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
2.0/4 Pt Con-
tamination
Gas contam-
inants from
the fuel, air or
system-born
contaminants
such as silicone
or metals, can
poison the
catalyst layer.
Reduction in
reaction kinet-
ics (poisoned
reaction sites),
Drop in output
voltage
Atomic Ad-
sorption
Spectroscopy
(AAS) \& In-
ductively Cou-
pled Plasma
with Mass
Spectroscopy
(ICP-MS)
Cyclic Voltam-
metry
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
Reduced ionic
condutivity of
PEM, Drop in
output voltage
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
Mass trans-
portation
problems due
to change
in structure
of GDL and
catalyst layer,
Drop in output
voltage
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
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2.0/4.1 CO
Contamination
CO takes up
active sites on
the Pt catalyst,
thus blocking
active sites and
reducing the
ECSA
Reduction in
reaction kinet-
ics (poisoned
reaction sites),
Drop in output
voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy,
Cyclic Voltam-
metry, Gas
Mass Spec-
trometry
Can be re-
versed with
purge of H2
gas feed at pe-
riodic intervals
2.0/4.2 Anion
Contamination
Cl- from
feed stream
or catalyst
preparation
promotes dis-
solution of Pt
and produces
Pt ions in
the inlet side
of cathode.
Crossover of
H2 reduces
the Pt ions
to metal Pt
causing Pt
band in PEM.
Reduction in
reaction kinet-
ics (poisoned
reaction sites),
Drop in output
voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
2.0/4.3 Other
Contaminants
NH3, SOx
and NO2 in
the airstream
cause catalyst
degradation.
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
2.0/4.3.1 NH3 NH3 degrades
the ionemer in
the CL
Reduction in
reaction kinet-
ics (poisoned
reaction sites),
Drop in output
voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
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2.0/4.3.2 SOx S-containing
species absorbs
on the active
sites of a c
catalyst sur-
face, occupying
the polyatomic
sites.
Reduction in
reaction kinet-
ics (poisoned
reaction sites),
Drop in output
voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
2.0/5 Pres-
ence of foreign
cationic ions:
Dissolution of
metal ions from
BIP corrosion
/ Contam-
inant from
humidifier/air
pipe/gas impu-
rity
Adsorbation
onto membrane
or catalyst.
Foreign ions
have stronger
affinity with
H+ ions in
membrane.
Attenutated
water flux
and proton
conductiv-
ity, extensive
and fast de-
hydration of
membrane
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Gas
Mass Spec-
trometry
Leads on to
reactant mal-
distribution.
Which can
either cause:
Electron path-
way cut-off,
delamination
of membrane,
or Pt agglom-
eration/dis-
solution. All
classed un-
der Carbon
support degra-
dation
Metal ion
release from
Bipolar plate
can catalyse
the OH &
OOH radical
formation
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
durability:
Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
2.0/6 Star-
tup/Shutdown
Cycling
Reactant mal-
distribution /
non-uniform
reactant dis-
tribution,
leading to
either carbon
black corrosion
mechanism
Reduction in
Voltage output
Leads on to
reactant mal-
distribution.
Which can
either cause:
Electron path-
way cut-off,
delamination
of membrane,
or Pt agglom-
eration/dis-
solution. All
classed un-
der Carbon
support degra-
dation
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
durability:
Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
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2.0/7 Flooding Blockage
of porous
pathways,
leading to
reactant mal-
distribution
Reduction in
Voltage output
Polarization
curve
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles.
Leads on to
reactant mal-
distribution.
Which can
either cause:
Electron path-
way cut-off,
delamination
of membrane,
or Pt agglom-
eration/dis-
solution. All
classed un-
der Carbon
support degra-
dation
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
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2.0/8 Ice For-
mation
Blockage
of porous
pathways,
leading to
reactant mal-
distribution
Reduction in
Voltage output
Polarization
curve/ Ther-
mocouple
measurements
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
Leads on to
reactant mal-
distribution.
Which can
either cause:
Electron path-
way cut-off,
delamination
of membrane,
or Pt agglom-
eration/dis-
solution. All
classed un-
der Carbon
support degra-
dation
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
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and mitigation
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3.0 Gas Diffu-
sion Layer
Provides
electrical con-
ductivity from
reaction site
to external
circuit. Also
known as ’elec-
trode’. GDL is
porous carbon
with PTFE
coatings, the
porosity dif-
fuses the
reaction gasses
and disperses
them to the
reaction sites
on the catalyst
layer.
3.0/1.0 OH
Radicals con-
tamination to
PTFE
OH radicals
attakc the car-
bon material
in the PTFE
and Carbon
support, de-
creasing GDL
conductivity
and hydropho-
bicity
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
Using graphi-
tized fibers
during GDL
preparation to
improve GDL
oxidative and
electrooxida-
tive stability.
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
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3.0/1.1 OH
Radicals con-
tamination to
Carbon
OH radicals
attakc the car-
bon material
in the PTFE
and Carbon
support, de-
creasing GDL
conductivity
and hydropho-
bicity
Reduction in
voltage output
Polarisation
Curve, Cyclic
Voltammetry,
Gas Mass
Spectrometry
Using graphi-
tized fibers
during GDL
preparation to
improve GDL
oxidative and
electrooxida-
tive stability.
J. Wu et
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3.0/2 Flooding
of GDL
Water
molecules
blocking the
passage of gas
through the
pores of the
GDL material
Loss of reaction
kinetics, result-
ing in drop in
voltage output
until failure of
cell
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles.
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
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3.0/3 Water
freezing in
GDL
Frozen wa-
ter molecules
blocking the
passage of gas
through the
pores of the
GDL material
Loss of reaction
kinetics, result-
ing in drop in
voltage output
until failure of
cell
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
Inerfacial
delamina-
tion due to
freeze/thaw cy-
cling. Caused
by expansion
and contrac-
tion of pores
during freeze
thaw cycling.
Drop in output
voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Elec-
trochemical
Impedance
Spectroscopy
Purge gas and
solution to
remove excess
water for start-
up shutdown
cycles, and
avoid opera-
tion in sub-zero
environments
Wang, H, et al.
(2012) PEM
fuel cell failure
mode analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
4.0 Bipolar
Plate
The BIP is a
multifunctional
component of
a PEMFC. It
seperates fuel,
oxidant gas
and coolant;
homogeneously
distributing
reactant gasses
to the GDL.
It also collects
the current
from the FC
reaction, de-
livering it to
the external
circuit.
4.0/1 Oxide
film formation
An oxide film
layer can form
at the junction
between GDL
and BIP. This
can increase
in size and in-
crease internal
resistance to
current flow.
Drop in output
voltage due
to resistance
increase
Polarisation
Curve, Gas
Mass Spec-
trometry,
Electrochemi-
cal Impedance
Spectroscopy
Swelling J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
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4.0/2 Corro-
sion leading
to release of
multivalent
cations
The chemical
corrosion of al-
loys can release
Fe, Ni and Cr
atoms.
Reduction in
output voltage
Polarisation
Curve, Gas
Mass Spec-
trometry
Catalyses
H2O2 forma-
tion
J. Wu et
al, (2008)
’A review of
PEM fuel cell
durability:
Degradation
mechanisms
and mitigation
strategies’
pp110-111
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a b s t r a c t
Reliability issues with fuel cells have held back the commercialisation of this new tech-
nology, and as such are required to be studied further. Current reliability standards for
automotive applications require an operational lifetime of 150,000 miles or 5000 h. These
standards are hard to achieve; therefore in depth reliability analysis and degradation
studies can help allude towards the key areas of improvement in fuel cell technology to
meet these standards.
Previous Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) work has shown that the multi-
component system of a Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) is inherently
complex. Dependencies exist between multiple failure modes which discounts Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) as a feasible reliability modelling technique. Therefore, in this study, Petri-
Net simulation and fuel cell modelling techniques have been adopted to develop an ac-
curate degradationmodel. Operational parameters such as water content, temperature and
current density and their effects on the occurrence of failure modes can be modelled
through this technique. The work will improve previous fuel cell reliability studies by
taking into consideration; operating parameters (water content, temperature), fuel cell
voltage based on demand (drive cycles) and dependencies between failure modes.
Copyright © 2015, Hydrogen Energy Publications, LLC. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.
Introduction
Why hydrogen fuel cells?
In recent years, climate change and sustainability issues have
become more poignant and further discussed. This is due to
the evidence that points towards an anthropogenic source of
climate change (Soloman et al. [1]). Man-made activities
contribute towards climate change through Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) emissions, which include; carbon dioxide (COs),
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) among others.
The UK emitted 549.3 Million tonnes of Carbon Dioxide
equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2011 (Dept. for Transport [2]) and 122.2
MtCO2e was due to the transport industry, with 74% of this
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 07896 009 227.
E-mail address: m.whiteley@lboro.ac.uk (M. Whiteley).
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figure due to cars, taxis and buses (DECC [3]). Other countries
have also pledged to tackle climate change, with the US
president stating that the US will reduce CO2 emissions 17%
from 2005 levels by 2020, 42% by 2030 and finally 83% by 2050.
Not only are GHG negatively affecting the atmosphere,
energy prices are set to continue to rise at alarming rates
(BERR. [4]), which could dramatically affect the UKs energy
system and energy security concerns. Due to the aforemen-
tioned negative environmental impacts of emissions from
fossil fuel energy sources and concernswith energy prices and
security, this figure needs to be dramatically reduced not only
to meet government targets, but for the health of the
biosphere.
Hydrogen fuel cells are a zero-emission energy conversion
and power generation device. They combine Hydrogen (H2)
and Oxygen (O2) gases to formwater (H2O), heat and electrical
energy. If the H2 is sourced from renewable means, such as
electrolysis of H2O from wind turbine electricity, the whole
process is zero emissions in use. With this in mind, hydrogen
fuel cells have the potential to mitigate climate change and
energy security concerns.
The Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell
Out of the five main types of fuel cell, the PEMFC has been
singled out as themost applicable to automotive applications.
This is due to its low operating temperature and rapid startup
times.
There are three main hurdles to the commercialisation of
PEMFCS; Cost, Infrastructure and Reliability. Currently
PEMFCS in automotive applications need to meet the United
States (US) Department of Energy (DoE) standards of 5000 h
lifetimewith a performance drop of nomore than 5% over that
time, with the Japanese and European standards being similar
(Borup et al. [5]). However, modern day PEMFCS systems
struggle to reach these targets due to unforeseen degradation
of the membrane, Cataly stLayer (CL), Gas Diffusion Layer
(GDL) and Bipolar Plate (BIP) components, contributing to-
wards a reduction in performance.
PEMFC
PEMFCS can suffer threemain types of degradation during the
operating lifetime; chemical, thermal and mechanical degra-
dation. These failure mechanism classes can stem from
numerous individual failure modes that the PEMFC can
experience. An example of a failure mode linked to chemical
degradation is illustrated in Chemical degradation section.
Chemical degradation
An example of chemical degradation is hydroxyl (OH) and
hydroperoxy (OOH) radical attack. OH and OOH radicals are
caused by the chemical changes brought around due to H2O2
(peroxide) presence. As such, H2O2 formation from its two
main pathways (diffusion of gasses through membrane and
electron reduction) can lead on to a chemical attack of the
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) based membrane and areas of
the CL and GDL.
To further explain the pathways, LaConti et al. [6] proposed
a method of production of radicals which occurs due to the
diffusion of gasses through the membrane.
H2/2H$ (1)
H$þO2/HO2$ (2)
HO2$þH$/H2O2 (3)
H2O2 þMþ2/Mþ3 þ $OHþOH (4)
$OHþH2O2/H2OþHO2$ (5)
Equations 1e5 show the stages of how radicals are a
product of H2O2 production which occurs under normal
operating conditions and membrane health. Therefore H2O2
needs to be included as the basic event leading to radical
formation.
Peroxide can form in another way, by a two electron
reduction of O2 pathway (Pozio et al. [7]) explained in Equation
(6);
O2 þ 2Hþ þ 2e/H2O2 (6)
The way in which radical and peroxide attack affects the
degradation of the cell is through the thinning of the mem-
brane over time. This is achieved by end-group unzipping and
chain scission processes, actively eating away at the chemical
bonds of the PTFE based membrane.
Reliability analysis of PEMFCS
Reliability analysis of PEMFCS is still in its infancy and needs
to be further developed to advance the understanding of
degradation mechanisms and lifetime of PEMFCS. Previous
work includes a failure mode identification and FTA of a
general PEMFC by Rama et al. [8]. Additionally, a more recent
FTA work was presented by Placca & Kouta [9], looking at the
failure modes that could cause PEMFC degradation.
The existing reliability work has proven to be a good start
with understanding PEMFC degradation and failure. However,
the latest work by Whiteley et al. [10,11] has identified that
there were areas that could be improved and developed to
further the reliability and degradation field of PEMFC research.
These enhancements, including FMEA & FTA are summarised
in FMEA and FTA section respectively.
FMEA
A FMEA was performed to systematically evaluate the po-
tential failures that can occur in a PEMFC system, and their
effects on the operation of the system. Thiswork extended the
previous work by Rama et al. [8], fully outlining all of the
failure modes and their effects in a PEMFC assembly.
The FMEA table consists of the identification of the phys-
ical component of the PEMFC being analysed, followed by a
brief description of its function. The failure modes that can be
experienced in this area are then listed, detailing the effects
that this failure mode has. The local effect is the contained
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effect of the failure mode, whereas the system effect is how
the failure mode will affect the overall operation of the entire
system. Failure detection methods are listed for more details
on how to distinguish these failures, whether it be in-situ or
ex-situ. Mitigation strategies are listed where previous work
has identified a way to reduce or mitigate against these failure
modes. Any poignant remarks are listed that may help further
the understanding of any of the previously highlighted points,
followed by any key relationships between the listed failure
mode, and any other failure mode in the system that is being
analysed. Finally the source of the failuremode information is
listed for integrity.
This work filled a gap in current PEMFC degradation liter-
ature by providing a comprehensive list of component and
system level failure modes that a PEMFC can experience. The
outcome was identification of 21 components failure modes,
resulting in 39 different potential system failure effects.
FTA
The existing work in FTA for PEMFCs by Placca & Kouta [9]
showed 37 individual basic events that could lead to the top-
level intermediate events of Membrane Degradation, Cata-
lyst Layers Degradation andGas Diffusion Layers Degradation.
These three intermediate events lead on to the overall top
event of Degradation of the Cell. The work harboured key
areas that were flagged for improvement, to increase the ac-
curacy of the FTA model. A new state-of-the-art FTA was
undertaken by Whiteley et al. [10,11] to rectify the issues
arisen in the existing work, which saw a complete re-draw of
the failure logic for a PEMFC. Areas that needed attention
were; Top Event Ambiguity, BIP Omission, Ambiguity of In-
termediate Events, Lack of Standardised Data, Errors in Pro-
posed Degradation Rates and an overall re-think of the failure
logic (see Fig. 1).
The failure modes identified and developed to advance the
FTA PEMFC work are presented in Table 1, where failure
modes listed in bold font are carried over from the existing
work by Placca & Kouta [9]:
The FTA work has provided a clear failure logic structure
for a PEMFC, identifying the key basic events that contribute to
the overall degradation of PEMFC performance. However, one
of the main weaknesses of the FTA approach is that it as-
sumes independent failure event occurrence. Hence Petri-Net
simulation has been adopted to address this issue.
Petri-Net simulation
Petri-Net simulation is based upon a graphical process of
representing component relationships, conditions and
events. It can be used to model and analyse dynamic behav-
iours of systems taking into account relationships and de-
pendencies which FTA cannot.
Petri-Nets are comprised of two main symbols; ‘places’ (P)
and ‘transitions’ (T). These two nodes are connected by arrows
known as ‘Arcs’ (A), which show the direction of flow of ‘to-
kens’. Tokens are used to describe the state of the system, and
are used to mark/enable a place as in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows a simple Petri-Net that has place one enabled
(P1 containing a token). The transition (T1) will fire based on
criteria that could range from time intervals to probability.
Once the criteria are met, the transition will take the one
token from P1 and place it into P2, denoting a new state.
P, T and A can be defined as by Liu & Chiou [12]:
P ¼ fPijPi is a place; 1  i  Ig;
where I is a positive integer
T ¼ fTijTi is a transition; 1  i  Ig
Fig. 1 e Proposed change to ‘global’ tree.
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Benefits of Petri-Net simulation
Petri-Net simulation offers significant advantages over FMEA
and FTA. FMEA is more geared towards the analysis of indi-
vidual failure modes, and doesn't look at the interactions be-
tween a group of failure modes. FTA can look at the
relationships between failure modes in a graphical manor,
however the technique cannot take into account de-
pendencies between failure modes.
Petri-Net simulation can take into account dependencies,
and has been chosen to analyse the failure characteristics of a
PEMFC.
Existing work in the literature
Although Petri-Nets have been used numerous times to assess
system degradation and reliability concerns (Volovoi [13] &
Malhotra, Trivedi [14]), There is currently only one example of
Petri-Net use for reliability analysis of PEMFCs from Wieland
et al. [15] and is a good start to develop reliability analysis in this
field. However, the model could be further developed to accu-
rately represent all of the previously identified failure modes
from FMEA and FTA work presented by Whiteley et al. [10,11].
The existing work in the literature has an initial place
which denotes the operational state of a PEMFC. The model
can fire through five main transitions; Degradation, Sponta-
neous event, Reversible event, Repair and Breakdown. All
transitions are based upon degradation rates taken from the
literature or the authors own assumptions. These rates are
selected using the normal distribution based upon mean,
lower limit and upper limits, again assumed by the authors.
Limitations with failure rates/probabilities used
Using the normal distribution is a limitation when analysing
PEMFCs. Components don't share characteristics with normal
distribution probability theory, rather components ageing in a
system share more characteristics with the Weibull distribu-
tion, owing to the ‘bathtub curve’ (Fig. 3).
The Weibull shape parameter ‘b’ is reflective of what stage
the component is in due to the lifetime of the component. This
shape parameter can be changed dependent upon the failure
mode in question. That is to say that an early life failure mode
such as early life Platinum (Pt) agglomeration would have a
shape parameter of less than one. Whereas failure due to
creep under normal conditions (that can take upwards of
5000 h to cause a failure) would use a shape parameter ofmore
than one.
Limitations with parameters used
The failure parameters used can be considered to be vague
and limited in number for an accurate degradation model of a
PEMFC. In the work by Wieland et al. [15], degradation tran-
sition severity is calculated from a normal distribution using
the Natural Aging parameter from 1 to 70 mV h1 (micro-volts
per hour). This assumes that degradation is a simple process
and can be derived from lifetime test degradation rates.
However due to the inherently complex system of a PEMFC,
degradation relationships can interact and harbour de-
pendencies that can alter the overall lifetime, based upon
their interaction and operating conditions (Whiteley et al.
[10]). Spontaneous and reversible parameter use could also be
optimised. Wieland et al. [15] suggest that random variables
are used to select if one of the spontaneous events or revers-
ible events are occurring. However ‘High temperature opera-
tion and Start below 0 C (SBZ)’ could never occur together.
The authors themselves acknowledged the limitations of
their model:
‘There is a lot of simplification done to get this first model.
For example, spontaneous events occur independently of the
stack state and degradation is steady, instead of increasing at
certain times such as summer or winter’.
Wieland et al. [15] pp38.
Proposed model
The proposed work in this paper seeks to enhance the capa-
bilities of the Petri-Net approach for PEMFC degradation
modelling. The overall ‘Global’ Petri-Net is presented in Fig. 4.Fig. 2 e Example, simple Petri-Net.
Table 1 e List of basic events.
Basic events e membrane
Incorrect BIP torque
Polymer membrane ‘creep’
Microcrack fracture
OH and OOH radicals & H2O2 contamination to PTFE
Presence of foreign cationic ions: dissolution of metal
ions from BIP e corrosion/contaminant from
humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
Ice formation
Fatigue from relative humidity and temperature cycling
Excessive heat degradation
Flooding
Basic events e catalyst
Pt agglomeration and particle growth
Pt elemental loss
Pt Migration
Pt Contamination
Startup/shutdown cycling
Flooding
Ice Formation
Basic events e gas diffusion layer
OH Radicals
Flooding
Ice formation
Basic events e bipolar plate
Oxide film formation
Corrosion leading to release of multivalent cations
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There are two global states ‘Operating State’ and ‘Failed
State’, The ‘Operating State’ is initially set at 100% health of
the PEMFC and fires through the ‘Degradation’ transition on
every time-step. Contained within the degradation transition,
are separate Petri-Nets based upon the knowledge gained
through FMEA and FTA as discussed in 4.1. Each failure mode
has a relationship Petri-Net to explain its logic, and how it
might interact with other failure modes in the system.
The ‘Failure’ transition will fire based upon the criteria of
unacceptable system performance. This is set at a lifetime of
less than 5000 h withmore than a 5% drop in cell performance
over that time as per the US DoE target. If this target threshold
is exceeded, the transition will fire into the ‘Failed’ state.
Degradation modules
Each failure mode previously identified in the FMEA and FTA
has a Petri-Net attributed to it, which shows the logic
contributing towards its activation. A total of 21 Petri-Net
modules have been created however only one is discussed
here for brevity. Fig. 5 shows an example of a Petri-Netmodule
for a given failure mode: ‘H2O2 Degradation’.
P1 is the initial place, and is enabled with a token on the
first running of the model. It is indicative of a healthy PEMFC
and is enabled from the first running of the model, with no
H2O2 degradation. T1 can only fire when there is a token in P2
and P1 at the same time. P2 is used to indicate a state of H2O2
degradation, agglomerating the lower level transitions. This is
for the integrity of the transition logic. The firing of this
transition would enable P8, indicating a state of H2O2 degra-
dation, and would have an output affecting the performance
of the PEMFC and potentially linking into another Petri-Net
module. There are a number of contributors to P2, stemming
from places P3 ‘Pt dissolution/redistribution ‘Pt Band”, P4 ‘Low
rate of gas crossover’, P5 ‘BIP corrosion& release ofmetal ions’
and P6 ‘High rate of gas crossover’. P3 is enabled by an inter-
action from a separate Petri-Net module, and indicates the
presence of Pt which acts as a catalyst for H2O2 formation
(LaConti et al. [6]) shown in Equations 7e9.
H2 þ Pt/PtH (7)
Pt HþO2/$OOH (8)
$OOHþ PtH/H2O2 (9)
Therefore for ‘T2’ to fire, ‘P3’ and ‘P4’ need to be enabled.
This would show that there is gas crossover and a free Pt
presence to cause a rate of formation of H2O2.
As has been previouslymentioned in Equation (1)e(6), H2O2
can form from the crossover of the reactant gasses through
the membrane. Thus for a given rate of gas crossover, a cor-
responding rate of H2O2 formation is attributed. This enables
the Petri-Net modelling of ‘T3’ and ‘T5’ firing and a corre-
sponding degradation of PEMFC overall performance. Conse-
quently if ‘P6’ is enabled, ‘T5’ will fire, placing a token in ‘P2’,
and if ‘P4’ is enabled, ‘T3’ will fire a token into ‘P2’.
Pozio et al. [7] also showed that the presence of Feþ2 and Cu
þ
2
(Iron and Copper ions) released from BIP corrosion greatly
accelerate the degradation due to H2O2 formation when there
is gas crossover. Therefore a separate rate is associated with
‘T4’.
‘P7’ is an inhibitor and serves to prevent the transition of
‘T2’, ‘T3’, ‘T4’ & ‘T5’. Borup et al.[5] state that the potential for
H2O2 formation (E
o H2O2) is equal to 0.695 V, and that any
potential greater than this would inhibit the formation of H2O2
in the PEMFC.
Petri-Net firing
The firing of the Petri-Net uses the following equation:
Mn ¼ M0 þ AT
X
(10)
where Mn is the final marking, M0 is the initial marking, AT is
the incidence matrix for the module, and
P
is the transition
firing count vector. The relationship between AT and
P
is
summarised in Equation (11):
AT
X
¼ DM ¼ Mn M0 (11)
For each individual Petri-Net module contained within the
‘Degradation’ transition of the global Petri-Net, there is a
corresponding incidence matrix as in Equation (12) for H2O2
degradation.
AT ¼
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
T1 T2 T3 T4 T50
BBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
(12)
The logic behind each transition from place to place is
noted in each AT matrix for each module. A ‘1’ indicates the
Fig. 3 e Component ‘bathtub curve’.
Fig. 4 e Global Petri-Net.
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taking of a token from a place, and a ‘1’ indicates the placing of
a token into that place.
Fuel cell model
A lumped parameter PEMFC model developed by Fly & Thring
[16] is used to validate voltage degradation predictions against
observed degradation from the literature. Additionally it can
be used to integrate the degradationmodel and therefore have
a more accurate relationship between degradation and oper-
ational performance. The fuel cell model is initially run to
ascertain the operating conditions of the cell. These data are
then used by the Petri-Net to model the degradation based
upon the fuel cell's conditions.
Summary of the Petri-Net model
The Petri-Net degradation model developed in this work is a
comprehensive model of the interactions between the previ-
ously identified failure modes in a PEMFC of standard con-
struction (PTFE based membrane, Carbon/Pt catalyst, steel
BIP, carbon GDL). The individual modules range from rela-
tively simple relationships with 2e3 places and a low number
of transitions, to larger modules with 8 places and 8 transi-
tions. It contains 21 separate modules that interact to both;
deliver a voltage degradation value, and further interact with
other failure modes. However, if further interactions or
modules are discovered that need to be added, the Petri-Net
model can easily facilitate this occurrence, with a simple
addition to the script files. The model parameters and degra-
dation rates for failure modes are listed in Tables 2 and 3.
Using the parameters listed in Table 2, the polarisation
curve in Fig. 6 can be achieved using the fuel cell model
developed. Data from Ref. [17] is also plotted, and the model
shows a good correlation with experimental results.
The parameters listed in Table 3 show the degradation
rates used for the Petri-Net model. There is little data in the
literature to ascertain all failure mode's interaction upon the
voltage of a PEMFC, therefore proposed values are used, based
upon the review of experimental data and expert opinion.
The initial setup of the model requires the user to input
some starting variables such as; operating temperature (to
consider ice formation and excessive heat) and number of
startup/shutdown cycles. This data is implicit in placing to-
kens in the relevant initial places, and inhibitor gates. A dy-
namic range of inputs can be added to have a varying input
(such as temperature) over time. Transition timings for the
example in Fig. 5 are instant, but for others could be timed or
based upon enabling criteria.
Results
The Petri-Net model was programmed in MATLAB on a
desktop PC running a dual core 3.10 GHz processor. For all of
the individual Petri-Netmodels, anAT matrix was constructed
with a corresponding transition ‘firing’ script to use the AT
Fig. 5 e Example Petri-Net for H2O2 degradation.
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matrix information. For each Petri-Net that has an output for
which a reduction in performance is noted, a voltage drop
count variable is used to store the total amount of degradation
in performance due to the failure relationships. Therefore for
each output place in a degradationmodule Petri-Net, a voltage
drop figure is added to the overall voltage drop count. Model
initialization is commenced via the input of key operating
parameters such as operating temperature and potential
amongst others. This will place tokens is specific module
initial states ready for simulation runs. The in-putted pa-
rameters also decide whether key inhibitor places are enabled
or not. The model is run either until 5000 h is reached or a
performance drop of >5% is experienced.
Verification of model
Startup Shutdown Cycling (SSC) degradation was considered
through a review of the literature in this area. Kim et al. [22]
conducted extensive experimentation to reveal the relation-
ship between SSC and degradation of fuel cell performance.
Their results show that after 1500 instances of SSC, a drop in
performance of 0.08 V was observed (Fig. 7). Therefore per
cycle it can be considered that SSC causes a drop in perfor-
mance of 5.333  105 V.
The degradation rate was programmed to take affect per
SSC, through the transition T1 in Fig. 8.
Therefore, for each time there is an instance of SSC, a
degradation rate of 5.333  105 V is applied to a voltage drop
count variable.
The results of the Petri-Net model using an SSC degrada-
tion module was tested using a polarisation curve model as in
Fig. 9.
Table 2 e List of fuel cell parameters used.
Cell performance Model Parameter Value & Unit
Fuel cell rated power 50 kW
Maximum system efficiency 56%
System efficiency @ 50% load 50%
Number of cells 360
Cell active area 200 cm2
Cathode stoichiometry 2.5
Anode stoichiometry 1.03
Stack mass 30 kg
Stack specific heat 3.5kJ/kg K
Stack cathode volume 0.01 m3
Stack dimensions 20  20  60 cm
Ambient humidity 70%
Membrane thickness 100 mm
Internal current density 1.5  104 A/cm2
Mass transport coefficient 3  104
Exchange current density 3.2  108 A/cm2
Stack surface heat transfer coefficient 5 W/m2 K
Water entrainment constant 2.0
Molar mass membrane 1.1 kg/mol
Dry density membrane 1.98 g/cm3
Cathode activation energy 66 kJ/mol
Table 3 e List of degradation parameters used.
Failure mode parameter Value (V h1) Ref
Incorrect BIP torque 103 Proposed
Polymer membrane ‘creep’ 105 Proposed
Microcrack fracture 102 Proposed
OH and OOH
radicals & H2O2degradation
1.3  103 [18]
Presence of foreign cationic ions 10 Proposed
Ice formation 0.5 Proposed
Fatigue from relative
humidity cycling
1.2  104 [19]
Excessive heat degradation 0.25 [20]
Flooding 0.39 [20]
Pt agglomeration
and particle growth
105 Proposed
Pt elemental loss 105 Proposed
Pt migration 104 Proposed
Pt contamination 4.37  103 [21]
Startup/Shutdown cycling 5.333  105
per cycle
[22]
OH Radicals 1.3  103 [18]
Oxide film formation 106 Proposed
Corrosion leading to release 3.125  105 [23]
Fig. 6 e Polarisation curve ascertained from the developed
model.
Fig. 7 e Startup/shutdown cycling tests [22].
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The model shows a good replication of the polarisation
curve drop observed by Kim et al. [22] in Fig. 7, with the same
logic being carried through the entirety of the Petri-Netmodel.
Each failure mode interaction has a voltage degradation value
assigned to it, with some acting reversibly dependent upon
the state of the system, and some acting as a counter
(irreversible).
Conclusions & future work
The presented work is a step forward in degradation and
reliability modelling of PEMFCs. The previous work by the
authors leading to this has ensured that the Petri-Net model
proposed, is reliably constructed based upon an in-depth, and
up-to-date review of PEMFC failure phenomena.
As can be seen in Figs. 7 and 9, the initial activation range of
the polarisation curve does not match up correctly. Due to the
fuel cellmodel developed, this area can bemodified due to SSC
and take into account degradation in different regions of the
polarization curve in future work.
Future work will include an integration of this degradation
model into a PEMFC performance model, capable of plotting
polarisation data from key operational inputs. Currently the
degradation model needs operating data in the form of initial
inputs from the user. That is to say that operating voltage is
set from the outset, alongside operating temperature, number
of SSCs and other variables. Integration into a PEMFC perfor-
mance model will allow the performance model to output
operational data into the degradation Petri-Net model for its
inputs. Then after running the Petri-Net model, the outputs
would feed back into the performance model. As the process
continues, degradation, and its effect on the performance of
the cell can be accurately ascertained. Not only does integra-
tion with a PEMFC performance model mean more accurate
degradation modelling, it also means that PEMFC operational
load levels (such as drive cycles) can be preset, and the
degradation due to the fluctuation in load (and therefore
temperature etc.) can be considered.
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a b s t r a c t
Hydrogen fuel cells have the potential to dramatically reduce emissions from the energy
sector, particularly when integrated into an automotive application. However there are
three main hurdles to the commercialisation of this promising technology; one of which is
reliability. Current standards require an automotive fuel cell to last around 5000 h of
operation (equivalent to around 150,000 miles), which has proven difficult to achieve to
date. This hurdle can be overcome through in-depth reliability analysis including tech-
niques such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
amongst others. Research has found that the reliability field regarding hydrogen fuel cells
is still in its infancy, and needs development, if the current standards are to be achieved. In
this work, a detailed reliability study of a Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC)
is undertaken. The results of which are a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a PEMFC.
The FMEA and FTA are the most up to date assessments of failure in fuel cells made using a
comprehensive literature review and expert opinion.
Copyright © 2015, Hydrogen Energy Publications, LLC. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.
Introduction
With the increase in environmental awareness and climate
change concerns in recent years, hydrogen fuel cells have
been put forward as a technology that could potentially
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Anthropogenic activities
contribute to climate change mainly through Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) emissions from fossil fuel based energy sources. These
harmful GHGs are comprised of, among others, carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) that contribute
to the greenhouse effect. Additionally, energy prices are set to
continue to rise by alarming rates [1] which will disrupt the
energy system of many countries due to a rise in oil prices.
Therefore an alternative energy source would mitigate energy
security and pricing concerns to a certain degree.
The United Kingdom (UK) emitted 549.3 Million tones of
Carbon Dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2011 [2] and 122.2
MtCO2e was due to the transport industry, with 74% of this
figure due to cars, taxis and buses [3]. Due to the aforemen-
tioned negative environmental impacts of emissions from
fossil fuel energy sources, this figure needs to be dramatically
reduced not only to meet government targets, but for the
health of the biosphere. The UK government set out targets to
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reduce GHG emissions in the ‘Climate Change Act’ of 2008.
The act presents the targets of an 80% reduction of green-
house gas levels by 2050, with a closer target of a 34% reduc-
tion by 2020. These two targets are based upon the level of
GHG emissions in 1990 [4]. The targets are legally bound and
thereforemust bemet, thusmany initiatives and research has
emerged to aid the UK in reaching these targets. Other coun-
tries have also pledged to tackle climate change, with the US
president stating that the US will reduce CO2 emissions 17%
from 2005 levels by 2020, 42% by 2030 and finally 83% by 2050.
Hydrogen fuel cells have the potential to mitigate the
aforementioned climate change concerns, as they are a zero-
emission energy conversion device. They use H2 and O2 to
form water, releasing heat and electrical energy. Their only
emissions are water, meaning that at the point of use, the fuel
cell has no carbon emissions associatedwith it. If the H2 fuel is
sourced from renewable means, the whole process is zero
emissions and therefore has the potential to dramatically cut
CO2 emissions in a number of industries.
Fuel cells currently suffer from reliability concerns, and are
more likely to contribute to the above issues if the current
reliability issues are overcome.
Hence, this paper analyses the reliability of a PEMFC using
in-depth techniques in order to understand how their per-
formance can be improved. The layout of the paper is as
follows:
In Section Reliability analysis, the reasons for studying
PEMFCs is given, followed by a brief description of the tech-
niques used in reliability analysis. Section Reliability analysis
describes the reliability techniques adopted here and previous
related studies on the reliability of PEMFCs. Section Proposed
FMEA describes the FMEA performed and the main conclu-
sions drawn from it. Section Proposed FT outlines the Fault
Tree (FT) developed and Section Conclusions concludes the
findings of the study.
Reliability analysis
The US Department of Energy (DoE), Japanese New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) and
European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform (HFP)
Implementation Panel (IP) have all set reliability targets for
PEMFCs in automotive application of a lifetime of more than
5000 h of operation (equivalent to around 150,000 miles oper-
ation) [5]. The current state of fuel cell development struggles
to meet these targets, and as such, an in-depth reliability
analysis of PEMFCs is invaluable to help manufacturers and
developers. Such an analysis requires obtaining a detailed
understanding of the failuremodes of all the different parts of
the cell, and the effects the failures have on the cell as awhole.
Currently, the understanding of the reliability of PEMFCs is
still in its infancy, and requires further development to help
with the commercialisation of this promising technology.
The work presented in this paper uses the techniques of
FMEA and FTA to comprehensively ascertain key failure
phenomena and analyse their role and effects within in an
automotive PEMFC system. Boundaries are set to only
consider the PEMFC itself, the balance of plant and supporting
ancillaries are omitted as shown in Fig. 1, where the
functional block diagram of a simple fuel cell automotive
system is shown. The dotted rectangle shows the boundaries
of the system considered here.
PEM FMEA
FMEA is a bottom-up approach to analysing equipment, or a
system, with relation to its failure events. That is to say that
the analysis of the system starts with the individual compo-
nents that make up the system, rather than looking at the
overall system and working top-down. The technique is a
systematic scrutiny of all of the individual ways in which a
component or piece of equipment can fail, and the effect of
that failure on the overall system's operation. Any additional
features can be added to a basic FMEA such as mitigation
strategies and poignant remarks for the reader. It is ideally
used early on in the development cycle in order to ascertain
key failure modes that can be designed out as early as
possible. It should not, however, be limited to the design stage
Fig. 1 e Boundaries of presented reliability analysis.
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of system development, but should be used throughout the
development stages as an ongoing process.
FMEA techniques were first used by the US military, and
the standard MIL-STD-1629A [6] was developed to help stan-
dardise the FMEA process. The process of performing an FMEA
includes [7].
 Breaking down the equipment/system into components or
sub-assembly blocks.
 Examining each component or block for its modes of
failure.
 Listing each mode of failure according to the effect it has
locally and on the system.
 Applying failure rates for each failure mode where quan-
tification is required.
Advantages of FMEA
FMEA is a comprehensive way to analyse all of the potential
component failure modes in a system. It is widely used in
industry as a means to identify, rank and mitigate against the
component failure modes.
Disadvantages of FMEA
The main drawback when using only FMEA for reliability
analysis, is that the technique is geared towards analysing in-
dividual component failure mode occurrences. Because these
failure modes are considered one by one, the interaction of
multiple failuremodeoccurrencesareoftennot listedusingthis
method. Additionally, this type of reliability process is not fully
quantitative. Severity and risk rankings can bemade, however
overall reliability levels cannot be deduced using FMEA.
PEM FTA
FTA is a deductive technique that can be used to classify the
instrumental relationships leading to a specific failure mode.
Whereas FMEA is a bottom-up approach, FTA is a top-down
approach and is a graphical representation of the relation-
ships between the failure modes previously identified in the
FMEA. In order to describe this approach, Fig. 2 shows an
example branch of a FT from a larger FT for a fuel cell system.
‘Pinholes’ is the top event of the branch of the FT and in-
dicates the overall undesirable event that the FT is modelling.
This top event is split by an ‘OR’ gate into the intermediate
event: ‘Pinholes due to Mechanical Stress’ and the basic event
‘Exothermal combustion due to previously formed pinholes’.
The ‘OR’ gatemeans that either of the two intermediate events
could trigger the top event. The intermediate event is then
brokendown further. ‘Pinholes due toMechanical Stress’ is fed
by another ‘OR’ gate. ‘Pinholes due tomechanical stress’ is fed
by an intermediate event ‘Swelling& ForeignParticle Presence’
and the basic event ‘Creep’. ‘Swelling & Foreign Particle Pres-
ence’ is fed by an‘AND’ gate that is in-turn fed by an interme-
diate event (‘Local mechanical stress due to increased
pressure’) and a transfer gate (‘Foreign Particle Presence’). A
transfer gate takes logic fromanother part of the overall FT and
transfers this logic in without repeating large section of the
graph. ‘Foreign Particle Presence’ itself is fed by an ‘OR’ gate
resulting from the combinational occurrence of ‘Oxide Film
Formation’, ‘Platinum Particle Presence’ transferred from
another section of the overall tree, ‘Dissolution of Metal Ions’
and ‘Contamination from Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity’.
The values for ‘eta’ (h) listed underneath the basic events is
the scale parameter for the quantification analysis using
Weibull analysis which is discussed in Section Quantification.
The values for ‘Q’ are the unrealiability of the basic event,
expressed as an number between zero and one. If Q ¼ 0, the
basic event is 100% live, and if Q ¼ 1, the basic event is
considered to be 0% live.
Basic events, such as ‘Creep’ in the above example, are
events which cannot be broken down any further and for
which basic information, such as failure rate, repair rate etc. is
available. All intermediate events can be broken down further
until reaching the basic events.
Once a full FT has been created, the Minimal Cut Sets
(MCSs) can be obtained from the tree, where a MCS is a min-
imal combination of basic events that cause the top event.
These can then be used to determine the probability or fre-
quency of the top event [7].
Advantages of FTA
Due to being a graphical representation, FTA is structured in
such a way that is easy for the reader to comprehend. The
interactions between failure modes can be easily determined
from the simple representation style. FTA can also be quan-
titatively analysed to ascertain overall system reliability.
Disadvantages of FTA
The main drawbacks of using FTA is that it cannot take into
account dependencies between failure modes. They also don't
tend to consider the cause of failuremodes, rather just tackling
the knock-on effect of the failure's occurrence. Also, a FTmust
be undertaken individually for each failure mode of interest.
The entire range of operating conditions that the system can
operate in are not considered in one tree. A tree must be made
for each operating condition to be fully accurate.
Existing reliability analysis of PEMFC systems
Fuel cell reliability
The application of reliability techniques to PEMFC systems in
the literature is limited. Rama et al. [8] adapted an FMEA
approach and presented a tabular format list of failure modes
in a PEMFC which was limited to only the area of the failure
mode, and a brief description of the failure mode itself. It did
not describe the effect of the failuremode on the system. It is a
good start to ascertaining the different failure modes attrib-
utable to a PEMFC, however it can be further developed to
provide additional information and comprehension of failure
relationships in a PEMFC.
Other work in the area includes that of Placca & Kouta [9],
who present an initial FTA of a PEMFC in no specific applica-
tion. Thework considered failuremodes and their effects for a
total of 37 individual basic events in a single cell PEMFC.
Component failure modes including; ‘Creep’, ‘Fatigue from
relative humidity and temperature cycling’ and ‘Oxide film
formation’ were considered. The overall FTA top event of
‘Degradation of the cell’ was split into three of the four
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physical components of the cell; membrane, Catalyst Layer
(CL) and Gas Diffusion Layer (GDL). The Bipolar Plate (BIP) was
omitted for undisclosed reasons.
FTs have been used in other works regarding water man-
agement in PEMFCs [10], however this work was not targeted
at PEMFC degradation, and rather singled out the contributing
factors towards water management concerns.
FTAwas used by Ref. [11] to explain failures in a solid oxide
fuel cell. It used fuzzy logic terms for the basic events for
failures, such as: ‘Decrease in stack power’ and ‘Increase in
stack power’. The authors discuss how FTA is used to: “clear
out” complex relationships between failure modes, however
one of the main stumbling blocks of FTA is that it cannot take
into account dependencies and intricate relationships.
Other reliability techniques such as Markov Modelling
(MM) [12] and Petri-Net simulation [13] have been used to
study fuel cell systems. In the study by Ref. [12] the reliability
of PEMFCs in power plant environments was considered. The
authors used the common fuel cell Nernst equation to model
fuel cell performance, then used a simple Markov Model to
plot reliability using a Weibull distribution for degradation
rates, based upon an assumed overall lifetime of 5000 h. Using
MM for fuel cell reliability would require very large models
that could show degradation in stages for each component.
Petri-Net simulation has been used by Ref. [13] tomodel the
reliability of PEMFCs using a relatively simple Petri-Net as
shown in Fig. 3.
Thework uses the Petri-Net in Fig. 3 to calculate a simulated
reliability of a single cell, stack or even fleet of fuel cell cars. It
uses a set of parameters for six of the conditions that a fuel cell
can operate in, and an associated degradation rate when in
those operating conditions. The degradation rates are taken
from literature and applied throughout the running of the
model. The authors acknowledge that the model is simplified
as regards steady state degradation instead of changing rates
determined by stack age or operational conditions.
Fig. 2 e Example branch of a Fault Tree.
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Fuel cell degradation, prognosis & simulation
Although the area of fuel cell reliability modelling is not well
covered in the literature, fuel cell degradation studies are
prominent. Countless component level experimentation and
analyses are presented in the literature body, with [5] [14], and
[15] proving to be very good review papers discussing the
range of failure modes analysed in the literature.
The vast majority of works in the literature related to
degradation are individual component experiments, or
studies of the operating condition's affect on PEMFC perfor-
mance. An example of which is presented by Ref. [16], and
looks at the lifetime prediction of a PEMFC under ‘accelerated
startup-shutdown’ cycling.
Some prognosis work using neural network modelling to
determine flooding and drying out of membranes is presented
by Ref. [17]. This work uses FTA techniques to qualitatively
understand what happens when a membrane drys or floods,
then uses said information to inform the neural network
model to simulate flooding and drying out.
Additional work by Ref. [18] used polarisation curve and
Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy (EIS) techniques to
characterise real world fuel cell degradation, then predicting
ageing time in the future through analysis of key features in
the polarisation and EIS data sets.
As the work described in this paper uses FMEA and de-
velops a FT for a PEMFC, the previous studies of [8] & [9] are
directly relevant and hence have been described in more
detail below.
Rama et al. [8] ‘Failure mode identification’
The previous work in Ref. [8] identified 22 failure modes
attributable to reduction in performance or catastrophic cell
failure. Overall degradation was divided into the electro-
chemical overpotential pathways; activation, mass transport,
ohmic and fuel efficiency losses, with catastrophic cell failure
also noted as a division of overall degradation. A list of faults is
presented that shows a cause, however no system effect for
each failure mode is given. The comprehensive list of failure
modes relating to the loss mechanisms includes all types of
PEMFC construction at the time of writing, some of which are
no longer used.
Placca & Kouta [9] FTA
FTA was recently presented by Placca & Kouta [9] in an
attempt to model the reliability of a single cell PEMFC. From
various literary sources, they came to the conclusion that
there are 37 individual basic events to be considered when
analysing the degradation of a PEMFC. The FT presented is a
physical analysis of a single cell PEMFC, splitting the top-event
of the ‘Degradation of the Cell’ down through an OR gate into
three physical components of a PEMFC; Membrane (G2), Gas
Diffusion Layer (G4) and Catalyst Layer (G3) as shown in Fig. 4.
These are three of the four main physical components of a
PEMFC with only the bipolar plate being omitted.
G2, G3 and G4 each had 12, 12 and 6 intermediate events
respectively, which further branched down through OR gates
to the basic events. As all of the gates in the presented FTwere
of the OR variety, the minimum cut sets are simply single
events, representing the basic events of the tree.
Contribution of this research
The qualitative failure identification table presented by Rama
et al. [8] has proved to be a good start in identifying the
multitude of failure modes in a PEMFC system.
The aforementioned presented quantitative FTA by Placca
& Kouta [9] has proven to be a good first step in degradation
analysis and failure forecasting. Some areas that need to be
Fig. 3 e Petri-Net Model of fuel cell/stack/fleet of cars.
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addressed have been identified in Ref. [19] & [20], in particular
critical component omission, basic event logic & structure,
ambiguity of events and lack of standardised data sets. It is
envisaged that if these issues can be addressed, the overall
degradation analysis of PEMFCs will become increasingly
more accurate.
The research contained within this paper contributes to
the reliability area by providing the first, fully comprehensive
FMEA which details the most up-to-date failure modes in a
tabular format. The FTA contains themost current and advanced
logic of failure in a PEMFC.
Proposed FMEA
PEMFC construction
Due to the range of materials and components that can be
used to create a PEMFC, the following analysis is based upon
the key assumptions of material and construction (Fig. 5);
 Standard PEMFC construction
e (PTFE) based membrane
e Carbon GDL
e Pt/C catalyst layer
e Stainless-Steel BIP
 UsingH2 fuel feedwith a purity of 99.97% as required by the
ISO standard 14687-2:2012 [21].
In the FMEA & FT the PEMFC has been considered to be
composed of the following components: membrane, GDL,
catalyst and BIP as described in the following sections.
PTFE membrane
PTFE membranes are perfluorinated polymers, with the most
commonly available being Nafion. Perfluorinated polymer
membranes are also available from Tokuyama (Neosepta-F®),
W. L. Gore and Associates, Inc. (Gore-Select®), Asahi Glass
Company (Flemion®), Asahi Chemical Industry (Asiplex®) and
Dow. Nafion has a backbone chemical structure very similar to
PTFE (Teflon®) however, where it differs is that Nafion in-
cludes sulfonic acid (SO3Hþ) functional groups. The PTFE
backbone forms the strength of the membrane, and the
SO3Hþ terminal groups provide charge sites for protonic
transport.
Carbon GDL
The GDL is made from a carbon-fibre based material that is
either formed into a paper or woven cloth type. Carbon-fibre is
used due to its high electrical conductivity and high porosity
values. Due to the materials for each method of constructing
the GDL being identical, the failure mechanisms that can be
experienced by either construction method are the same,
therefore in any reliability analysis of the PEMFC it is not
necessary to consider the construction methods separately.
Pt/C catalyst
Pt and C are mixed in an ionomer and usually ball milled to
mix into an ink. This is then either screen printed or directly
painted onto the membrane or GDL surfaces.
Stainless-steel BIP
The endplates, or BIPs are usually made from steel, and are
routed to form serpentine channels for the gas to be delivered
to the GDL component.
Operating conditions
The operating conditions for the system are considered to be
reflective of the power requirements of the New European
Drive Cycle (NEDC), used to assess the emissions of car en-
gines and fuel economy in passenger cars. The NEDC is
representative of the typical usage of a car in Europe, con-
sisting of an Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)-15 urban
drive cycle repeated four times, followed by an extra-urban
driving cycle. The product of which is shown in Fig. 6. It is
assumed that due to the power demand from the vehicle
during this cycle, a range of failure modes can occur.
Fig. 4 e ‘Global’ Fault Tree presented in Ref. [9].
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 66
Please cite this article in press as: Whiteley M, et al., Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis of Polymer Electrolyte
Membrane Fuel Cells, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2015.11.007
The fuel cell is assumed to be of an open anode configu-
ration, and therefore purging strategies need not be consid-
ered in the failure analysis. During operation in the above
context, the fuel cell can experience a range of operating
conditions that can trigger a number of failure modes. The
FMEA developed in this work details the entirety of these
based upon the current knowledge of PEMFC degradation.
New, comprehensive FMEA
The full FMEA developed contains 15 individual failure modes
(Table 1) pertaining to the four main components of a PEMFC;
Membrane, CL, GDL and BIP. The failure modes listed in bold
Fig. 5 e Components of a PEMFC [22].
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Fig. 6 e New European drive cycle.
Table 1 e List of events
Basic events e Membrane
Flooding
Ice Formation
Incorrect BIP torque
Creep
Fatigue from Relative Humidity and Temperature cycling
Oxide Film Formation
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination form Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
OH or OOH Radical attack
Previously Formed Pinholes
Excess Heat
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic events e Catalyst
Pt Loss and Distribution
Pt Migration
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination form Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution
Ice Formation
Flooding
Creep
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic events e Gas diffusion layer
OH or OOH Radical attack
Flooding
Ice Formation
Basic events e Bipolar plate
Oxide Film Formation
Corrosion leading to release of multivalent cations
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font are carried over from the work presented by Placca &
Kouta [9]. The other failure modes have been obtained from
previously published experimental results from numerous
sources, however built upon to more accurately represent up-
to-date PEMFC reliability analysis. Certain failure modes
identified in Ref. [8] were omitted from this work. Namely:
 ‘Gas leak from seals’e This is not considered as part of this
work as seal degradation has been singled out as a negli-
gible failure mode when PEMFC construction is quality
controlled, See Ref. [14]. Gasket seals that do suffer from
degradation are the liquid applied sealant types used in the
past. Modern systems use a solid type gasket that doesn't
suffer the same degradation.
 ‘BIP warping of polymer matrix’ e As the boundaries for
this work state a steel BIP, a polymer BIP failure is not
necessary.
 ‘BIP cracking’e This has been omitted as the steel plates do
not suffer from cracking, only the polymer and graphite
BIPs suffer from this.
 ‘Injection-moulded BIP low electrical conductivity’ e
Polymer material BIPs are not considered in this work
 ‘Coated stainless-steel BIP loss of surface electrical con-
ductivity’ e As above, only plain stainless steel BIPs are
considered in this work.
The four failuremodes related to the BIP are all omitted due
to thematerial considerations. The work in Ref. [8] considered
multiple construction materials for the BIP, however for the
sake of an accurate end result pertaining to a single con-
struction type PEMFC that would be manufactured with only
one type of BIP, this work only considers one construction
type BIP (stainless-steel).
Aside from the above omissions from previous studies, this
work shares some similarities with previous examples, how-
ever developments to logic and basic event definitions have
been made.
The full FMEA was constructed by considering each of the
component failure modes listed in Table 1 in detail. The ef-
fects that the failure mode has local to the component and to
the cell as a whole were identified. Any methods available to
detect the failure were listed. The FMEA also included infor-
mation on mitigation strategies and relationships between
the failure modes resulting in 14 pages. The full FMEA has not
been included here for brevity.
Although the majority of the failure modes in Table 1 are
re-designated and present the latest understanding of failure
logic, the failure modes listed in bold are new for this work.
One of the most important component failure mode iden-
tified by the authors is presented in Table 2 and explained
below. The importance is derived from the effect that the
failure mode has on the system, and it's relationship with
other failure modes and operating conditions of the fuel cell.
Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide attack in the membrane
has a complicated relationship with other components and
failure modes within a PEMFC system. The ways in which this
failure mode was analysed is through results from chemical
degradation studies [5] [23] [24]. It has been discovered that
radicals can be formed from oxygen molecules permeating
through from the cathode side of the fuel cell, to the anode
side of the fuel cell. This O2 can reduce at the anode Pt catalyst,
forming ,OOH radicals, and then lead on to H2O2 formation,
and more radical formation [5]. showed that Hydrogen and
Platinum can interact, forming radicals and ultimately,
hydrogen peroxide.
If there are foreign ions present such as Feþ2 and Cu
þ
2
released from BIP degradation, the H2O2 formed can further
develop into $OH and $OOH radicals, and at a higher rate.
Therefore the metal ions from the BIP catalyse, and severely
increased the rate of radical and peroxide degradation to the
membrane, as presented in Ref. [5].
Another mechanism for radical and peroxide attack is
presented in Ref. [25]. The authors proposed a method of
production of radicals, which occurs due to the diffusion of
gasses through the membrane, and formation of H2O2.
It is also suggested in Ref. [26] that peroxide can form by a 2
electron reduction of O2 pathway.
Due to the above, OH and OOH radical attack, and H2O2
attack were grouped into one basic events; ‘OH and OOH
radicals & H2O2 contamination to PTFE’, which represents the
formation under normal conditions, and H2O2 created from 2
electron reduction of O2 on Pt.
The way in which radicals and peroxide degrade the
membrane, is through end-group unzipping, as stated in the
local effect column of the FMEA entry (Table 2). The PTFE
backbone of the membrane is modified with end-groups or
side chains of perfluorosulfonic acid ionomers which help
facilitate the fuel cell reaction. These are attacked and ‘unzip’
from the PTFE core, releasing fluorine into the exhaust water.
All the entries in Table 2 are explained below.
Column:
1. Identifies the component of the PEMFC where the given
failure mode is experienced. In this instance, ‘OH and
OOH radicals & H2O2 contamination to PTFE’ affects the
membrane, and as such the Polymer Electrolyte Mem-
brane component is listed.
2. Gives a brief description of the component and its
function within the PEMFC. The Polymer Electrolyte
Membrane component of a PEMFC is the central part of
the cell which forms the electrolyte, and serves to block
the passage of reactant gasses and electrons released
during the reaction, however allows the passage of
hydrogen protons from the anode side, to cathode.
3. Contains the identification number and description of
the failure mode to affect the PEMFC. The number 1.0 is
in relation to the Polymer Electrolyte Membrane, listed
in column one. The number/2.1 identifies the second
failure mode listed of that section, in it's own sub-
section. Therefore failure modes 1.0/2.1 and 1.0/2.2 are
both primarily related to mechanical degradation.
4. Contains information pertaining to the local effect of
the failure mode, as explained earlier.
5. Lists how this local effect affects the system overall. For
this example if the membrane is weakened, there is an
increased risk of mechanical damage to the membrane
and an overall reduction in the performance of the
stack/cell. This can be observed in a polarisation curve
from a linear drop in the centre section of the curve.
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 68
Please cite this article in press as: Whiteley M, et al., Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis of Polymer Electrolyte
Membrane Fuel Cells, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2015.11.007
6. Lists the potential methods to detect this failure mode's
affect on the system. For this example, a polarisation
curve would show a drop, as the failure mode is
affecting the system. Linear sweep voltammetry could
potentially identify this failure mode as it is most
commonly used to identify gas crossover. The rate of
gas crossoverwould changewithmechanical damage of
the membrane through radical attack.
7. Lists any potential mitigation strategies to reduce the
likelihood of occurrence, or the severity of the effect. For
this example, preconditioning the membrane with a
modified PTFE compositing to include in-situ solegel
polymerization of titanium isopropoxide to generate
titania quasinetworks in the polar domains of the
membrane [27].
8. Contains any pertinent remarks that would either help
the reader to understand the entire row, or any factors
to consider regarding the failure mode.
9. Lists any relationships that this failure mode may have
with other aspects of the FMEA. For this example, The
resistance of themembrane relating to proton exchange
is affected through membrane thinning. Additionally,
H2O2 formation is increased through an increase in gas
crossover, and of course, mechanical degradation is
facilitated.
10. Finally, the source of the data is noted for ease of
referencing the experimentation that tested the failure
mode. The references for this example are from a re-
view book [27].
The FMEA showed that there are many failure modes in a
PEMFC that are not completely understood. The work now
provides the first fully comprehensive FMEA using the latest
information to understand more failure modes than ever
before. Relationships are considered which prove to be
invaluable in linking failure modes which is of paramount
importance in PEMFC science.
Proposed FT
Following investigation into the operation of the PEMFC and
the FMEA analysis carried out to understand the effect of the
component failure modes described above, a FT was con-
structed to consider the event ‘<5000 h cell lifetime with >5%
drop of output voltage’. 15 basic events were found relating to
this top event, and for which data is available for a quantita-
tive analysis.
The structure of the FT presented by Ref. [9] was modified
to more accurately represent an up-to-date analysis of
PEMFC degradation. The top event in Fig. 4 was modified to
be less ambiguous, BIP degradation was added to the ‘global
tree’ (see Fig. 7), and the interactions between basic event
failure logic were vastly modified. The level 2 intermediate
events are also presented in Fig. 7, Catalyst Layer Degrada-
tion, Membrane Degradation, Gas Diffusion Layer Degrada-
tion and Bipolar Plate Degradation. All intermediate events
lead to a 5% drop in voltage corresponding with the top
event. The Bipolar plate omission by Ref. [9], has been
addressed with the addition of a fourth level 2 intermediate
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event; ‘Bipolar Plate Degradation’. The basic events feeding
this intermediate event are; ‘Oxide film Formation’ and
‘Dissolution of metal ions’, both of which cause the plate to
degrade. Cho et al. [28] showed that the corrosion of the
metal bipolar plates for stainless steel releases metallic ele-
ments such as Fe, Ni, Cr and Ti. The dissolution of these
metals into the Membrane Electrode Assembly (MEA) can
increase the ohmic resistance and the charge transfer resis-
tance by taking up space on the active sites of the catalyst.
Wu et al. [15] discuss the degradation mechanisms of bipolar
plate materials in a PEMFC, paying attention to the formation
of an oxide film on the plate. A large concern with bipolar
plates, is the contact resistance between the BIP and the GDL,
attributed to the resistance caused by the formation of the
oxide film. Due to the aforementioned factors observed in
Refs. [28] and [15], these two factors are included in the
presented FT as shown in Fig. 7.
All of the intermediate events shown in Fig. 7 are expanded
out until they only contain basic events. For example;
The membrane degradation branch of the global FT is
further split down into the three main pathways of degrada-
tion in the membrane; ‘Mechanical Degradation’, ‘Chemical
Degradation’ and ‘Thermal Degradation’, with themechanical
section being presented in Fig. 8 for brevity.
The intermediate events of the sub-branch shown in Fig. 8
include; ‘Local mechanical stress due to increased pressure’,
‘Microcrack Fracture’ and ‘Pinholes’. Any localised mechani-
cal stress is caused by swelling inside the cell, and as such the
swelling relationships detailed under the event ‘Local me-
chanical stress due to increased pressure’ are repeated in the
‘Microcrack Fracture’ branch as shownby the transfer symbol.
Microcrack fractures can be considered to be anything that
results in a physical breach of the membrane, and is segre-
gated from pinholes due to geometry. Microcracks can be
considered to be tears, whereas pinholes are circular holes.
These are not grouped under one mechanical breach inter-
mediate event due to the varying conditions and events
leading to each phenomena. The Pinholes section describes
the basic events and combinations of events leading to the
formation of pinholes on the membrane material. The two
main pathways described are from either mechanical stress
(such as punctures from foreign bodies) and a branch trans-
ferred in via the transfer gate (denoted by a triangle) labelled
‘COMB0 in Fig. 8 from the chemical degradation segment of the
membrane FT. The branches ‘Chemical Degradation’ and
‘Thermal Degradation’ of the membrane were developed in a
similar way.
Fault Tree summary
The FT was split into branches representing the physical
components of a PEMFC; membrane, CL, GDL and BIP. These
were further broken down depending upon the categorisation
of the failure phenomena. The FT was drawn based upon in-
formation from the FMEA completely previously.
The membrane is a single component which can experi-
ence failures from mechanical, thermal or chemical degra-
dation mechanisms. Therefore this section was split into the
three degradation mechanisms.
The GDL has a single component construction, however
there are two GDL layers in a PEMFC and as such, this segment
was split into anode side and cathode side degradation
Fig. 7 e Proposed change to ‘Gobal’ Tree.
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mechanisms. Mechanical compression was also included
which would affect both sides of the GDL. The BIP is a very
simple segment with only few failuremechanisms that do not
need to be further split down into sub-categories. The CL is
split into its constituent carbon support, ionomer and Plat-
inum particle construction materials. These three intermedi-
ate events then branch down into the basic events and
intermediate events leading to the degradation of the
component materials for the CL.
In terms of the full tree, there are 37 indistinct intermediate
events. The majority of basic events input into OR gates as
each basic event can lead to the overall top event individually,
leaving only two AND gates in the membrane section. Simi-
larly to the work in Ref. [9], the MCS for the overall FT are just
single basic events. Due to the complicated nature of the in-
teractions of basic events, and the gradual degradation of
components in a PEMFC, individual component failure modes
can cause the top event in the presented FT.
Quantification
Quantification of the FT was undertaken to gain an under-
standing of the expected failure occurrence during operating
life. Degradation rates were sought from the literature where
available, with any gaps in the data filled by expert evaluation
as in Table 3. For example, where available, previously pub-
lished experimental studies were analysed and the degrada-
tion rate presented due to an adverse operating condition was
used in this work as the rate associated with the same basic
event occurring. For example [29] found that when flooding
occurred, a degradation in voltage equal to 0.39 V h1 was
observed. Therefore this rate was used to correspond to the
failure mode of “flooding”.
In their experimentation, the flow rate of cathode supply
feed was decreased to induce flooding effects in the cell, and
produced the results presented in Fig. 9. Two testes were
conducted, and for integrity of results, both test were
considered and averaged for the overall voltage drop due to
cell flooding of 0.39 V h1.
Table 3 shows the basic event codes for each correspond-
ing basic event description. This code will be used in later
tables for brevity and formatting limitations.
As in Ref. [9], for each basic event listed in Table 3, m(t) is
assumed to follow a Weibull distribution, where m(t) ¼ 1/l(t)
and l(t) is the degradation rate. The probability density func-
tion F(t) is given by Equation (1).
FðtÞ ¼ b
hd

t g
hd
b1
e


tg
hd
b
(1)
Where b is the shape parameter or Weibull slope, hd is the
scale parameter or characteristic lifetime, and g is the location
parameter. The shape parameter is equal to the slope of the
line in a probability plot.
The scale parameter can be determined from:
hd ¼
mðtÞ
G

1þ 1
b
 (2)
Where:
GðhÞ ¼
Z∞
0
xh1exdx (3)
The location parameter, g, is left at 0 for this study, as it is
assumed that all degradation starts at the beginning of life for
the cell.
Table 3 e List of degradation parameters used.
ID Failure mode parameter Value (Vh1) Ref
BE01 Flooding 0.39 [29]
BE02 Ice Formation 0.5 Proposed
BE03 Incorrect BIP torque 103 Proposed
BE04 Creep 105 Proposed
BE05 Fatigue from Relative
Humidity Cycling
1.2 104 [30]
BE06 Oxide film formation 3.125 105 [31]
BE07 Dissolution of metal ions 3.125 105 [31]
BE08 Contamination from
Humidifier..
4.37 103 [32]
BE09 Exothermal Combustion
due to..
1.3 102 [33]
BE10 Previously Formed Pinholes 1.3 103 [33]
BE11 OH or OOH Radical Attack 1.3 103 [33]
BE12 Excess Heat 0.25 [29]
BE13 Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution 2.5 102 [34]
BE14 Pt Loss & Distribution 2.5 102 [34]
BE15 Pt Migration 2.5 102 [34]
Fig. 9 e PEMFC Membrane flooding degradation test [29].
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It was shown in Ref. [35] that if mðtÞ follows a Weibull dis-
tribution with parameters b & hd then times to failure (T) will
also follow a Weibull distribution with parameters b and
h ¼ Dfhd. Where Df is the degradation level at which failure
occurs. In the analysis performed here, failure is assumed to
occur when there is a 5% drop in voltage. Therefore
Df ¼ 0:05Vin where Vin is the initial voltage of the cell. Vin is
assumed to be 1 V for this work.
Using the parameters h and b for T in the Fault Tree, en-
ables the probability of the top event to be determined.
Each parameter calculated for each basic event is listed in
Table 4, and shows the degradation rate, multiplicative in-
verse, scale parameter for m(t), scale parameter for T, gamma
function, and the shape parameter.
Results
Theminimal cut sets for the FT developed are in fact the basic
events themselves due to the fact that the vast majority of the
logic gates are of ‘OR’ gates. This means that the basic event
with the highest likelihood of failure will trigger the top event
first under every iteration of the model. A plot of the un-
availability of the cell over time is shown in Fig. 10.
As can be seen, the unavailability of the fuel cell e when
the cell is considered failed e is after around 30 min hours.
This is a very low lifetime for a fuel cell, and is solely due to the
highest degradation rate interacting with the logic of the FT.
BE02 - Ice Formation, has a degradation rate of 0.5 Vh1 as
operating a fuel cell in sub-zero temperatures has severe ef-
fects on the materials of the fuel cell and even the blockage of
Table 4 e Table of Weibull distribution data used.
ID Deg. rate Mu (t) Scale parameter for m(t) Scale parameter for T Gamma function Shape characteristic
l(t) m(t) hd h G(a) b
BE01 0.39 2.56 2.56 0.13 1 1
BE02 0.5 2 2 0.1 1 1
BE03 103 100 88.26 4.41 1.13 0.8
BE04 105 10,000 11283.79 564.19 0.89 2
BE05 1.2  104 8333.33 9403.16 470.16 0.89 2
BE06 3.125 105 32,000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE07 3.125 105 32,000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE08 4.37 103 228.83 258.21 12.91 0.89 2
BE09 1.3 102 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE10 1.3 102 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE11 1.3 102 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE12 0.25 4 4 0.2 1 1
BE13 2.5 102 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE14 2.5 102 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE15 2.5 102 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
Fig. 10 e Unavailability of cell over time.
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feed gasses to the reactant sites, however the probability of
this occurring depends on operating conditions.
If high degradation failure modes such as BE12, BE02 and
BE01 are removed, we see the unavailability increase to
around 3 h of operation (Fig. 11), which is consistent with a
failure due to the next highest degradation rate. This shows
that the failure mode with the lowest h and corresponding b
will be the failure mode to trigger the top event soonest.
BE01, BE02 and BE12 are failure modes that shouldn't occur
under normal operating conditions, however they can be
triggered by the occurrence of alternative failure modes. If
pinholes occur during normal operation, they can trigger the
exothermal combustion of the feed gasses, which leads to
excess heat. The FTA approach does not consider these knock
on failure occurrences, and is an additional pitfall to using this
technique for a highly accurate degradation model.
Also, in order to understand the degradation experienced
under all possible operating conditions, a FT would need to be
analysed for each condition, which can be considered to be
infeasible. Alternative methods to understand degradation in
fuel cells is needed to overcome this shortfall.
Conclusions
This work has re-evaluated FT logic determined in the earlier
work, including the addition of previously omitted failure
modes. The new FT layout developed here is a more logical
progression of the failure modes in a PEMFC than shown
previously, and as such is a step forward in the reliability
analysis of PEMFC. Up to date validity of the causes of degra-
dation in a PEMFC have also been shown, enhancing the un-
derstanding of reliability issues in PEMFCs.
The presented FMEA and FTA work provides an under-
standing of failure logic in a PEMFC which can be used by
developers and manufacturers of PEMFC systems, to identify
key areas of improvement in the area. The FMEA provides a
detailed, systematic breakdown of each failure mode that a
PEMFC can experience, and the failure modes' effect on the
system, and other components. To date, this FMEA is the only
comprehensive, up-to-date listing of failure modes that a
PEMFC can experience, to this level of detail.
The presented FTA goes on from the FMEA to graphically
show the logical interactions between failuremode areas. The
FTA has highlighted where each failure mode stems from,
with reference to each physical component of a PEMFC.
Although the FTA presented is a step forward in the qualita-
tive reliability understanding of PEMFCs, the work has un-
covered the fact that relationships and dependencies between
failure modes exist that make a quantifiable reliability anal-
ysis not totally accurate when using FTA methods. De-
pendencies have been found to exist between failure modes
which would discount FTA for a quantitative analysis of a
PEMFC. Specifically, any failure due to pinholes was high-
lighted as an area where loops occur, and basic events are
intrinsically linked through dependent relationships. As pin-
holes can be caused by the crossover of gas, which increases
the rate of gas crossover, which in turn increases pinhole
production. Additionally, due to the minimal cut sets being
each individual failure mode, the failure mode with the
shortest h is the failure mode that will inevitably cause the
occurrence of the top event first. The presented FTA considers
all possible failure modes in a fuel cell, and as such contains
failure modes that are not normally observed in ideal oper-
ating conditions. A FT would need to be developed for each
operating condition for every time-step for it to be completely
accurate, which is infeasible due to scale.
Hence, although FTA can be seen as a tool to gain a greater
understanding of how failure occurs in a PEMFC, and what
basic events lead on to in a cell, it has limited use in reliability
Fig. 11 e Unavailability.
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assessment as no useful quantification can be made. If a true
understanding of the probability or frequency of failure is
required, a different approach must be adopted.
Markov modelling and Petri-Net simulation can take into
account dependencies between failure modes and could
therefore be exploited in a PEMFC study. However, as dis-
cussed in Section Reliability analysis, Markov Modelling is not
suitable for detailed component failure modelling dues to the
sheer amount of states that would be required for each of the
many components in the system. As such, future work will
entail development of a Petri-Net model that can take into
account dependencies between failure modes and deal with
the inherent issues with using FTA for quantitative analysis of
PEMFCs.
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